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Abstract 
 
Ruapehu is an active volcano located on the North Island of New Zealand, with the most 
recent major eruptions occurring in 1945, 1969, 1975, and 1995/96. Ruapehu is also home to 
the three major North Island ski areas, Whakapapa, Turoa, and Tukino. Because of the high 
frequency of eruptions, there is a significant volcanic hazard at the ski areas particularly from 
lahars which can form even after minor eruptions. Most recently, lahars have affected 
Whakapapa ski area in 1969, 1975, and 1995/96. The most significant risk at Turoa is from 
ballistic bombs due to the proximity of the top two T-Bars to the crater. Ash fall has also 
caused disruption at the ski areas, covering the snow and causing damage to structures. There 
is yet to be a death at the ski areas from a volcanic event; however the risk at the ski areas is 
too high to be completely ignored.  
 
The ski areas at Whakapapa and Turoa are currently operated by Ruapehu Alpine Lifts 
(RAL), who have been significantly improving their commitment to providing volcanic 
hazard training for their staff and preparing for handling a volcanic eruption. RAL is joined 
by the Institute of Geological Sciences (GNS) and the Department of Conservation (DoC) in 
trying to mitigate this risk through  a range of initiatives, including an automated Eruption 
Detection System (EDS), linked to sirens and loudspeakers on Whakapapa ski areas, as well 
as by providing staff training and public education.  
 
The aim of this study was to provide RAL with recommendations to improve their staff 
training and warning system response. Staff induction week at both Turoa and Whakapapa ski 
areas was observed. Surveys were distributed and collected from staff at both ski areas, and 
interviews were conducted with staff at Whakapapa ski area. Data obtained from staff 
interviews and surveys provided the author with insight into staff’s mental models regarding a 
volcanic event response. A simulation of the warning system was observed, as well as a blind 
test, to collect data on the effectiveness of training on staff response. 
 
Results indicated permanent and seasonal staff were knowledgeable of the volcanic hazards 
that may affect the ski areas, but had differing perspectives on the risk associated with those 
hazards. They were found to be confident in the initial response to a volcanic event (i.e. move 
to higher ground), but were unsure of what would happen after this initial response. RAL was 
also found to have greatly improved their volcanic hazard training in the past year, however 
further recommendations were suggested to increase training effectiveness. A training needs 
analysis was done for different departments at the ski areas by taking a new approach of 
anticipating demands staff may encounter during a volcanic event and complementing these 
demands with existing staff competencies. Additional recommendations were made to assist 
RAL in developing an effective plan to use when responding to volcanic events, as well as 
other changes that could be made to improve the likelihood of customer safety at the ski areas 
during an eruption.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Introduction 
Ruapehu is an active andesitic cone volcano, situated at the south end of the Taupo Volcanic 
Zone, North Island, New Zealand (Wilson et al., 1995), and represents a significant volcanic 
hazard due to the regular use of areas on and surrounding the volcano by tens of thousands of 
people. Most recent eruptions occurred in 1969, 1975, 1995, and 1996. Ruapehu contains a 
crater lake, which modifies eruptive behaviour with the chance of dangerous mudflows and 
lahars forming after even minor eruptions (Wilson et al., 1995). An eruption in 1945 at 
Ruapehu was the largest in New Zealand in the century (Neall et al., 1995), and more than 60 
lahars (volcanic mudflows) have occurred on Ruapehu since 1860 (Geonet, 2002). 
 
Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas are situated on the upper slopes of Ruapehu and in excess of 
20,000 skiers use these two areas on some days. Chairlifts and tows carry skiers within two 
kilometres of the summit crater, and during the 1995 eruption lahars entered the Whakapapa 
ski area 90 seconds after the initial eruption (Nairn et al., 1996). No one was injured as the ski 
area was closed but extensive damage was done to all three ski areas on Ruapehu (Johnston et 
al., 2000). A range of volcanic hazards still pose significant risk to skiers in both areas, such 
as a potential hydrovolcanic eruption or the possible formation of a lahar (Neall et al., 1995). 
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The Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences (GNS), the ski resort company (Ruapehu 
Alpine Lifts, RAL), and the Department of Conservation (DoC) have developed a range of 
initiatives to mitigate this risk, such as an automated electronic Eruption Detection System 
(EDS), telemetered lahar warning system including sirens and loud-speaker message, staff 
training, and public education. The EDS uses seismometers to measure volcanic tremor and 
air pressure sensors to detect sound waves given off by material ejected from the crater 
(Geonet, 2002). This project has been ongoing for the last 5 years at Whakapapa ski area and 
was expanded to Turoa in 2004.  
 
The issue of managing the eruption response at Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas is very 
complex for several reasons. One is that eruptions on Ruapehu occur frequently and 
sometimes without warning. Another is that whether the eruption will actually affect the ski 
areas depends on many factors, such as the type of eruption and wind direction. Also, the 
majority of people on the mountain are visitors with differing levels of knowledge about the 
risk and how to respond to it. Most hazard preparedness research focuses on residents of a 
particular community, which made finding relevant literature for this study difficult. The 
transient nature of those at risk places even greater demands on staff at the ski areas to inform 
visitors and to guide their response in the event of a volcanic crisis. Adding complexity to the 
issue is that the ski area is already a high risk workplace, with many other hazards for staff to 
worry about every day (i.e. avalanches and blizzards). Also, the nature of the response 
demands fall outside the normal job demands of most staff. The stress associated with this 
adds to the challenge, and highlights a need for training.  
 
Therefore, it is imperative that lahar risk management planning involves complementing 
existing staff competencies with those required to facilitate effective response and recovery 
following a volcanic crisis. This has called for a new approach to training needs analysis that 
occurs by anticipating the demands that staff may encounter (Paton and Flin, 1999). In order 
to identify gaps between routine competencies and those required to deal with a volcanic 
crisis, the current research project at Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas involved observing staff 
training at both areas, analyzing survey results from seasonal staff and conducting semi-
structured interviews with both permanent and seasonal staff at Whakapapa ski area, as well 
as observing two tests of the warning system. 
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1.2 Objectives 
The following objectives were developed at the beginning of this research project: 
Objective 1: To examine staff understanding of the risks of volcanic hazards affecting  
the ski areas. 
 
Objective 2: To examine staff knowledge of procedures for the response to a  
volcanic event, particularly the evacuation stage (Stage 2). 
 
Objective 3: A practical system consisting of effective training session and  
simulations can be designed to mitigate the risk. 
 
Objective 4: A realistic volcanic hazard response plan can be developed for the  
ski area using a CIMS structure. 
 
To meet these objectives, the research strategy was as follows: 
• Review international literature on staff training, effective response to warning 
systems, simulation exercises, human response to emergencies, and hazard mitigation,  
• Determine staff knowledge of the volcanic hazards, warning system, and training, 
• Observe a simulation of the warning system, and 
• Observe staff reactions in a ‘blind’ test of the warning system to determine training 
knowledge retention. 
• Use interviews and surveys to determine staff knowledge of ski area evacuation 
procedures during a volcanic event 
• Determine the existence and effectiveness of an eruption response plan, 
• Evaluate the effectiveness of current staff training from outputs of above objectives 
and critical analysis using human psychology theories, 
• Evaluate staff training needs for Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas, and  
• Provide recommendations on how to improve lahar hazard training at Whakapapa and 
Turoa ski areas to maximize effective response to the warning system.  
 
Several methods were used to fulfil these objectives and are detailed in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis. They include: 
• Literature review 
• Observation of ski area staff training 
• Surveys of ski area staff 
• Interviews with ski area staff 
• Observation of a simulation exercise 
• Observation of a blind test of the warning system 
 
Grounded theory methodology was used to build theory from the data that was collected. 
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1.3 Outline of Thesis 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief synopsis of the issues RAL faces on Ruapehu in regards to 
volcanic hazards, as well as measures which are being taken to mitigate the risk. It also covers 
the hypotheses and objectives of the research and a brief summary of the methodology.  
 
2. Background Information on Ruapehu 
Chapter 2 briefly summarizes the geology of Ruapehu, and the recent eruptive history. The 
Crater Lake tephra barrier failure issue is also discussed.  
 
3. Background Information on Skiing at Ruapehu 
This chapter summarizes the history of skiing on Ruapehu, the formation of the company 
Ruapehu Alpine Lifts (RAL), and the constraints under which it operates. Potential volcanic 
hazards and the impacts of past events on the ski area discussed, and the Eruption Detection 
System (EDS) is introduced.  
 
4. Past research on staff training at the ski areas and Eruption Response Plans 
This chapter summarizes past research at Whakapapa ski area, and the volcanic hazard public 
education campaign. CIMS is introduced, as well as the eruption response plans of both DoC 
and RAL.  
 
5. Methodology 
In this chapter, the methodology of this research project is detailed and discussed. The 
Grounded Theory Method is then introduced and explained, including the selection of themes, 
and the reliability and validity of the data.  
 
6. Results and Initial Discussion 
Results from the research study are presented here, including staff training observation, 
survey data, interview data, and warning system test observations.    
 
7. Further Discussion and Recommendations 
The implications of the results are further discussed in this chapter, and recommendations are 
made to the ski areas to improve staff training and response effectiveness. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In the final chapter, the main results and conclusions from the research project are 
summarized 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Background Information on 
Ruapehu 
 
This chapter briefly summarizes the geology of Ruapehu and the recent eruptive history. Covered 
in detail are the risk to life of an eruption at Ruapehu, past disasters during a volcanic eruption 
including the Tangiwai disaster, the possibility of renewed volcanism and types of events that may 
occur, and hazard zones on Ruapehu in regards to differing frequency events. The Crater Lake 
tephra barrier failure is also discussed, with emphasis on the lack of likelihood of such an event 
affecting the ski area. 
 
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON RUAPEHU 
2.1 Geology of Ruapehu 
Ruapehu is an active, andesitic stratovolcano located on the North Island of New Zealand at the 
south end of the Taupo Volcanic Zone. It lies in Tongariro National Park (Figure 2.1) south of 
Ngauruhoe and Tongariro. Ngauruhoe is the youngest (<2.5 ka) and most active cone vent of 
Tongariro, last erupting in 1975 (Wilson et al., 1995). Volcanism in this area is due to rapid 
extension and the oblique subduction of the Pacific Plate beneath the Australian plate, specifically 
along the Hikurangi margin (Hurst and McGinty, 1999). It is believed that Ruapehu has been in 
existence for 0.5 million years, however the oldest dated lavas are 230,000 years old. It has been 
built up and partly destroyed occasionally during its existence by both sector collapse and glacial 
erosion, with glacial erosion occurring to the present day (Wilson et al., 1995). It is the highest 
mountain on the North Island of New Zealand at its current height of 2797 metres. Present-day  
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Ruapehu was created in four cone-building episodes. Holocene eruptions occurred along a 25 
kilometre long lineament, which extends from the modern vent northeast to the Tongariro volcano 
(Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.1 Location of Tongariro National Park 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Holocene eruption vents at Ruapehu  
(modified from Houghton et al., 1987) 
 
These eruptions have taken place from 
two summit and four flank vents. There 
is little evidence on Ruapehu of past 
volcanism, due to the rapid erosion of the 
rock record from the steep flanks of the 
volcano (Hackett and Houghton, 1989 ), 
as well as cone collapse and glacial 
erosion (Wilson et al., 1995). A more 
complete record is found in the ring plain 
surrounding Ruapehu. Stratigraphy here 
implies that in the late Pleistocene-
Holocene (post 22,600 years B.P.) 
volcanic events at Ruapehu were 
dominated by small volume tephra 
eruptions and lahars, while debris 
avalanches and pyroclastic flows were 
rare (Donoghue et al., 1999). Activity at 
Ruapehu has included Strombolian 
explosive eruptions, eruptions of aa lava, 
eruptions of block lava areas, one 
(possibly two) sub-plinian eruptions, a 
debris avalanche caused by minor cone 
collapse on the north-western flank of the 
volcano, and creation of two large lahars 
(dated at approximately 407 and 756 
years B.P.) which extended up to 160 
kilometres from the volcano (Houghton 
et al., 1987).  
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2.2 Recent Eruptive History of Ruapehu 
2.2.1 Risk to Life 
 
In terms of probability, a volcanic event at Ruapehu (particularly the formation of Whakapapa 
lahars) poses the greatest risk to human life than any other volcano in New Zealand (Houghton et 
al., 1987). Neall et al. (1995) suggest four reasons why Ruapehu is such a threat.  
1. Ruapehu is an active volcano, periodically erupting with both major and minor events. 
Major events have included the formation of substantial lahars that would certainly have 
caused loss of lives if they had occurred during the day.  
2. The presence of a crater lake makes Ruapehu more dangerous. The Crater Lake, at 2,540 
metres elevation, contains 7 million m3 of acidic water which can rush down surrounding 
valleys. This lake has the potential to turn even minor eruptions into dangerous events due 
to the formation of lahars, which sweep down drainage outlets on the mountain (Wilson et 
al., 1995).  In fact, Ruapehu is the only volcano known to produce lahars by depositing 
water from a crater lake onto surrounding snow/ice (Otway et al., 1995).  
3. Ruapehu has a volcanic activity history extending back 240,000 years, making it likely that 
the volcano will keep erupting periodically in the future as it has done in the past. 
4. Ruapehu has become a major tourist destination, especially for skiing at Whakapapa, 
Turoa, and Tukino ski resorts, and is located close to several major highways, railways, air, 
and electricity routes. An eruption would likely cause disruption to these services.  
 
Both phreatomagmatic and magmatic eruptions have occurred at Ruapehu in the historical record. 
Phreatomagmatic eruptions have been the most common, occurring when andesitic magma is 
injected into the Crater Lake. The difference in heat between the hot magmatic gases, hot rock and 
fragmenting magma, and the colder water generate violent steam explosions which eject water out 
of the lake and into the crater basin and surrounding areas (Otway et al., 1995). When these 
deposits fall outside of the crater basin at Ruapehu, they continue down-slope, incorporating snow, 
ice, and sediments to become a lahar (Houghton et al., 1987). The most recent eruptions at 
Ruapehu in 1995/96 were sustained phreatomagmatic/magmatic eruptions, with a total duration of 
20 weeks (Johnston et al., 2000). Magmatic events have also occurred at Ruapehu, however only 
two magmatic events have occurred during historical record keeping, in 1861 and 1945. The 
eruptive sequence during these magmatic events consisted of dome building (from magma 
extrusion) and explosive eruptions. The principal hazard during these events is ash fall, which is  
spread over a large area (Houghton et al., 1987). The total duration of the 1945 magmatic eruption 
at Ruapehu was 40 weeks (Johnston et al., 2000). 
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Ruapehu eruptions are very unpredictable as to the time of day and season an eruption will occur 
in, as well as whether the volcano will produce warning signs before a major event (Table 2.1). By 
looking at the four main historical eruptions at Ruapehu documented by Otway et al. (1995), it is 
clear to see that no pattern emerges as to the time of day or the season the main event occurs in. In 
1969, the main event occurred just after midnight, whereas in 1995, the main event occurred 
around 5pm in the afternoon. The 4 eruptions have also occurred in each of the 4 different seasons, 
with 1945 beginning in the summer, 1969 beginning in the winter, 1975 beginning in the fall, and 
1995 beginning in the late winter/early spring. Warning signs preceded the main 1995 eruption for 
several months, however the magnitude of the eruption on September 23rd was unexpected. It is 
relatively unknown whether warning signs preceded the 1945, 1969, and 1975 eruptions, however 
both the 1969 and 1975 eruptions were preceded by earthquakes up to half an hour before the main 
event. It is generally thought that Ruapehu eruptions occur in bad weather (Department of 
Conservation, 1996) as was the case with the 1975 eruption, where the initial event was not 
observed due to bad weather. However, the major eruptions of 1945, 1969, and 1995 were all 
observed, with the 1995 eruption occurring in the late afternoon of a fine day.  
 
Event Style of Eruption Time of Day of 
Major Beginning 
Event 
Beginning of event -
Date/season 
Warning Signs of 
impending event 
1945 Magmatic Unknown Thursday, March 8/  
Summer 
Dome growth 
1969 Phreatomagmatic Night (0033h) Sunday, June 22/  
Winter 
Earthquakes 
beginning at 0004h. 
1975 Phreatomagmatic Early morning 
(0359h) 
Thursday, April 24/  
Fall 
Increase in seismic 
activity at 0350h. 
1995/96 Phreatomagmatic Late afternoon 
(1700h) 
Saturday, September 23/ 
Early Spring 
Seismic swarms, 
fluctuations in Crater 
Lake temperature and 
chemistry for several 
months before main 
eruption. 
 
Table 2.1 Time of day and season of main historical Ruapehu eruptions  
(compiled from Otway, 1995) 
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2.2.2 Disasters at Ruapehu 
 
Lahars or other dangerous volcanic hazards may occur without an eruption on Ruapehu. The most 
famous example is the December 24th, 1953 Tangiwai disaster. Healy (1954) described how the 
lahar was created when a temporary ash/ice barrier formed by the 1945 eruption at the Crater Lake 
collapsed, spilling water into the Whangaehu drainage basin. This lahar swept down the valley, 
destroying the Tangiwai railway bridge, subsequently derailing the Wellington-Auckland express 
train and causing the loss of 151 lives (Houghton et al., 1987). Another event occurred on April 
26th, 1968, when it is believed intrusion of lava caused spillover of the Crater Lake, forming a lahar 
which flowed down the Whangaehu valley (Houghton et al., 1987). A simple solution to prevent 
these events would be to drain the Crater Lake or construct alternate lahar passage-ways, which 
have been proposed by numerous authors (Houghton et al., 1987; Otway et al., 1995; Department 
of Conservation, 1996). However, it has been decided that engineering mitigation is not possible 
See Section 2.4 for a more detailed discussion.  
 
Ruapehu has been very active in historical times. Major eruptions include 1861, 1889, 1895, 1903, 
1907, 1925, 1945-1946, 1966, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1975, 1977, 1988, and 1995-1996 (Otway et al., 
1995). Smaller eruptions occurred in 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981-1982, 1985, and 1987. All of these 
events have occurred at the western summit crater, which has been occupied by the Crater Lake 
(0.16 km2). Major lahars, either destructive or having the potential to be destructive, were formed 
during the eruptions in 1969, 1971, 1975, and 1977 eruptions (Houghton et al., 1987), and more 
recently the 1995 eruption of Ruapehu. The frequency of lahar producing events stresses the 
importance for the ski areas to be prepared to handle a volcanic crisis, as they can occur often and 
with little warning and have the potential to cause disasters. The ski areas must also be flexible in 
how they plan to respond, as each volcanic event is unique. See Table 2.2 for a complete 
description of historical eruptions at Ruapehu. 
 
 
Table 2.2 A complete description of historical eruptions at Ruapehu (compiled from Otway, 1995; Dept. of Conservation, 1996; Nairn, 1996) 
 
Date Event 
Lahar 
generated 
Catchments 
affected 
Estimated total 
volume (m3) Lahar notes Hazards Associated 
Ski areas 
affected? 
13-Feb-1861 likely non-eruption related lahar ; Whangaehu 6 000 000 Likely the largest historical Ruapehu lahar   
16-May-1861      phreatomagmatic eruption :  
1-May-1889    Phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu 100 000 River rose ~1m in a few minutes   
Whangaehu 2 000 000 Observed 
Whakapapanui/   
Whakapapaiti  
Likely but no supporting 
evidence 10-Mar-1895  
  
  phreatomagmatic eruption ; 
Mangaturuturu Likely but no supporting evidence 
Whangaehu   100 000 Observed
1903  Phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whakapapanui/ 
Whakapapaiti  Possible, none observed 
Eruption cloud directed 
over Whakapapa area  
15-Apr-07     phreatomagmatic eruption : 
Ash and mud covered 
mountain, large 
rock/snow slip on Turoa 
side 
 
22-Jan-25 No eruption seen ; Whangaehu    100 000 River rose 3m, eroded bridge piles 
3-Feb-25      phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu 100 000 similar magnitude to Jan 1925 lahar 
March 1945 to 
December 1946 
Combination of 
phreatomagmatic and 
magmatic eruptions 
:      Ash fall ; 
24-Dec-53 likely non-eruption related lahar ; Whangaehu 1 650 000 
Lahar washed out 
Whangaehu rail bridge, led 
to Tangiwai Rail Disaster 
  
24-Jul-66  phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu 1 000 Small lahar   
26-Apr-68     Magmatic event ; Whangaehu 700 000 Long duration, long peak lahar (total volume)   
Whangaehu    67 000
Whakapapanui/ 
Whakapapaiti 117 000 
Estimated velocity of 17m/s 
at 1 kilometre from Crater 
Lake. Destroyed Dome 
Shelter and Staircase Kiosk 
on ski area. 
22-Jun-69  
   
phreatomagmatic eruption ; 
Mangaturuturu 24 000
Ash fall, acid water ; 
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      8-May-71 phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu 41 000
16-May-71        phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu 72 000
16-May-71        phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu 58 000
19-May-71        phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu 18 000
21-May-71        phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu 9 000
3-Jul-71        phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu 5 000
4-Jul-71        phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu 19 000
Whangaehu 1 800 000 
Whakapapanui/ 
Whakapapaiti 900 000 24-Apr-75  
  
phreatomagmatic eruption ; 
Mangaturuturu 600 000
The lahars damaged three 
facilities on the Whakapapa 
ski area, bridges, and 
hydroelectric power 
schemes 
Hot ballistics 1.6 km 
from vent, ash fall 
extended 115 km SE 
; 
27-Apr-75        phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu Small lahar
Whangaehu  130 000
2-Nov-77  
  
phreatomagmatic eruption ; 
Mangatoetoenui
 Water, ash, blocks, and bombs ejected  
8-Dec-88  phreatic eruption ; Whangaehu 13 200 Small lahar 
Water, rock, and ash 
ejected to north and 
northeast of vent 
 
18-Sep-95  phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu  Estimated velocity of 15 m/s   
Whangaehu  
Largest lahar down 
Whangaehu valley of 1995 
eruptions 
Whakapapaiti  
Two separate lahars 
produced. One passed 
within metres of the Far 
West T-Bar at Whakapapa 
23-Sep-95  
   
phreatomagmatic eruption ; 
Mangaturuturu
Ash fallout to east, 
large blocks thrown 1 
kilometre from crater 
; 
26-Sep-95       phreatomagmatic eruption : Ash fall ; 
Oct-95    phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu Numerous lahars generated during October Ash fall ; 
Late October-
1995 Secondary ; Mangatoetoenui  
Destroyed walking track 
bridge 
Secondary debris flow 
ran down Whakapapa 
ski area 
; 
17-Jun-96  phreatomagmatic eruption ; Whangaehu  Small lahar Ash fall ; 
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2.2.3 Renewed Volcanism 
 
Prior to the 1995/1996 eruptions at Ruapehu, it was proposed by Houghton et al. (1987) that 
renewed volcanism at Ruapehu will likely occur in six possible ways: 
1) phreatomagmatic eruption through Crater Lake (which occurred during the 1995/96 
eruption), 
2) construction and explosion of lava domes on the western summit vent, 
3) Strombolian or sub-Plinian eruption somewhere along the Holocene vent lineament, 
4) extrusion of lava flows from the summit or flank, 
5) cone collapse, resulting in a debris avalanche, or 
6) formation of a new satellite vent. 
 
Phreatomagmatic eruptions are likely the greatest short term hazard, but sector collapse of the 
volcano may be the most potentially destructive hazard. Collapse of the Crater Lake wall is likely 
the second greatest risk (see Section 2.3 for detailed discussion). It is likely that future eruptions 
will occur from the same general area as historical eruptions (Neall et al., 1995), however there is 
no way of accurately predicting the location of future activity, as other flank and summit vents may 
also be possible sites for future volcanism (Houghton et al., 1987). This uncertainty adds a further 
complication to eruption response planning at the ski areas, as it is possible a different style of 
eruption may occur which would make a response plan for lahars unnecessary, as ballistic bombs 
or avalanches may become the biggest hazard.  
 
2.2.4 Hazard Zones 
 
Houghton et al. (1987) have assessed the hazard zones for phreatomagmatic eruption events at 
Ruapehu of differing frequency. Their results are as follows:  
• The events with the lowest relative risk are phreatomagmatic eruptions occurring at a 1 to 3 
year (or greater) frequency. The only real hazard is to anyone who may be in the Crater 
Lake basin being struck by a ballistic block. Skiing could be disrupted by ash fall (Figure 
2.3a). 
• Greater risks occur with eruptions of frequency 10 to 30 years. Within 1 kilometre of the 
Crater Lake, risk is extreme as ballistic blocks will likely exceed 1 per 10 m2 and few 
people in this area would survive. Between 5% and 30% of the water from Crater Lake 
would be ejected, elevating lahar risk. The resulting lahars would likely be moving fast 
enough to damage bridges and buildings. As the slope lessens, the lahars will become more 
flood-like. Minor damage can be expected on Whakapapa ski area, increasing if a southerly 
wind is present. Damage to road and rail is unlikely, but ash fall may extend 10 to 30 
kilometres downwind (Figure 2.3b). 
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• A larger area is covered by eruptions occurring at a 100 year frequency. The summit 
hazard zone will likely cover 3 kilometres, with a high abundance of ballistic blocks in this 
area. There is also the potential in this region for destructive surges. Large lahars will likely 
be created, damaging areas in valleys downwind of the vent. A southerly wind would result 
in damage from lahars to Whakapapa ski area and destruction of bridges. Ash fall would  
extend 100 kilometres downwind, causing serious problems to areas on or near the 
mountain as 10 centimetres may accumulate (Figure 2.3c). 
• The lahar risk from a 400-500 year eruption (similar to the 407 and 756 year B.P. lahars) 
would be extreme as 80% to 100% of the Crater Lake water may be ejected. It is possible 
that such a large lahar would either damage or destroy Iwikau village (part of Whakapapa 
ski area).  
 
Therefore it is possible that the most frequently occurring style of eruption may not affect the ski 
areas, particularly if the wind is not blowing the right way. This produces a very dynamic decision-
making environment, as different style and frequency eruption events may occur which may or 
may not affect the ski area.  
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Figure 2.3 Zones of volcanic risk associated with different frequency events at Ruapehu  
(modified from Houghton et al., 1987) 
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2.3 Crater Lake Tephra Barrier Failure 
The 1995/1996 eruptions of Ruapehu deposited a tephra layer at the Ruapehu Crater Lake outlet. 
The tephra barrier has allowed the Crater Lake to fill to 7 metres above its former level. However, 
the tephra barrier is highly permeable and relatively weak. Water from the Crater Lake will likely 
seep through the permeable layers of the barrier and erode it internally, causing the barrier to fail, 
releasing 1.4 million m3 of water into the Whangaehu valley. The release of this water could 
generate a lahar that would travel down the Whangaehu river valley (Figure 2.4), similar to the 
lahar of the 1953 Tangiwai rail disaster. However due to glacial recession, the resulting lahar from 
a tephra barrier failure could be much larger (50 to 75%) than the Tangiwai lahar (Galley et al., 
2004).  
 
Confusion has arisen between a lahar produced by the failure of the Crater Lake tephra barrier and 
an eruption-produced lahar. A lahar produced by the failure of the tephra barrier poses no hazard to 
any of the ski areas (Leonard et al., 2004). However, misconception of risk may affect the ski areas 
indirectly as skiers may choose to stay away by thinking an event is imminent. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Path of Crater Lake tephra barrier failure lahar and associated warning system 
(Department of Conservation, 2006) 
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2.4 Engineering Mitigation at Crater Lake 
A commonly mentioned solution to the lahar problem at Ruapehu is to use engineering mitigation 
to remove the threat, such as draining the crater lake. In 1999, twenty-three options were 
considered in a report to the Minister of Conservation (Department of Conservation, 2006). These 
options fell into six categories (Department of Conservation, 2003a): 
1. No engineering mitigation, 
 2. Intervention only in lahar flood run-out zone, 
 3. Stabilising the dam over the Crater Lake outlet, 
 4. Excavate a trench though the Crater Lake dam, 
 5. Excavate a trench into the underlying lava at the dam outlet, or 
 6. Other options: siphoning, barrier truss. 
 
While these options aimed at reducing the risk of a Crater Lake tephra barrier breakout, they would 
also reduce the lahar risk on the ski areas by lowering the level of the Crater Lake, thereby 
lowering the amount of water available to be ejected by an eruption and likely reducing the size of 
resulting ski area lahars.  
 
It was decided by the Minister of Conservation that no engineering mitigation would take place at 
the Crater Lake. This was due to the impact of several factors, including cultural and religious 
implications, as well as the notable risks to operator safety while taking out these mitigations 
(Department of Conservation, 2003a). A major factor in the decision was the Ngati Rangi, whose 
tribal area includes the southern part of Ruapehu. They released the following statement: 
“Ngati Rangi unilaterally opposes any interference with the natural landscape created by 
the 1995-96 eruptive forces on the peaks of Mount Ruapehu and see it as a cultural affront 
and a major degradation of the sacred regard in which Ngati Rangi hold their mountain 
peaks to even consider any option that would seek to artificially alter that mountain 
landscape.” (Department of Conservation, 2003b, p. 1) 
 
The decision of the Minister of Conservation was to install a reliable warning system, ensure 
emergency response systems were in place, and to construct a bund to prevent overflow into the 
Tongariro River (Department of Conservation, 2003a), which have all been completed. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Background Information on 
Skiing at Ruapehu 
 
The beginning of this chapter includes a brief summary of ski areas on volcanoes worldwide to 
give the reader an indication of the uniqueness of the situation at Ruapehu. The ski area company, 
Ruapehu Alpine Lifts, is introduced, and a brief history of the company is presented including 
recent skier numbers. Potential volcanic hazards to the ski area are then discussed specifically. 
Impacts of the 1945, 1969, 1975, and 1996/96 eruptions on the ski area are also outlined, including 
the impact of similar eruptions on the present-day ski area. The history of lahar warning systems at 
the ski area is also presented, and the Eruption Detection System (EDS) is introduced.  
 
3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON SKIING AT RUAPEHU 
3.1 Worldwide ski areas on volcanoes 
 
The problem at Ruapehu is not a unique one, as Keys (1997) has identified developed ski areas on 
25 active volcanoes worldwide (Table 3.1). All are known to erupt explosively, however vary in 
eruption styles and magma composition. Half of these volcanoes are found in Japan, which is 
where the only known volcanic activity-caused deaths of downhill skiers worldwide occurred on 
Kusatu-Shirane, where nine skiers have been poisoned and killed by volcanic gas on two separate 
occasions. A cross-country skier at Mammoth Mountain was likely killed by volcanic gas in 1998 
(The Star-Ledger, 2005). However, non-skier fatalities have occurred on several of the volcanoes 
identified. Keys (1997) finds the presence of active volcanoes and ski areas no coincidence, as it is  
 
                                Chapter Three 
 
18 
18 
 
related to “the presence of suitable snow-covered terrain provided by volcanoes and the demand for 
ski facilities, together with a lack of suitable terrain on inactive or non-volcanic areas” (p. 66). 
Ruapehu and Kusatsu-Shirane are the only active volcanoes with technological systems for direct 
warnings of volcanic hazards on ski areas. Kusatsu-Shirane’s system is a gas alarm system.  
 
Keys (1997) also found that risk management styles on the active volcanoes are similar in the 
various countries. All areas have plans for either restricting access during active periods or have 
warning systems in place. However, the degree to which this is pursued by officials is questionable. 
He also found that the extent of risk management is based partly on the magnitude of the hazard, as 
well as the number of people at risk. Walker (1997) followed Keys’ study with a more detailed 
investigation into volcanic management plans for ski resorts on 7 selected volcanoes, which 
included Ruapehu. It was found that while most ski resorts were aware they were located on an 
active volcano, volcanic management plans ranged from being acceptable to unacceptable (Table 
3.1). Whakapapa was the only ski resort with a specific hazard management strategy, however 
success of the plan was dependent on acknowledgement of the problem and acceptance by 
customers. Walker (1997) believes that money and advanced technology available in developed 
countries yields a more detailed and complete system. But the system is only a ‘good one’ if it 
facilitates timely action to safeguard life and property (i.e. warning and time to protect ski area 
infrastructure). 
 Volcano Height (metres) Location 
Eruptions in 
19th century 
Eruptions in 20th 
century (No. fatal) Causes of death Main victims 
Current Volcanic 
Response Plan 
 Adatara 1718 Honshu, Japan 1-2 3 (2) tephra, gas 72 miners in crater, hikers  
Akita-Komogatake    1637 Honshu, Japan 1 2-3(0) - -  
Antuco       3585 Central Chile 11 0 - -  
 Asama 2560 Honshu, Japan 10-11 45- 47 (9) tephra, pyroclastic flows  climbers, townsfolk 
 
 Aso-caldera 
(Nakadake) 1592 Kyushu, Japan 23 65-68 (5) 
tephra, pyrosurge, 
Gas? workers, tourists 
 
 Avachinsky 2741 Kamchatka 6-7 7-9 (0) - -  
 Azuma 2024 Honshu, Japan 3-6 4(0) -   
 Baker 3285 Washington, USA 8-17    9 (1975=steam) - - acceptable
 Bandai 1819 Honshu, Japan 1-2 0 - -  
 Chillan 3212 Central Chile 5-7 3(1) lahars townsfolk unacceptable 
 Copahue 2965 Chile-Argentina 0-1 3(0) - -  
 Etna 3350 Sicily 34-35 71-72 (3) lava, tephra townsfolk, tourists  
 Hood  3426 
 
Oregon, USA 
 
2-6 0-1 (0) - - 
unacceptable 
Iwate      2041 Honshu, Japan 0 1(0) - -  
 Kurikoma 1628 Honshu, Japan 0 3(0) - -  
Kusatsu-Shirane 2176 Honshu, Japan 3 14-18 (3) lahar, gas  miners, 6 skiers, tourists  
Lassen 3187 California, USA 0-1 1 (0) - -  unacceptable 
Lliama 3125 Central Chile 15-16 27-28 (1) lahar residents  
 Lonquimay 2865 Central Chile 1-2 2-3 (1) tephra poison woodsman  
Mammoth Mountain 3369 California, USA 0 0 (recent unrest) (1) gas, tephra, pyroclastic flow  cross-country skier 
 
 Nasu (Chausudake) 1917 Honshu, Japan 2 3-4 (0) - -  
Nikko-Shirane 2578     Honshu, Japan 3-4 0 - -  
Ontake 3063 Honshu, Japan        0 1 (0) - -
 Osorno 2652 Southern Chile 5 0 - -  
 Ruapehu 2797 New Zealand 3 from 1861 47-48 (1) lahar train disaster acceptable, but needs work 
Tokachi 2077 Hokkaido, Japan 3 14 (2) lahars, blocks various (no skiers)  
 Villarrica 2840 Central Chile 17-19 24-25 (4) lahars townsfolk unacceptable 
 Zao 1841 Honshu, Japan 14-16 2-4(0) - -  
Table 3.1 Active volcanoes with developed ski areas on their slopes (from Keys, 1997). The volcanoes listed have all erupted in the 19th or 20th centuries 
and are therefore regarded as active. Includes eruptions up to 1994 (and the 1995/96 eruption at Ruapehu). 
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3.2 Ruapehu Alpine Lifts 
Skiing on Ruapehu started in 1913 when William Mead and Bernard Drake formed the Ruapehu 
Ski Club. The first rope tow was installed on the mountain in 1929, and twenty years later 
membership in the Ruapehu Ski club was 1,000. Ruapehu Alpine Lifts was formed in 1953 as a 
public company to develop ski facilities at Whakapapa, with any profit from the company being put 
back into improving facilities at Whakapapa. In 1954 the first chairlift in New Zealand was 
installed at Whakapapa. This led to a building boom at Iwikau Village and the development opened 
the mountain not only to skiers but also to sightseers. More lifts were constructed in the 1960s and 
by 1966 there were 170,000 visitors per year, an increase of 700% from when the first chairlift was 
built back in 1954. The early years were very hard for RAL, as the company had to deal with the 
consequences of lahars, lightning, and ice (Williams and Bamford, 1987). The first tow rope was 
built on the south slopes of Ruapehu in 1962, and Turoa emerged as a major ski area on Ruapehu in 
1978 (Ruapehu Alpine Lifts, 2005a). Ski facilities continued to increase at Whakapapa ski area, 
and in 1987 the capacity of ski lifts and T-Bars was 20,000 skiers per hour (Williams and Bamford, 
1987). After the 1995/96 eruptions, New Zealand Ski Fields Ltd, operators of Turoa ski area, sold 
their operation license to RAL. RAL currently operates the two biggest ski areas on Ruapehu, 
Turoa and Whakapapa ski areas.  
 
Currently, Whakapapa is the largest ski area in New Zealand (in terms of skiing area), and Turoa is 
the highest ski area in New Zealand.  The company employs approximately 70 permanent staff, and 
expands to 750 staff for the winter seasons as 600 to 700 seasonal staff are added. Ski area statistics 
for Whakapapa and Turoa are as follows (Table 3.2). 
 
 Whakapapa Turoa 
Typical Season 
Duration 
Late June to mid 
November 
Late June to mid 
November 
Chairlifts 5 Double, 2 Quad 2 Quad, 2 Triple 
T-Bars 4 2 
Platters 2 3 
Learners Ropes 1  
Base Area Altitude 1630 metres 1600 metres 
Highest point 2300 metres 2322 metres 
Area 550 hectares 500 hectares 
Access Road 6 kilometres, sealed 17 kilometres, sealed 
   
Cafes 6 3 
Retail Shops 2 1 
Snow Groomers 8 5 
Instructors 126 60 
 
          Table 3.2 Ruapehu ski area statistics (Ruapehu Alpine Lifts, 2005a) 
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Skier numbers have also increased on Whakapapa and Turoa since the 1995/96 eruptions (Figure 
3.1). The 2004 season had the highest winter patronage (239,000) since 1992 at Whakapapa, and 
the highest number ever for Turoa (176,400). International visitors were also up 27%. Whakapapa 
had 75,000 visits by beginner skiers, and Turoa had 25,000 (Milne, 2005b). The 2004/2005 
summer season for Whakapapa was 21,500 (Figure 3.2). Overall, patronage at Whakapapa and 
Turoa ski areas has been generally increasing since the 1995/96 eruptions.  
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Figure 3.1 Winter Patronage at Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas  
(Ruapehu Alpine Lifts 2003, 2004, 2005b) 
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Figure 3.2 Summer patronage at Whakapapa ski area  
(Ruapehu Alpine Lifts 2003, 2004, 2005b) 
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The 2005 season is also looking promising, as 25,000 season passes were sold in the pre-season, up 
on the 22,000 sold in 2004 (Milne, 2005b). It is likely that numbers will keep increasing, as there 
are numerous plans to update the current development at the ski areas. The following changes have 
been proposed (Milne, 2005a): 
1. Expand beginner area at top of Centennial chairlift at Whakapapa, 
2. Install a gondola to provide easier access to the Far West area at Whakapapa, 
3. Install magic carpet beginner lifts at Whakapapa and Turoa, 
4. Increase the café size at Turoa at the top of the Movenpick to 500 seats, 
5. Increase Alpine Meadow beginner area at Turoa, and 
6. Install an 8-seater chairlift to replace the High Noon T-Bar at Turoa. 
 
By increasing the number of facilities on the ski areas, the numbers of customers and staff present 
each day will also increase. This contributes to a rising risk to human life by a volcanic event each 
year at the ski areas, as more people being present on the mountain increases the probability for one 
or more to be affected. The current layouts of the base areas and trail maps of both ski areas can be 
found in Appendix 7. 
 
The length of the winter season at Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas is generally about four months, 
with the Upper Mountain of the ski areas being open approximately 70% of those days and the 
Lower Mountain being open approximately 90% of the time (Table 3.3). These times of the year 
are therefore the times when the likelihood of a death occurring on Ruapehu from a volcanic event 
increases substantially. 
 
Table 3.3 Length of winter ski season at Turoa and Whakapapa  
(Ruapehu Alpine Lifts 2003, 2004, and 2005)  
 
Length of Winter Season 
 Opening date Closing date Days Available Days open 
Upper Mountain 
2004 Whakapapa July 06 Oct 31 118 68% 
 Turoa June 24 Nov 21 151 66% 
2003 Whakapapa July 13 Nov 16 127 65% 
 Turoa June 27 Nov 16 143 63% 
2002 Whakapapa June 29 Oct 28 122 63% 
 Turoa June 21 Nov 10 143 59% 
2001 Whakapapa July 4 Oct 28 116 79% 
 Turoa June 25 Oct 28 125 76% 
Happy Valley/Alpine Meadow 
2004 Whakapapa June 25 Oct 10 108 92% 
 Turoa June 23 Oct 24 124 81% 
2003 Whakapapa June 28 Oct 5 100 89% 
 Turoa June 20 Oct 29 132 83% 
2002 Whakapapa July12 Oct 3 87 93% 
 Turoa July 3 Oct 13 103 74% 
2001 Whakapapa June 22 Oct 6 107 99% 
 Turoa June 22 Oct 6 107 94% 
 22 
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3.3 Potential hazards from Ruapehu 
3.3.1 Lahars 
 
Lahars are the main volcanic hazard on Ruapehu in the early stages of an eruption (Johnston et al., 
2000), and are the greatest volcanic threat to life and property at Whakapapa ski area (Leonard et 
al., 2004). Lahar is an Indonesian word meaning a slurry of water and volcanic debris that flows 
down the side of a volcano. At Ruapehu, lahars are specifically created by the mixing of ejected 
rocks and lake water with snow (Nairn et al., 1996). Lahars may occur during an eruption or be a 
secondary occurrence as volcanic debris may be re-mobilised during heavy rainfall. Lahars may 
also occur by overflow of a crater lake, which may or may not be triggered by a volcanic event. 
Death is generally caused by severe crush injuries, drowning, or asphyxiation (Johnston and 
Houghton, 1995). Nearly all major eruptions in the historical record at Ruapehu have produced 
lahars, draining into valleys around the summit (Nairn et al., 1996). Ruapehu is unique 
internationally as lahars on the mountain are produced by depositing water from a Crater Lake onto 
surrounding snow/ice (Otway et al., 1995).  
 
 
Figure 3.3 1995 eruption lahars down Whakapapa ski area, viewed from above the Crater Lake 
(Photograph from GNS) 
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Figure 3.4 Lahar at Mt. St. Helens, produced by melted snow from the March 21, 1982 eruption  
(Photograph by Tom Casadevall, March 21, 1982, USGS) 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Damage done by a lahar at Mt. St. Helens  
(Photograph by Don Swanson, May 19, 1980, USGS) 
 
Lahars at Ruapehu most commonly run down the Whangaehu river valley, but can also run down 
the Whakapapaiti and Whakapapanui valleys to affect the ski areas. Recent lahars on Ruapehu 
originated by two processes. The first is by collapse of the tephra barrier on the edge of Crater Lake 
to form a lahar which typically travels down the Whangaehu valley (see Section 2.3 for a more 
detailed explanation). The second process involves an explosive eruption which ejects contents of 
the Crater Lake onto surrounding snow/ice/rock, and the mixture will begin to flow downslope 
(Otway et al., 1995). In order to get lahars in the Whakapapaiti and Whakapapanui valleys, which 
will affect the ski area, a northerly headwind must prevail to direct the surge into these headwaters 
(Otway et al., 1995) or the eruption must be laterally-directed towards these drainage basins, as 
occurred in the 1995 eruption (Department of Conservation, 1996).  
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3.3.2 Ballistic bombs 
 
Another threat on Ruapehu is the ejection of rocks during an eruption from the vent. These rocks 
are known as ballistic bombs or blocks, depending on their angularity. They follow ballistic 
trajectories and can be highly damaging. Generally, they land within 2 kilometres of the vent from 
which they were ejected (Johnston and Houghton, 1995). Therefore, they can be hazardous to 
anyone or anything within 2 kilometres, but are of low risk to anyone outside this zone. This area 
of high hazard at Ruapehu is known as the Summit Hazard Zone, and can be easily managed during 
periods of volcanic activity by simply restricting access to the area (Sherburn and Bryan, 1999). 
The two upper chairlifts of Turoa ski area fall within this 2 kilometre Summit Hazard Zone. The 
zone also passes close to the top of the Far West T-bar on Whakapapa. However, in the event of a 
100-year frequency eruption, this Summit Hazard Zone would increase to 3 kilometres (Houghton 
et al., 1987). There would be little chance of survival in this area. This 3 kilometre Summit Hazard 
Zone would extend further down into Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas, increasing the hazard for 
people on the ski area. This Summit Hazard zone continues to increase in distance from the crater 
as the frequency of event decreases (Houghton et al., 1987).  
 
3.3.3 Ash fall 
 
Ash fall is a common hazard occurring with eruptions from Ruapehu and can affect a large area, 
particularly downwind of the eruption. Ash from the 1995 eruption fell on Hastings (Johnston et 
al., 2000), which is approximately 120 kilometres from the vent. The impacts of ash falls on 
structures, people, and equipment will vary depending on the thickness of the ash layer. Ash fall 
can severely disrupt infrastructure in the effected areas, for instance by polluting water supplies, 
causing vehicle damage, reducing visibility, covering roads which effects vehicle traction, and 
disrupting electrical supplies (Johnston and Houghton, 1995). In a large eruption (frequency 100-
year) it is likely that the zone of ash fall will extend for 100 kilometres downwind, particularly 
causing problems for areas close to the mountain (Houghton et al., 1987). Ash fall could adversely 
affect the surrounding area including: closing the ski areas, closing the Desert Road, severely 
disrupting the electricity supply, pose problems for power scheme intakes, tunnels and equipments, 
disrupt the NZ Army’s activities, and ruin the trout fishing in surrounding rivers (Neall et al., 
1995). Ash fall on the snow at the ski area would disrupt skiing until subsequent snowfall occurs. 
Ash is not usually a direct cause of loss of life, but it can act as an irritant affecting the eyes and 
throat (Johnston and Houghton, 1995). 
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3.3.4 Volcanic Gases 
 
Volcanic gases may also be hazardous during an eruption episode. Volcanic gases are continuous 
products of volcanic activity, and eruptions may produce lethal quantities. Besides being dangerous 
to humans, volcanic gases also affect the regional and global environment. Commonly emitted 
volcanic gases include carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2), hydrogen sulphide (H2S), 
radon (Rn), hydrochloric acid (HCl), hydrofluoric acid (HF), and sulphuric acid (H2SO4) 
(Williams-Jones and Rymer, 2000). Concentration of the gases in the air decreases as distance for 
the source increases, so threat is only posed to areas within a few kilometres of the eruption vent. 
Volcanic gases can affect respiration and eyes, and can also corrode metals (Johnston and 
Houghton, 1995). Volcanic gases can cause acid rain, which may damage equipment on the ski 
areas over time.  
 
3.3.5 Avalanches 
 
Avalanches can also be a hazard during an eruption, particularly to the ski areas. It is possible for a 
large explosive eruption to trigger wet slab avalanches from steep areas of the mountain, or 
possibly elsewhere depending on the stability of the snow pack (Otway et al., 1995).  
 
3.3.6 Pyroclastic flows 
 
Another hazard from a volcanic eruption is the generation of pyroclastic flows. A pyroclastic flow 
is a “laterally transported, fluidized mass of hot dry rock fragments mixed with hot gases” which 
moves away from the volcano at very high speeds (Lipman, 2000). Anyone caught in a pyroclastic 
flow will likely die or be severely injured. Dome collapses during a magmatic eruption at Ruapehu 
are likely to cause pyroclastic avalanches and/or hot, dry pyroclastic surges (Houghton et al., 
1987).  
 
Historically, pyroclastic flows have not been seen on Ruapehu. However, new geological evidence 
suggests that pyroclastic flows have occurred on Ruapehu in the past, particularly during the 
Taurewa eruptive episode which consisted of closely space Plinian eruptions (10,500 years B.P.). 
Therefore there is potential for another pyroclastic flow to occur on Ruapehu, although it is likely 
that these events would be very infrequent, possibly on time scales of thousands of years 
(Donoghue et al., 1999). 
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3.4 Impacts of eruptions on Ruapehu ski areas 
Knowledge of the characteristics and consequences of previous eruptions provides invaluable input 
into defining the context in which response activities could take place. This information also 
identifies the range/diversity of hazard consequences. Ski area staff will need to understand this, 
and use this knowledge to develop contingent decision competencies to deal with emergent and 
possibly rapidly changing circumstances (Paton and Flin, 1999; Paton and Jackson, 2002).  
 
3.4.1 1945 
 
In March 1945, a viscous andesitic lava dome began growing in the Crater Lake, slowly displacing 
the water through a natural outlet into the Whangaehu Valley (Williams, 1986). A large eruption 
was observed on March 26th and then activity was relatively quiet throughout April. The first two 
weeks of May saw steam and ash emitted in a continuous column, however the lava dome appeared 
to stop growing in the second half of May. Activity increased in June and the lava dome continued 
to grow, entirely displacing the Crater Lake. On July 1st, two trampers were injured when an 
explosion showered them with hot rocks. One was knocked unconscious and both received burns 
(Johnston and Neall, 1995). After the lake had disappeared, explosive activity began to commence 
starting in August, 1945 and continuing until November, 1945. The main hazard was ejection of 
volcanic blocks landing up to 1.5 kilometres from the crater and ash fall (Williams, 1986). At the 
end of August, skiing on Ruapehu was abandoned due to ash fall (Johnston and Neall, 1995).  
 
If this eruption were to have occurred during the present day ski season in the middle of the day, it 
is likely the ski areas would be quickly evacuated and the biggest hazard to customers, staff, and 
infrastructure would be ash fall.  
 
3.4.2 1969 
 
The eruption sequence began on 22 June 1969, just after midnight, and 29 minutes after seismic 
tremor had begun (Williams, 1986). The Dome seismograph was destroyed soon after, likely by the 
main eruption which was accompanied by a ML 3.5 volcanic earthquake (Otway et al., 1995). The 
large eruption resulted in 30% of the Crater Lake being ejected (Williams, 1986). Southerly winds 
caused the majority of ejecta to be deposited in the Whakapapanui and Whakapapaiti catchments, 
creating lahars in the Whakapapanui, Whakapapaiti, Mangaturuturu, and Whangaehu valleys, and 
later flooding in the Whakapapa area. The lahar passed through Whakapapa ski area, destroying or  
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severely damaging the Dome Shelter and the Staircase Kiosk (Figure 3.6). It is estimated that near 
the top of the Far West T-Bar (about 1 kilometre down from Crater Lake) the velocity of the lahar 
was ~17 m/s (Otway et al., 1995). It is estimated that the lahar was up to 2.5m thick and 30m wide 
(Williams, 1986), and the total volume of the Whakapapa lahar has been estimated at 117,000 m3. 
Ash arrived at Iwikau Village shortly after (Otway, 1995). 
 
Figure 3.6 Staircase Kiosk (since removed) damaged by 1969 lahar (GNS) 
 
The Ruapehu lahars of the 1969 eruption were easily documented due to clear weather and pre-
eruption snow cover. Numerous aerial and ground photographs were taken of the lahars’ paths. 
These paths have been used in lahar hazard planning by the ski area companies (Otway et al., 
1995).  
 
If this eruption were to occur during the present-day ski season in the middle of the day, it is 
possible that hundreds of skiers would be in the lahar path when the eruption would begin. Skiers 
and staff would then have to respond to the warning system by moving to higher ground. After the 
lahar passed, it is likely that groups of people would be isolated by the lahar path. The evacuation 
situation would also be greatly complicated by the immediate prospect of ash fall on the ski area.  
 
3.4.3 1975 
 
This eruption began early on 24 April 1975. A ML 4 earthquake was recorded but the actual 
eruption was not observed. It is estimated the explosion was equivalent to the detonation of about 
20 kilotons of high explosive (Williams, 1986). Lahars were created in the Whakapapanui, 
Whakapapaiti, Mangaturuturu, and Whangaehu valleys, as 25% of the water in the Crater Lake was  
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ejected (Williams, 1986). Water passed through the “Notch” of the Central Crater, flowing onto the 
Whakapapanui glacier down through the Whakapapa ski area. The lahar passed to the east of and 
below the Staircase Kiosk and beneath the Waterfall chairlift and T-Bar terminals (Figure 3.7). 
 
Damage was done to all 
three buildings. The total 
volume of the Whakapapa 
lahar was estimated at 
900,000 m3.  Another 
eruption occurred on 27 
April 1975, but only one 
lahar down the Whangaehu 
glacier was generated 
(Otway et al., 1995).  
 
Figure 3.7 Chairlift (since removed) damaged by  
1975 lahar (GNS) 
 
If this eruption would occur during the present-day ski season in the middle of the day, there is 
potential for hundreds of skiers to be in the path of the lahar when the alarm sounds. To survive, 
skiers would either have to know the correct response actions (move to higher ground) or be 
instructed to do so by staff. Groups of skiers and staff may be isolated by the lahar paths, 
complicating the evacuation. Infrastructure damage would likely be inconsequential, as structures 
damaged by this lahar have since been removed.  
 
3.4.4 1995 and 1996 
 
This eruption sequence began in the morning on 18 September 1995, although it was not seen due 
to bad weather. A large lahar was seen in the Whangaehu River from the Tukino ski area. On 
Saturday 23 September 1995, there were many skiers on the ski areas during the day due to good 
weather. The largest eruption of the sequence began an hour after the ski areas had closed. 
Ballistics were thrown 1 kilometre from the vent. Lahars were created in the Whangaehu, 
Mangaturuturu, and Whakapapaiti drainage basins (Department of Conservation, 1996). Two 
separate lahars entered the western areas of Whakapapa ski area within 90 seconds of the eruption 
(Nairn et al., 1996). One ran down the Outer Limits/Three Boys Bowl run. The second lahar ran 
through the Turn Pipe run into the Far West ski area, and exited out through Turner’s Valley  
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(Department of Conservation, 1996) (Figure 3.8). The Lahar Warning System for the ski area was 
never triggered (Nairn et al., 1996; Sherburn and Bryan, 1999).  
 
 
Figure 3.8 Far West T-Bar and 1995 lahars (GNS) 
 
If this eruption was to occur during the present-day ski season in the middle of the day, it is likely 
that hundreds, if not thousands, of skiers would be in the popular Far West area, including many 
out-of-bounds skiers. Due to the alarm not sounding, and the short time between the eruption and 
the entry of the lahars into the ski area (estimated 90 seconds), it is likely that many skiers would 
remain in the lahar path, resulting in a high casualty rate. Evacuation of the Far West area would be 
complicated by the presence of the lahar paths, as well as the relative isolation of the area from the 
rest of the ski area. 
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On 25 September 1995, Tukino ski area was closed for the season due to ash fall (Department of 
Conservation, 1996). The largest lahars of the eruption sequence occurred in the Whangaehu valley 
(Nairn et al., 1995). Ash fall occurred into October, and on 2 October 1995 Turoa ski area received 
a thin layer of this ash. The area was able to stay open due to following snowfalls. On 13 October 
1995, ash eruptions intensified and subsequent ash fall covered the Whakapapa ski area, which then 
closed for the season (Department of Conservation, 1996). Later in October, a secondary debris 
flow occurred on the Whakapapa ski area, running down the Gut and coming within 120 metres of 
the Waterfall T-Bar drive station (Department of Conservation, 1996)  
 
If this secondary debris flow where to occur during the present-day ski season in the middle of the 
day, it is likely that ten to 
fifty skiers may be present 
in the queue lines near the 
Waterfall drive station 
(Figure 3.9), as well as 
skiers in the Gut. There 
would be many 
injuries/casualties, as there 
is no warning system to 
warn of secondary debris 
flows, so skiers and staff 
would be caught off-guard.  
 
 
Figure 3.9 Waterfall T-Bar drive station, 2005 winter season 
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Strong gas emission continued into November (Department of Conservation, 1996). By the 
end of the eruptions, the Crater Lake (10 million m3) was completely empty. Secondary lahars 
occurred as spring rainfall and snowmelt remobilized the ash and scoria at the top of 
Ruapehu, though none affected any of the ski areas (Nairn et al., 1996). 
 
A sequence of phreatomagmatic eruptions then occurred on 17 June 1996. Ash from these 
eruptions spread over most of the North Island, especially to the north and west of the vent. 
The last eruption was on 1 September 1996. Ash from these eruptions resulted in the closure 
of all ski areas on Ruapehu for most of the season (Johnston et al., 2000). The eruptions 
disrupted the ski season and caused large economic losses for the companies through both 
direct risk-related closure and lack of customers due to public concern. Damage was caused to 
most facilities on all three areas. Rust damage was severe, particularly to lift towers and 
galvanized iron fittings. The ski areas  
 
 
took various mitigation measures to try to limit damage such as: closing lifts, covering 
motors, sealing drive stations, removing vehicles from the areas, and disconnecting 
water supplies (Johnston et al., 2000).  
 
3.5 Warning systems on Ruapehu 
Warning systems for lahars have been present at Whakapapa ski area since 1984. The first 
system installed was the Lahar Warning System (LWS), which was operated by the 
Department of Conservation (DoC). The LWS consisted of “stage 1” and “stage 2” alarms. A 
stage 1 alarm was produced when an earthquake of magnitude ML≥3.6 occurred near the 
crater. A stage 2 alarm was generated when the Dome Shelter was destroyed, which would be 
signalled when the seismic signal from the shelter failed. This alarm consisted of sirens and a 
pre-recorded warning message which were broadcast over Whakapapa ski area. Sherburn and 
Bryan (1999) noted the system had some weaknesses. The first was that the LWS could not 
distinguish between volcano-tectonic earthquakes (which do not accompany eruptions) and 
volcanic earthquakes (which usually signal an eruption). The second was that the Dome 
Shelter had to be destroyed or endure significant damage to generate a stage 2 alarm. For the 
system to be reset, the Dome Shelter and seismic equipment had to be replaced or repaired. 
There would also be a delay between the initial eruption and the destruction of the Dome 
Shelter, when the LWS would activate.  
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The LWS was tested on 23 September 1995, when an eruption produced lahars down the 
Whakapapa ski areas. However, the Whakapapaiti lahar was caused by a lateral jet from the 
eruption, which did not destroy the Dome Shelter. Therefore, the warning system was never 
triggered (Nairn et al., 1996). When the ski area opened later in the season for a few weeks, 
RAL ski patrollers were used to watch for lahar events (Department of Conservation, 1996).  
After this incident, it was recommended that the LWS be redesigned, especially to increase 
warning time for the upper ski area (Department of Conservation, 1996). The Institute of 
Geological and Nuclear Sciences was commissioned by the Department of Conservation and 
Ruapehu Alpine Lifts to upgrade the system (Sherburn and Bryan, 1999).  
 
It was decided to name the new system the Eruption Detection System (EDS). The EDS 
would be used to detect large eruptions that have the potential of producing lahars but may 
not actually cause a lahar (Department of Conservation, 1996). The EDS uses seismic and 
acoustic data to detect volcanic eruptions. It relies upon characteristic earthquakes at 
Ruapehu, and uses this data to  
 
 
distinguish which earthquakes are associated with volcanic eruptions (Sherburn and Bryan, 
1999). Acoustic microphones are used to tell when material is ejected from the crater, 
allowing the EDS to distinguish volcanic earthquakes accompanied by an eruption and 
volcanic earthquakes unassociated with a volcanic eruption (Geonet, 2002). If the EDS 
detects a volcanic earthquake (ML≥ 3) and airwaves, the warning system will be activated. In 
the past 25 years, all lahar-producing eruptions were associated with volcanic earthquakes 
ML≥3.5. However as a fail-safe mechanism volcanic earthquakes of ML≥4 detected with no 
accompanying acoustic signal will generate the warning system (Sherburn and Bryan, 1999). 
When the EDS activates, sirens and a broadcast message will be played over Whakapapa ski 
area (Figure 3.10), warning everyone to move to high ground as lahars may travel down 
valleys (Geonet, 2002).  
 19
 
                                Chapter Three 20 
 
Figure 3.10 Siren locations at Whakapapa ski area 
 
The following message is played: 
 (siren) Move out of the valleys to high ground. Move out of the valleys to high 
ground.  
 This is a volcanic emergency. This is a volcanic emergency.  
A lahar is expected to pass through the ski area. A lahar is expected to pass through 
the ski area.  
Move out of the valleys to high ground. Move out of the valleys to high ground. 
Move out of the valleys to high ground. (siren). Repeats message. 
 
In the past few years, the EDS has been linked to a pager system which will notify Turoa 
management that the EDS has been activated (Peter Blaxter, personal communication, 2005). 
Management can then broadcast over the radio and PA systems at Turoa ski area that an 
eruption is in progress. Whakapapa management will also have pagers, beginning for the 
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2005 season, in case of failure of the siren speakers (Peter Blaxter, personal communication, 
2005). The EDS can be seen in Figure 3.11.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Eruption Detection System (EDS) which can  
distinguish between different tectonic events 
 
 
The EDS is very different from the LWS in that it is proactive in determining when a lahar 
may be generated to activate the system and does not rely on a lahar already having been 
generated. The EDS is the only system in the world that attempts to warn of lahars with such 
a short time for reaction (likely 90 seconds for the upper part of Whakapapa ski area). The 
EDS operates in near-real time to detect the specific seismic and acoustic signals of a lahar-
generating eruption for Ruapehu (Sherburn and Bryan, 1999). However, the EDS has yet to 
be proven effective during a real event. 
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Past Research and  
Eruption Response Plans 
 
There have been three previous research projects on staff training and public awareness of the 
volcanic hazards at Whakapapa ski area, and the results of these studies are presented in the 
beginning section of this chapter. The current public education campaigns at both Turoa and 
Whakapapa are introduced. CIMS is also explained. A summary of the DoC Eruption Response 
Plan and the key role of RAL in this plan is introduced and discussed.  
 
4. PAST RESEARCH AND ERUPTION RESPONSE PLANS  
4.1 Past Research at Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas, Ruapehu 
This section contains summaries of previous research done at Whakapapa ski area in regards to 
staff training and volcanic hazards. The main findings and conclusions of the authors are 
summarized, and any suggestions or disagreements by this author can be found in the discussion 
section (Chapters 6 and 7) of this thesis. 
 
4.1.1 Summary of Galley et al. (2003) 
 
Galley et al. (2003) studied lahar response planning at Whakapapa ski area over the winter of 2000, 
and they developed a framework for developing a comprehensive response plan for a lahar event at 
Ruapehu. Galley et al. (2003) acknowledged the eruption may be a ‘blue-sky’ event, where an  
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eruption occurs with no warning. Fortunately, although a ‘blue-sky’ event is the most dangerous for 
the ski field, it is the least likely.  
 
Galley et al. (2003) identified that a lahar event should roughly follow this sequence: 
1) Eruption begins 
2) Lahar initiated 
3) Eruption Detection System (EDS) activated 
4) Ski-field staff immediately begin moving customers to designated safe areas 
5) Strategic management command post (CP) personnel begin setting up in designated CP 
building 
6) Lahar flow ceases 
7) Evacuation of ski-field begins – overseen by CP personnel 
8) CP personnel interacting with outside agencies to gain intelligence on event and coordinate 
relevant external disaster response agencies, if any (e.g. DoC, ambulance) 
9) Other personnel setting up various evacuee areas (e.g. general evacuees, those looking for 
separated family etc, injured evacuees) 
10) Non-essential personnel in villages evacuating at this time 
11) Ski-fields are now fully evacuated 
12) General evacuation of area begins 
 
The operation is therefore divided into four phases: 
1. Warning phase 
2. Event occurrence and initial response 
3. Lahar flow ceases and evacuation of ski field is undertaken 
4. Wider evacuation of lower levels and related activities 
 
Galley et al. (2003) also outlined hypothetical events that may follow a lahar. Stage 1 would 
involve the event occurrence and initial response. At this stage, staff will immediately begin 
clearing lifts and moving customers to safe areas. Galley et al. (2003) noted that it is important that 
staff begin immediately to act under their own initiative, and should not seek confirmation from a 
higher authority. Organisational authority should also be suspended in favour of lover-level 
decision making until later in the event, when the authority can be gradually transferred to those in 
more decision making roles. The latter, if the event is prolonged, would deal with strategic 
recovery issues and leave operational issues to those with the requisite knowledge (Paton, 1997). If 
staff act immediately to take control, there will be less room for panic and counter-productive 
actions by customers. Staff should then wait in safe zones until the “All-clear” is given, and staff 
must be proactive during this waiting period in providing information and reassuring customers.  
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Stage 2 of events would involve the cessation of lahar flow and evacuation of the ski field. Galley 
et al. (2003) identifies two options that RAL may select from to evacuate the ski field: 
• All staff and skiers may begin to evacuate as soon as permission is given. This will 
be the fastest option, but there are risks of bottlenecks forming 
• Groups will stay in their safe areas until they are specifically instructed to start 
evacuating. This option will be slower but will likely be safer. However, it may 
break down under pressure because it will require more organization. 
 
Galley et al. (2003) also suggested that potential evacuation routes from threatened areas be 
considered in advance, with a single best option being decided upon. Galley et al. (2003) identified 
a number of stressors staff may have to deal with at this stage, such as dealing with serious injuries, 
separated family members, differing ability levels of customers, difference in mobility, individuals 
responding aversely to the situations, and becoming the focus of unreasonable demands and/or 
targets of blame.  
 
According to Galley et al. (2003), stage 3 will involve an evacuation of lower levels, and will be 
the responsibility of DoC. Symptoms related to stress and trauma may also being to manifest, and 
provision of optional counselling should be made available to staff. 
 
Galley et al. (2003) suggested that when developing the emergency plan, all groups that may be 
potentially involved must be identified, and their roles and tasks defined. Galley et al. (2003) 
acknowledge that people will function better in an emergency if they know in advance what to do, 
but stresses that this does not mean developing a long list of details of individual actions. Rather, a 
clear role description should be provided, allowing individuals to use common sense to carry out 
that role. Staff should also be encouraged to act on their own initiative depending on how the 
situation develops. 
  
Galley et al. (2003) also felt communication would be an essential part of the response plan, and 
should be developed to use similar communication channels to those typically used by staff. Staff 
must also communicate what is going on to customers, which will be done best by calmly 
conveying the gravity of the situation to customers which will improve their willingness to follow 
instructions. Plans must also be laid out on how to pass scientific information to ski field staff on 
the status of the eruption. Galley et al. (2003) suggested that establishing a central Command Post 
(CP) will be crucial to this, as the CP will link personnel on the ski areas to outside agencies. The 
CP will begin to take control of the ski area once the initial danger has passed. 
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A survey was undertaken in August 2000 to determine the level of customer understanding of the 
lahar risk and response. Galley et al. (2003) reported the following results: 
• Almost all customers (96%) were aware that Ruapehu was an active volcano and just over 
half (56%) expected the next volcanic event within the next 10 years. 
• Only half (52%) were aware of the lahar warning system. 
• Of those aware of the warning system, 86% believed it contained sirens and only 29% were 
aware of the loudspeaker announcements. 
• Of those aware of the system, 79% knew to move to high ground out of the valleys upon 
receiving a warning. 
• Only 21% of customers interviewed claimed they were aware of all the lahar danger zones 
and another 28% claimed to know some of the zones. 
 
RAL staff were also surveyed but with a very low return rate. Galley et al. (2003) hypothesized this 
could be seen as an indicator that the level of awareness of the lahar threat was low. However, 
given the management set-up at the time on the ski area, it is more likely that senior employees 
gave tangible signals to seasonal staff that the lahar threat was not important. 
 
Galley et al. (2003) also provided the following recommendations for training: 
1. Training should include: 
a. Lectures, first hand accounts, 
b. Case studies, and 
c. Audio-visual presentations. 
2. Points to cover include: 
a. The probability of an event, 
b. The typical build-up scenarios to an eruption, 
c. The range of potential hazards involved, 
d. The nature of a lahar, and 
e. The history of Ruapehu’s eruptive activity. 
3. The program should strike a balance between giving staff an understanding of the threat 
and how to respond to it, and overloading them with excess details that will cause 
confusion. 
4. Staff must have realistic performance expectations. 
5. Regular simulations must be conducted, followed by a debriefing. 
6. The knowledge and skills of staff members must be maintained and updated. 
 
Galley et al. (2003) pointed out that simulations are vital to producing an effective response, 
especially with the unique situation at the ski areas where there is limited time to train staff. The 
evacuation plan must also be revised regularly, however Galley et al. (2003) warns that the mere 
existence of a plan can lead to a false sense of security, and an eventual relaxation in training, 
vigilance and preparedness. 
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4.1.2 Summary of Ward et al. (2003) 
 
Ward et al. (2003) studied staff training at Whakapapa ski area for a lahar response over the winter 
of 2001. They identified staff training and customer education as being crucial to an effective 
response. Ward et al. (2003) felt staff training was important, because staff need to respond quickly 
and effectively to the warning system as the response time is very short before the lahar will enter 
the ski area. Customer education is also crucial, because if customers know how to respond, they 
will react sooner without instruction, making the job of RAL staff easier. Ward et al. (2003) 
identified Ski Patrollers and Lift Operators as being the greatest priority for training, because they 
are directly involved in the immediate response and will bear the biggest responsibility for moving 
customers to safe areas. Customer service staff were identified as the next priority, as they are the 
first point of contact for mountain users and will be crucial during an event for providing 
information to those both on the ski area and outside.  
 
Ward et al. (2003) observed staff training at RAL over the 2001 ski season. RAL staff training 
elements in relation to lahars included staff induction, a video, and a staff handbook. Staff received 
lahar training during new staff induction week. All new staff from all departments attended a one 
and a half hour session which detailed the lahar paths on the mountain and what to do when the 
alarm sounds. Ski Patrol staff received more detailed training, but returning staff receive no 
training. The main training tool during induction week was a ten-minute video from the early 
1990’s. The video was aimed at informing customers of the lahar dangers, as opposed to training 
staff. The 2001 staff handbook includes two pages on instructions on response to a lahar warning, 
however it was aimed at Lift Operators and did not go into detail about how other staff should 
respond. Ward et al. (2003) also identified training needs for each department at the ski area (Table 
4.1 and 4.2).  
 
 
 
 Table 4.1 Roles of RAL staff in the event of a lahar, from Ward et al. (2003) 
 Role: Pre-lahar Role: During lahar Role: Post lahar 
Ski Patrollers • Provide accurate 
information to any 
customers 
enquiring about 
this hazard 
• Sweep of high risk areas 
• Move customers to safe areas and 
assure they stay there, reassure them of 
their safety 
• If near shelter in safe area, move there 
• Provide information about location and status of customers to Ski Patrol 
Manager 
• Attend to those injured 
• Take instructions from Area Two Controller on evacuation of mountain. 
May also have to take control of a sub-area (see DoC Eruption Response 
Plan) 
Lift 
Operators 
• Provide accurate 
information to any 
customers 
enquiring about 
this hazard 
• Clear lift, stop lift 
• If in safe area, stay there. Otherwise, 
move customers to safe area and ensure 
they stay there, reassure them of their 
safety 
• If near shelter in safe area, move there 
• Provide information about location and status of customers to lift 
operations supervisor 
• Attend to those injured if able, or ensure they are warm and comfortable 
until help arrives 
• Take instruction from either supervisor or evacuation coordinator on 
evacuation of mountain. 
Snow School • Provide accurate 
information to any 
customers 
enquiring about 
this hazard 
• If in safe area, stay there. Otherwise, 
move customers to safe area and ensure 
they stay there, reassure them of their 
safety 
• If near shelter in safe area, move there 
• If able (e.g. by radio), provide information about location and status of 
customers 
• Attend to those injured if able, or ensure they are warm and comfortable 
until help arrives 
• Take instruction from either supervisor or evacuation coordinator on 
evacuation of mountain. 
Customer 
Services 
• Provide accurate 
information to any 
customers 
enquiring about 
this hazard 
• If customers are around in a safe area, 
make sure they stay there, reassure 
them of their safety 
• Begin a register of customers 
present/missing 
• Provide up to date information on the status of the mountain and those on it 
• Will likely receive calls from those with friends and relatives on the 
mountain, need to try and reassure these people as best as possible 
• Avoid making false/uncertain statements 
Food and 
Beverage 
• Provide accurate 
information to any 
customers 
enquiring about 
this hazard 
• Make sure customers in cafes in safe 
areas stay there, reassure them of their 
safety 
• Stop serving food, as this may be 
required to be rationed if evacuation of 
the mountain is delayed for some time 
• Provide shelter to those stranded on the mountain 
• Provide food to those stranded on the mountain 
• Begin a register of customers present/missing 
• Provide information about customers present/missing to those coordinating 
evacuation 
Rental/ 
Workshop/ 
Retail 
• Provide accurate 
information to any 
customers 
enquiring about 
this hazard 
• If customers are around in a safe area, 
make sure they stay there, reassure 
them of their safety 
• Provide shelter to those stranded on the mountain 
• Begin a register of customers present/missing 
• Provide information about customers present/missing to those coordinating 
evacuation 
Groomers • Less likely to be on mountain during operating times, but must be aware of dangers in order to protect themselves 
  
 Table 4.2 Training needs of RAL staff in relation to their roles in the event of a lahar, from Ward et al. (2003) 
Ski 
Patrollers 
• General information about lahars, including probability of an event, the range of potential hazards involved, safe and high risk areas on the ski field the 
nature of a lahar, and Ruapehu’s eruption history. 
• Information regarding human response in threatening situations     
• Awareness of own response to this situation, and how to deal with it after the event is over. 
• Specific role information – doing a sweep of high risk areas, moving people to safe areas, involvement in evacuation of the mountain, and first aid 
duties. Ski Patrollers need to be aware of these tasks, and other information pertinent to them, like where the high risk areas are, where safe areas are 
and the best way to get to them, where shelter is, which radio channel to employ in emergencies. Ski patrollers may also have to take control of sub-
areas in Area Two, as outlined in the DoC Eruption Response Plan 
Lift 
Operators 
• General information about lahars, including probability of an event, the range of potential hazards involved, safe and high risk areas on the ski field the 
nature of a lahar, and Ruapehu’s eruption history. 
• Information regarding human response in threatening situations 
• Awareness of own response to this situation, and how to deal with it after the event is over. 
• Specific role information – Clearing and stopping lifts, moving people to safe areas, evacuation. Lift operators need to be aware of these tasks, and other 
information pertinent to them, like which lift queues are in safe/high risk areas, the trouble that may be caused by people getting caught in ropes or 
tripping over other skis/boards in a crowded area, which radio channel to employ in emergencies, where shelter is, how to keep those injured warm and 
comfortable until help arrives. 
Snow 
School 
• General information about lahars, including probability of an event, the range of potential hazards involved, safe and high risk areas on the ski field the 
nature of a lahar, and Ruapehu’s eruption history. 
• Information regarding human response in threatening situations 
• Awareness of own response to this situation, and how to deal with it after the event is over. 
• Specific role information – moving students and nearby skiers to safe areas, evacuation. Snow School instructors need to be aware of these duties, and 
other information pertinent to them, like knowing which areas of the ski field are safe/high risk, where shelter is, how to keep those injured warm and 
comfortable until help arrives 
Customer 
Services 
• General information about lahars, including probability of an event, the range of potential hazards involved, safe and high risk areas on the ski field the 
nature of a lahar, and Ruapehu’s eruption history. 
• Effective communication and human relations skills, with knowledge of how people are likely to respond in a threatening situation, and to a lack of 
information. Effective information coordination skills 
• Specific role information – such as the provision of information to the public and coordination of information 
Food and 
Beverage 
• General information about lahars, including probability of an event, the range of potential hazards involved, safe and high risk areas on the ski field the 
nature of a lahar, and Ruapehu’s eruption history. 
• Effective communication and human relations skills, with knowledge of how people are likely to respond in a threatening situation 
• Specific role information – involvement in provision of shelter and food to those stranded on the mountain, making sure customers remain in safe areas, 
involvement in the evacuation of the mountain 
Rental/ 
Workshop/ 
Retail 
• General information about lahars, including probability of an event, the range of potential hazards involved, safe and high risk areas on the ski field the 
nature of a lahar, and Ruapehu’s eruption history. 
• Specific role information – reassuring customers, making sure customers remain in safe areas 
Groomers • General information about lahars, including probability of an event, the range of potential hazards involved, safe and high risk areas on the ski field the 
nature of a lahar, and Ruapehu’s eruption history. 
  
Ward et al. (2003) developed the following recommendations for training at Whakapapa ski 
area: 
• 1. All staff attend a session at induction on lahar hazards. 
• 2. This session should consist of a video and lecture 
The current video should be expanded to be a specific staff training tool. It should 
include (i) video footage of actual lahars and their effect, (ii) an explanation of how 
lahars are a hazard, (iii) the location of high risk and safe areas as well as the warning 
time, (iv) how to protect oneself, (v) lahar behaviour, and (vi) information on the 
history of lahar activity. The lecture should further explain the video contents, 
including an outline of RAL and DoC response plans, and an outline of each groups’ 
roles. This will help staff to develop a similar schema of the response, hopefully 
increasing the efficiency of the response in an actual event. 
• 3. After the general session staff should be divided into groups: (A) Ski Patrol 
and Lift Operators and (B) all other staff. 
• 4. The group of Ski Patrol and Lift Operators will receive more role specific 
information. 
The action plans for Ski Patrol and Lift Operators must be explained carefully. It will 
also be important to explain that customers’ reactions may not be as simple as may be 
expected. It is also necessary to make staff aware of some of the feelings that they 
may experience following an event, as these two groups of staff have increased 
responsibility.  
• 5. Customer Service may also receive more role specific information 
Customer Service staff will need to learn skills at employing communication and 
human relation skills in a high pressure situation. Role-playing is the most efficient 
way at learning these skills. Information on how customers may respond should also 
be provided. 
• 6. A simulation of the response plans should be run under ‘perfect’ conditions.  
Due to the limited time to train staff, a simulation is the only comprehensive way to 
identify issues and gauge demands that will be encountered during a lahar response. It 
is important the simulation be observed and video-taped, so staff performance can be 
assessed. The simulation must be run every year, early in the season. A debriefing 
should follow the simulation, with staff encouraged to give feedback as this 
participation may increase commitment from staff. 
• 7. Training should be evaluated.  
Training can be evaluated in numerous ways, including (i) asking employees how 
useful training was, (ii) assessing learning during the simulation, (iii) comparing 
simulation results with previous years, and (iv) paper-and-pencil knowledge test. 
 
Ward et al. (2003) felt the cost of this training (video development, personnel costs, and 
simulation assessment) was small compared to the benefit of having staff fully prepared for an 
effective response to a volcanic crisis and would also help to address obligations of due 
diligence RAL may have in regards to lahar risk. They also felt management support for 
integrated training was crucial, as the development may take time. If staff found that 
management regarded the lahar training as important, it is likely staff will take it more 
seriously. 
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Ward et al. (2003) also provided recommendations for customer education of the ski area. 
They said educational messages should be repeated in a number of different ways and must 
cater for a wide range of groups. Message content should include the following: (i) a 
description of the lahar and hazard, (ii) location on areas of high risk and safe areas, (iii) 
information about on what actions to take, and (iv) warning time before a lahar enters the ski 
area. The message also should be from a  
 
credible source, consistent, certain, clear, accurate, and sufficient. Education should also be 
provided to ski lodges. Customer education will also need to be evaluated for its 
effectiveness, which is more easily done by surveys. Ward et al. (2003) also mentioned that 
generally hazard information provided to visitors emphasizes that authorities have a degree of 
control over the situation.  
 
Ward et al. (2003) also reviewed the DoC and RAL Eruption Response Plans. The DoC 
Eruption Response Plan was a substantial document, but was being re-written at the time. The 
plan was found to be very vague in places, assuming that the person carrying out certain 
instructions would know what to do. The RAL Response Plan was not available, however 
Ward et al. (2003) recommended the following areas be specified in the plan: 
• Dealing with customers once the initial threat has passed 
• Planning for psychological care for staff after a disastrous event, such as peer support 
 
The 2001 warning system test was also observed. It was found that in most cases staff being 
observed gave correct instructions to the public – move to higher ground. However, it was 
also observed that many staff had a poor understanding of the lahar hazard. Five patrollers 
also were not able to make it to the area they were supposed to be sweeping in the allotted 
time.  Public response was widely varied, with some people following instructions and others 
reporting a very poor response.  
 
4.1.3 Summary of Leonard et al. (2004) 
 
Leonard et al. (2004) also reviewed Ward et al. (2003) and Galley et al. (2003), and provided 
an update of winter 2003 survey results. Leonard et al. (2003) stated that annual testing of the 
EDS’ reliability and effectiveness had occurred during the 2001, 2003, and 2003 ski season. 
Simulations were performed in 2001 and 2003, with staff being forewarned. The 2002 test 
was a blind test, which was supposed to be a surprise to staff. However, it was found a few 
staff suspected something was happening due to high radio activity. Surveys were conducted 
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by GNS staff and volunteers after each simulation to determine audibility of the alarm in 
different locations, and comments on staff and customer response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leonard et al. (2004) reported that: 
• In 2003, the alarm was audible to customers in all cafes on the ski field, besides LBC 
at the Top of the Bruce, with responses ranging from complacency to concern or 
confusion. This was compounded by an absence of staff instructions.  
• In all three years, Lift Operation staff generally gave the correct instructions to 
customers: they were in a safe area and they should stay put, or to move to higher 
ground.  
• Response of customers was mixed, indicating confusion over appropriate response 
actions. 
 
Leonard et al. (2004) indicated that Lift Operation staff have been the most reliable area in 
terms of performing the correct actions and public satisfaction with the warning system and 
its operation. However, absence of staff instructions in the cafes reiterated the importance for 
Food and Beverage staff to be trained in the proper response. Leonard et al. (2004) also 
pointed out that individuals tended to follow group actions where staff were not present 
giving direction, and that this group behaviour is inevitable due to uncertainty. One strategy 
he gave for dealing with this problem would be placing more information on the appropriate 
actions to take during a lahar alarm on the lift pylons.  
 
The article also includes results of the 2003 public perception survey at Whakapapa ski area. 
A similar survey was conducted by Galley et al. (2003) in the 2000 ski season. Both these 
surveys were conducted independently of the EDS annual simulation exercises. Leonard et al. 
(2004) noted four significant differences between the 2000 and 2003 survey results: 
• Decrease in knowledge of lahar paths. 
• Decrease in knowledge of the EDS. 
• Decreases in awareness of the correct course of action if the EDS is activated, given 
awareness of the EDS. 
 Increase in requests for public EDS education by skiers. •
 
In 2003, respondents were asked to suggest possible improvements to the EDS. Only 32% of 
respondents made recommendations to improve the EDS, and 70% of these suggestions 
involved some form of education. The most common suggestion was to post signs dealing 
with the lahar hazard. The remaining 30% suggestions were to improve the EDS itself.  
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Leo rd ing: 
• 
s of the volcanic hazards and (c) public awareness 
• . Previous modifications include 
• 
map was being drafted by GNS. This would be posted across the field, and would also 
be available digitally. Public education was also being planned for Turoa ski field. 
d in 
 (2002) believes there are two 
vari le
 The reliability of the EDS to trigger an audible warning. 
main 
reparedness, public awareness, and research. 
Leo rd
• Two sim
1. ich  
na  et al. (2004) also detailed work in progress at Whakapapa, including the follow
Ongoing annual testing of the EDS, including surveying of (a) its operational 
effectiveness, (b) public awarenes
of the EDS. 
• Annual lahar awareness surveys. 
• Continual discussion between GNS, DoC, and RAL. 
Continual modification to the operation of the EDS
replacing faulty or poorly directed loud speakers, and changing the announcement 
from a male to a female voice to improve clarity. 
Public education. A Whakapapa Volcanic Hazards brochure and hazard/safe-zone 
 
Leonard et al. (2004) indicated the importance of recognizing the Ruapehu lahar hazar
terms of risk to human life, by referring to the Taig Report (Taig, 2002). Taig (2002) 
calculated that there were similar probabilities for a (a) lahar killing one person on the 
Whakapapa ski area as there is for a (b) barrier break-out lahar (See Section 2.3 for a more 
detailed explanation) killing one person. Leonard et al. (2004) pointed out that even though 
the probabilities are similar, a barrier break-out lahar has received much more media attention 
and much more public concern than a lahar on the ski area. Taig
ab s that control the probability of a ski area lahar fatality: 
•
• The percentage of people actually removed from lahar paths. 
 
Leonard et al. (2004) indicated that the EDS is now running near 100% reliability, so the 
concern is achieving a 100% evacuation, which could be initiated by staff education and 
p
 
na  al. (2 et 004) suggested the following changes: 
ulations of the EDS annually 
A first beginning-of-season test where the staff are forewarned and wh
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therefore serves to motivate them to obtain information on aspects they do 
2. ith no warning to general staff, to gauge 
• Research should be ongoing, including the two main avenues of data collection 
3. The survey of observations and comments on EDS simulation effectiveness 
should continue annually. 
4. Ongoing annual surveys of the awareness of (a) volcanic hazards and (b) the 
EDS. 
 
 
l 
fe areas and the summit hazard zone, and describes the volcanic hazards, warning 
ystem, and correct actions to take during a volcanic event. There is also a picture of the Far 
est 
n.  
he Turoa poster (Figure 4.1B) displays graphics of the lahar paths, safe areas and summit 
hazard zone, and describes the volcanic hazards and correct actions to take during a volcanic 
event. There is also mention of the top two T-Bars being in the summit hazard zone.  
 
not understand. This also serves to check any EDS technical failures. 
A later season ‘blind’ test w
effectiveness of system in terms of public response. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Public Education for Volcanic Hazards at the ski areas 
A public education poster and brochure series was first introduced at Whakapapa for the 2004
ski season. The public education campaign was designed by the Institute of Geological 
Sciences (GNS) and the Department of Conservation (DoC), with input from RAL. The goa
was to increase public awareness of volcanic hazards at the ski area, specifically to increase 
knowledge of lahars. The Whakapapa poster (Figure 4.1A) displays graphics of the lahar 
paths, sa
s
West lahars from the 1995 eruption, showing how close it came to the bottom of the Far W
T-Bar.  
 
The public education campaign was expanded to include Turoa for the 2005 ski seaso
T
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 A 
Figure 4.1 Volcanic Hazards public education p
B. Turoa ski aBosters at A. Whakapapa ski area and  
rea. 
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Public awareness surveys of the volcanic hazards also continue to be conducted at 
Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas (Figure 4.2). This consists of approaching between 200 and 
250 customers and running through a survey with each customer every season, which has 
remained the same the past five years for easy comparison of any changes that may be 
occurring.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 A volunteer conducting public education surveys during  
the 2005 ski season (Photograph by Scott Barnard) 
 
 
During the 2005 winter season, the blind test of the warning system was recorded by TVNZ 
and a feature called ‘Decade On’ on the warning system and response at the ski area was 
shown on TV one’s Close-Up program, followed by a live interview with the Whakapapa ski 
area manager (Figure 4.3). The 1995 eruption was shown, as well as pictures of the 1995 
lahar through the ski area. The blind test was also shown, so viewers were given an idea of 
what the warning system sounded like and the correct actions to take. The reporter also 
described that a lahar occurring at Whakapapa ski area was not a case of if, but a matter of 
when. Science experts indicated that people should not be afraid to come to the mountain as 
two lahars in 50 years is not a high risk situation, but that it is useful to be prepared. RAL also 
had a chance to describe for viewers what they are doing to prepare, including their staff 
induction training and the CIMS course that managers had participated in. This will serve as 
beneficial public education, as people all over New Zealand were given the chance to learn 
about lahars at Ruapehu. It also reflects well on the ski area, as they look aware of the 
situation and are shown taking the proper actions to best prepare.  
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Figure 4.3 Images of the TV one Close-Up program ‘Decade On’ episode. 
A. Image of 1995 eruption at Ruapehu. B. A Lift Operator giving instructions when the 
warning system has sounded. C. Harry Keys (DoC) showing the proper response actions. D. 
Skiers moving to higher ground during the lahar warning. E. Brad Scott (GNS) explaining the 
warning system at the ski area. F. Image of the path a lahar could take and what it would look 
like. G. Reporter explaining the unpredictability of eruptions at Ruapehu. H. A volunteer doing 
public hazard awareness surveys at Whakapapa ski area. I. The host of Close-Up 
interviewing the RAL Whakapapa ski area manager. (TVNZ, 2005) 
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4.3 CIMS and Current response plans 
4.3.1 The New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) 
 
The New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) (New Zealand Fire 
Service Commission, 1998) provides a model for the command, control, and coordination of 
emergency response, focusing on four key components (reduction, readiness, response, 
recovery). This common incident management structure can be applied to emergency 
situations. The main principles of CIMS are: 
• Common terminology 
• Top-down organisational structure 
• Integrated communications 
• Consolidated Incident Action Plans – preferably written (includes response goals, 
operational objectives, and support activities) 
• Manageable span of control 
• Designated incident facilities 
 Comprehensive resource management •
 
The CIMS organisational structure has four basic components: control, planning/intelligence, 
operations, and logistics. The Incident Controller (IC) would be in charge of the response and 
responsible for coordinating planning/intelligence, operations, and logistics. The position may 
be transferred as the incident progresses. The structure of a CIMS response and roles within 
that can be seen in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 CIMS structure 
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Another important part of CIMS is the identification of incident facilities. The most important 
facilities relating to an incident on the ski area would be an Incident Control Point (ICP) and 
Emergency Operations Centre (EOC). The ICP is where the Incident Controller and main 
incident managers will be located, and there should only be one when multiple agencies are 
involved. There may be multiple EOCs for an event. It is possible that during a volcanic event 
at Ruapehu that the ICP would be located in Whakapapa Village and Iwikau Village on the 
ski area may be an EOC. For further discussion on the application of CIMS to a volcanic 
event response at the ski area, see Section 7.3.4. 
 
4.3.2 DoC Eruption Response Plan 
 
There are numerous plans that will be used in the response to a volcanic crisis on the ski field. 
The DoC response plan is titled the ‘Ruapehu Eruption Response and Management Plan’ 
(2004) and details the emergency response for Whakapapa Village and the ski area. It is based 
on CIMS principles. According to the plan, the central Incident Control Point would be in 
Whakapapa Village, and the Whakapapa Village Controller would be the main Incident 
Controller. Other controllers would include the Whakapapa Ski Area Controller, the Skotel 
Controller, and the Lodge Clearing Controller. The Whakapapa Ski Area Controller is 
designated be the main Incident Controller for the ski area until authority can be shifted to the 
Whakapapa Village Controller. Figure 4.5 shows the command structure. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 DoC Eruption Response Plan Command Structure (Department of Conservation, 
2004) 
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The Action Plan for the Whakapapa Ski Area Controller is also detailed in the DoC Eruption 
Response Plan. The main tasks for this controller include establishing a Control Point at 
Iwikau Shelter, appointing a Ski Lodge controller, appointing Sub-area Controllers, and 
establishing and maintaining communications with the Whakapapa Village Controller. The 
sub-areas will be as follows: 
• Iwikau 
• Knoll 
• West 
• Pinnacle 
• Valley 
• Downhill 
 
These controllers will be selected from senior management personnel or ski patrol. Situation 
reports would be requested from all Sub-area controllers, and field teams should be appointed 
to carry out search and rescue. Treatment centres for injured or sick customers must also be 
set up. There is no indication in the Eruption Response Plan as to how these centres will be 
resourced. 
 
The DoC Eruption Response Plan (2004) also details action plans for Lift Operation staff, Ski 
Patrol, and Ski Club lodges. The Lift Operations staff action plan contains notes on specific 
actions to take at certain lifts, as well as the general response that should be performed by Lift 
Operators. Ski Patrollers are also advised on what areas should be highest priority for 
sweeping. Ski Club lodge leaders are advised to ensure all occupants remain inside, record all 
persons being shelter and those reported missing, and ensure that roof guttering is isolated 
from water storage tanks. 
 
The DoC Eruption Response Plan (2004) also contains specific task guidelines for the 
following areas (many of these specific plans involve direct participation from RAL staff 
which if noted): 
• Sear  ch and Rescue 
o RAL staff may be requested to participate in ski area search and rescue 
i Patrol staff) (likely Sk
• Mis gsin  Persons 
o RAL staff may be advised to set up and staff a registration centre (likely 
ff) Customer Services sta
• First Aid/Emergency Care 
o RAL staff may be required to set-up and staff treatment centres on the ski 
 (likely Ski Patrol, Medical Centre staff) field
• Electricity 
• Wa  ter supplies 
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o RAL staff must disconnect down pipes which feed water storage tanks and 
must impose water conservation measures (likely Food and Beverage staff) 
 Roads 
 
• Shelter 
L staff may be required to provide sleeping arrangements for customers 
• Caterin
ll likely be required to cater to persons present at assembly 
•
t vehicles and drivers may be needed for ground transport (likely 
• Traffic
roadblock at the bottom of the loop 
s the road must remain clear for emergency 
• Law n
re 
• Commu
i Area controller will communicate with the Incident 
er by landline, cell phone, RAL UHF radio system, or DoC 
• Road/Bridge Repair 
dia 
 no 
e initial 
response to the warning system (which is described to all staff members at training), and then 
pply a broad ski area evacuation plan to the evacuation phase of the response. 
The following research questions have b eding discussion: 
ff awareness and response action 
• Are staff aware on the initial (Stage 1) response actions? 
•
 
 
o RA
(likely Food and Beverage, Customer Service staff) 
g 
o RAL staff wi
points (likely Food and Beverage staff) 
 Transport  Ground
 RAL ligho
Road Services staff) 
 Control 
RAL staff may be required to place a o 
road below the workshop, a
vehicles (likely Road Services staff) 
 E forcement 
entification • Disaster Victim Id
o RAL staff may be required to set aside an area for identification and secu
storage of deceased persons 
nications 
e Whakapapa Sko Th
Controller eith
VHF radio system 
• Aircraft 
• Information Services and Me
 
4.3.3 RAL Eruption Response Plan 
 
Numerous attempts were made by the author to view the RAL eruption response plan, to
avail. It was later discovered during the interview stage of this project that RAL does not have 
a specific ‘plan’ to use in the response to a volcanic event; they plan to begin th
a
 
4.4 Discussion 
een derived from the prec
• Have changes to training design influenced sta
knowledge? 
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• Are staff aware of the evacuation procedure? 
Can a CIMS structure be applied to a ski area response• ? 
nagers during a volcanic crisis, or are they 
• 
 skier 
and facilities increase, and the difficulty this may add to the response and 
 
• How can risk at the ski areas best be managed to include maximum economic 
vitality? 
 
 
 
• Are seasonal staff dependent on ma
confident in their knowledge of the response actions? 
• Will communication be efficient? 
• Are staff versatile enough to respond to a different style of eruption? 
• Do the DoC and RAL Eruption Response Plans have similar goals? 
Are staff knowledgeable of past eruptions and the impacts on the ski area? 
• What do staff expect to happen during a volcanic event? Do they have realistic 
expectations? Are they educated on physical stressors, but also told what to expect 
mentally? 
• IS RAL aware of the increasing risk from a volcanic event on their ski areas, as
numbers 
evacuation?
 
Figure 4.6 De-icing crew at Whakapapa, 2005 winter season 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter Five 
 
Methodology 
 
In this chapter, the methodology of this research project is discussed. Participants of the study and 
ethical issues relating to the study are presented. The four main data collection methods are also 
explained in detail, and topics of the staff interviews and surveys are also discussed. The Grounded 
Theory Method is then introduced and explained, including the selection of themes. The analysis 
methods applied to the four types of data are also brought up. The reliability and validity of the 
data and analysis is explained. 
 
5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Participants 
Participants for this study were staff working for Ruapehu Alpine Lifts during the 2005 winter 
season. Both permanent and seasonal staff were included. Staff were randomly selected from all ski 
field departments: 
• Permanent staff/ Management, 
• Ski Patrol/ Trail Safety, 
• Lift Operators, 
• Snow School, 
• Customer Services, 
• Food and Beverage, 
• p/Retail,  Rental/Worksho
• Groomers, and 
 Road Services. •
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Staff were invited to participate in the study by a request from the interviewer. Participation wa
voluntary, however all staff approached to be involved in the study decided to participate. An 
s 
formation sheet was then provided to participants of the semi-structured interviews (Appendix 2). 
 
5.2 Ethical Issues 
greeing that their 
articipation in the research was not anonymous but would be confidential.  
 
5.3 Data Collection 
.3.1 Staff Training Observation 
rd 
, 
sions were observed for Food and Beverage, Lift Operations, Snow 
chool, and Groomer staff.  
.3.2 Staff interviews 
e 
aff 
utes 
heir knowledge of volcanic hazards and RAL’s response plans. 
ll interviews were audio-taped. 
in
 
Details about this research project were sent to the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee for review and approval. Participants also signed consent forms, a
p
5
 
Staff induction week took place from June 13th to 16th at Turoa ski area, and from June 20th to 23
at Whakapapa ski area. The general company induction was observed by the author for both ski 
areas. Health and safety training sessions were observed for Lift Operations, Customer Services
Food and Beverage, Rental, and Road Services staff at Turoa ski area. At Whakapapa ski area, 
health and safety training ses
S
 
5
 
Staff interviews were conducted at Whakapapa ski area by the author; 13 permanent staff wer
interviewed from June 8th to the 10th, before staff induction week, and 13 seasonal staff were 
interviewed from July 29th to August 1st.  Seasonal staff interviews occurred a month after st
induction week, but before the lahar warning system simulation. The interviews were semi-
structured, as a guideline of interview questions was prepared but participants were allowed to 
guide the interviews to a point. Participants were questioned to saturation, which is the point where 
participants could add nothing further to the question. Interviews ranged in length from 16 min
to 69 minutes. The interview lengths were dependent on the length of time the participant had 
worked at the ski area, as well as t
A
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The ll
n, including daily roles at the ski area, 
• Wa
• Res
pany is making 
o Suggestions for improving the response, and  
tion at the ski areas for volcanic hazards. 
.3.3 Staff surveys 
minimized as far as possible. The survey can be found in Appendix 2. 
 fo owing basic topics were covered in the interviews: 
• Background informatio
• 1995/96 eruptions, 
uction week, • Staff ind
• Volcanic Hazards at Ruapehu, 
• Lahars, 
rning system at the ski area, 
ponse to a volcanic event 
o Any assumptions the com
o Problems that may arise 
o Stressful issues for staff 
o Their specific role in the response effort 
• Public educa
 
5
 
Surveys were prepared by the research team, and distributed by RAL Human Resources staff at 
both Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas. In total, 225 surveys were given out; 150 at Whakapapa and 
75 at Turoa. 70 surveys were returned by Whakapapa staff, which represents a response rate of 
47%, and 19 by Turoa staff, which represents a response rate of 25%. The total response rate was 
40%. The distribution of departments and years worked by survey respondents can be seen in 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. Survey questions were open-ended to ensure that bias in responses 
were 
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Figure 5.1 Departments worked by survey respondents. 
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Figure 5.2 Length of experience at ski area 
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5.3.4 Observation of simulation and blind test 
 
Two tests of the warning system were held during the 2005 winter season. The first was held on 
August 3rd and was a simulation exercise for ski area staff. All staff were notified of the test ahead 
of time and reminded of the correct actions to take. Observers from GNS, DoC, and RAL 
(including the author) were placed in strategic positions around the ski area (Figure 5.3) and took 
observations of the alarm audibility, customer response, and staff response to the warning system. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Observer locations for simulation exercise 
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A second test of the warning system was held on October 12th and was designed to be a blind test, 
where staff would be unaware of an impending alarm. However, due to unusual activity, 
particularly the presence of a camera crew filming the test, many staff were suspicious. The Ski 
Patrol radio channel was also observed during this test. Observers from GNS, DoC, and RAL 
(including the author) were placed in strategic positions around the ski area again (Figure 5.4) and 
took observations of the alarm audibility, customer response, and staff response to the alarm. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Observer locations for blind test 
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5.4 Data Analysis 
5.4.1 The Grounded Theory Method 
 
Grounded theory was developed in the late 1960s by Glaser and Strauss (1967) as a method of 
qualitative research which would allow theory to be generated systematically from the data. 
Therefore, in classic grounded theory, data is collected, coded, and conceptualized simultaneously 
throughout the project (Lacey and Luff, 2001). Generally, the strongest cases for use of grounded 
theory is when researching exploratory studies (Lacey and Luff, 2001) or to gain a new perspective 
in a familiar situation (Stern, 1994). Charmaz (1994) defines grounded theory research as: 
 “Grounded theorists affirm, check, and refine their developing ideas, but they do  
 not limit themselves to preconceived hypotheses…the groundedness of this  
 approach fundamentally results from these researchers’ commitment to analyze  
 what they actually observe in the field or in their data”. (p. 68) 
 
Grounded theory often begins with a clear, but broad, research question, rather than a tightly 
framed hypothesis (Charmaz, 1994). The researcher then begins collecting the data, constantly 
looking for relationships by comparing categories to form the base of the emerging theory (Lacey 
and Luff, 2001). This process continues until theoretical saturation is reached, which is where no 
new significant categories are emerging from the data (Lacey and Luff, 2001). It is possible that 
during the research, new ideas will emerge which may lead the researcher in unanticipated 
directions (Charmaz, 1994).  
 
Themes can then begin to be developed from this data, as codes pull together discrete statements, 
events, and observations. At first, the data can appear confusing and unrelated, however by coding 
order will begin to be created (Charmaz, 1983). According to Holsti (1969) themes that begin to be 
developed should:  
(i) reflect the purposes of the research,  
(ii) be exhaustive,  
(iii) be mutually exclusive, 
(iv) be independent, and  
(v) be derived from a single classification principle.  
 
For themes to be exhaustive, all relevant items in the data analysis must be capable of being placed 
into a category. Categories must be constructed by trial and error methods, which consists of 
“moving back and forth from theory to data, testing the usefulness of tentative categories, then 
modifying them in light of the data” (Holsti, 1969, p. 104).  
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There are many different units of analyses that can be used. For this research, themes will be used. 
A theme is generated when similar issues and ideas are brought together by a researcher into single 
categories. Themes can either be labelled by a word or description directly from the data, or one 
created by the researcher to best describe what is being said (Lacey and Luff, 2001). It is the most 
useful unit of content analysis because it is indispensable in research on propaganda, values, 
attitudes, beliefs, and the like. However, the main drawback of using themes is that boundaries are 
not easily identifiable (Holsti, 1969). It is also important to make themes fit the data, rather than 
forcing the data to fit into the themes (Charmaz, 1983). Themes may then be sub-divided into sub-
categories, which will help to build and clarify a theme (Charmaz, 1983). However, developing 
these sub-categories will increase as the researcher will have to make finer and finer judgements: it 
is also imperative that sub-categories do not become so narrow that the sub-categories become 
virtually identical with the raw data (Holsti, 1969). The themes and sub-categories for this study 
can be found in Appendix 6. 
 
There have been recent criticisms of grounded theory, particularly of not using literature to develop 
the categories. However, Charmaz (1994) argues that when using grounded theory the literature 
review is only delayed, not overlooked, and this delay decreases the likelihood that the researcher 
will become led by preconceived conceptual blinders when interpreting the data. 
 
5.4.2 Staff Training Observation Data Analysis 
 
The staff training observations were typed and separated into ski area, and then departmentally. 
The training induction week observations were summarized, as was the Health and Safety Session, 
into the main ideas. Common themes and important points from the lahar safety sessions were 
extracted from the observations. 
 
5.4.3 Interview Data Analysis 
 
Following the interviews at Whakapapa ski area, audio-tapes were converted to digital files and 
then transcribed by the author, which was useful for gaining initial familiarity with the data. Non-
verbal cues were also recorded in the transcript, as they are important elements of a conversation 
and may give added insight into the spoken word (Lacey and Luff, 2001). Interviewing is a way to 
come to understand the beliefs, attitudes, and expectations of the other person, and begin to 
understand the cognitive models that shape their worldviews (Krippendorff, 2004). Mental models 
can be elicited and evaluated by using open-ended interviews which allow the participants to  
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describe complex processes in as much detail as possible (Spedden, 1998), such as a ski area 
evacuation. Familiarisation with the data then continued, by re-listening to the audio-tapes and re-
reading the transcripts and making general notes.  
 
The interview transcripts were then open-coded for main themes, by colour coding and sorting key 
phrases in the text. Although this does not seem scientific, it is one of the best ways to begin 
hunting for patterns (Ryan and Bernard, 2005). According to Seidel (1998), this initial sorting has 
three effects:  
1. It leads to revisions in your coding scheme 
2. It helps you notice new things in your data 
3. It facilitates the process of thinking and making discoveries. 
 
Recurring themes were then noted and looked for in other interviews. Triangulation was used to 
identify any relationships between themes. The list of themes and sub-categories can be seen in 
Appendix 6. Important quotes that illustrated the main ideas were then extracted from the text.  
 
5.4.4 Survey Data Analysis 
 
Surveys were collected by Human Resources at Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas, and mailed to the 
author. The data was then entered into SPSS 13.0, and analyzed. The complete results can be seen 
in Appendix 3. Similarities between the interview data and the survey data were looked for and 
noted.  
 
5.4.5 Simulation and Blind Test Observation Data Analysis 
 
Observation sheets were collected from the observers following the simulation and blind test. 
These were typed up, and the observations were split into specific areas so the author could begin 
to get an idea for how each department and each part of the ski area responded. This then gave an 
overall idea for how each department remembered and responded to the training they had received. 
The complete results can be seen in Appendices 4 and 5. 
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5.5 Reliability and Validity 
According to Krippendorff (2004), for data to be reliable, it must: 
1. have been generated with all conceivable precautions in place against known pollutants, 
distortions, and biases, intentional or accidental, and 
 
2. mean the same thing for everyone who uses them. 
Therefore, the most important form of reliability is replicability (Krippendorff, 2004). In qualitative 
data analysis, it is important for the researcher to demonstrate that the methods that have been used 
are reproducible and consistent (Lacey and Luff, 2001). Reliability is a “function of the coder’s 
skill, insight, and experience, clarity of categories and coding rules which guide their use; and the 
degree of ambiguity in the data” (Holsti, 1969). Categories must be defined to accurately measure 
the ideas the researcher is trying to measure. This can in part be accomplished by developing rules 
that allow multiple coders to categorize and code the data in the same way over a period of time 
(Writing Center at Colorado State University, 2005). This is referred to as stability. 
 
Inter-rater reliability was used to provide a check on the consistency and transparency of the 
analysis (Lacey and Luff, 2001). Data analysis for this study was undertaken by two separate 
researchers. Both researchers initially coded the interviews, then compared themes and sub-
categories to ensure reproducibility. There were very few inconsistencies in this initial coding 
process between researchers. 
 
It is also important that research yields valid results, as the research effort should be open for 
careful scrutiny and the interpretation can be upheld in the face of other evidence (Krippendorff, 
2004). In other words, “validity will be judged by the extent to which an account seems to fairly 
and accurately represent the data collected’ (Lacey and Luff, 2001). However, validity cannot be 
ascertained through duplications, as reliability does not guarantee validity. For example, although 
two researchers may agree on their interpretation, they may have similar worldviews that differ 
from the worldviews of those whose beliefs, actions, and intentions are at issue (Krippendorff, 
2004).  
 
Triangulation is often used to demonstrate rigour of the research. Triangulation means that data is 
gathered and analyzed from more than one source to give the researcher a fuller perspective on the 
study (Lacey and Luff, 2001). In this research project, various data sources were analyzed, such as 
semi-structured interviews, survey responses, observation of warning system tests, and observation 
of staff training. Contradictions and differences between the different data sources was used to spur 
the researcher on to further investigation to make sense of what was happening (Lacey and Luff, 
2001).  
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Results and Initial Discussion 
 
Results from the research are presented here. The first section looks at the results from the analysis 
of the staff training observation for the 2005 winter season. The complete observations can be 
found in Appendix 1. Staff survey results are then discussed in multiple subsections relating to the 
main topic of each area of the survey. The full survey results can be found in Appendix 3. The staff 
interview results are also detailed, and are also split into subsections of the main themes that were 
brought up by staff members. The results from the observations of the simulation are also 
summarized, with the complete observations listed in Appendices 4 and 5.  
 
6. RESULTS 
6.1 Staff Training for the 2005 winter season 
Opening days for Turoa and Whakapapa ski areas were June 17th and June 24th respectively for the 
2005 ski season. Staff induction week took place from June 13th to 16th at Turoa ski area, and from 
June 20th to 23rd at Whakapapa ski area. Training at both ski areas had fairly similar set-ups; 
however the content discussed was slightly different. Both staff induction weeks began with a 
general company induction for new staff, which lasted 4 hours. The RAL general manager spoke 
about the history and future of the company at each session, including the 1995/1996 eruption and 
its effects on the ski areas. Also mentioned were major activities for the ski areas for 2005, as well 
as company values and policy. New staff were then introduced to department managers. After this 
general session, staff were split into their departments to attend department-specific training 
sessions for the rest of the week. 
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In the past, RAL has provided all staff with one health and safety training session that all new staff 
were required to attend. Coverage of the volcanic hazard safety training lasted approximately 20 
minutes, the majority of which included watching the RAL/DoC lahar hazard safety video. In the 
video, the past Safety Services manager covered volcanic hazards and  the Eruption Detection 
System (EDS), and briefly described past damage on the ski area from lahars. The correct response 
actions were also explained for different areas of the ski area, however these actions were heavily 
biased towards the likely response actions of Lift Operators and Ski Patrol, leaving many 
departments uncovered.  
 
The 2005 winter season was the first year RAL implemented some of the training 
recommendations from Ward et al. (2003), by separating each department for separate health and 
safety training sessions, which included the lahar hazard training and also by asking returning staff 
to attend. The Safety Services department at each ski area led the Health and Safety training 
session covering volcanic hazards, mountain environmental hazards, avalanche awareness, fire 
safety and detection, the snow responsibility code, RAL health and safety system, and department 
safety, in approximately two hours. The largest portion of time was spent on the mountain 
environmental hazards and avalanche awareness. At the beginning of the training, staff were given 
a test to fill in during the presentation to be submitted later. The following sections will cover the 
observations from only the volcanic hazard section of the Health and Safety training.  
 
6.1.1 General Structure of Volcanic Hazard Training 
 
The volcanic hazard training sessions at Whakapapa and Turoa were both given using the same 
power-point presentation. The sessions at Turoa lasted for 10 minutes on average, followed by the 
RAL/DoC lahar hazard video. The sessions at Whakapapa were run more as a workshop and 
averaged 30 minutes, also followed by the RAL/DoC lahar hazard video. The beginning of the 
session focused on introducing the staff to the warning system at Whakapapa ski area, and the 
pager system at Turoa linking them to that warning system. The 1995/95 eruptions were also 
introduced, with a brief description of the eruption. Staff were then shown the public education 
poster and brochures, and told about the lahar paths and summit hazard zone. They then were given 
a brief description of what will happen when the warning system is triggered. The next part of the 
session was specific to each department, with each department being described the specific 
response actions they will need to take. The video was then played, however in about half of the 
sessions that were observed the tape failed to work, having either sound problems or cutting out 
after about five minutes.  
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The following section briefly summarizes the department specific training observed at each ski 
area. A complete summary of observations can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
6.1.2 Summary of Department-specific training 
 
Turoa 
 
It was mentioned in all the lahar hazard training sessions at Turoa that the main hazard at the ski 
area was from ballistic bombs. The feeling that Turoa was at much lower risk than Whakapapa was 
also told to staff, and the overall feeling about a potential eruption was positive, with it being 
described as ‘cool’ and ‘awesome’. The session leader also went into detail about his experience 
during the 1995/96 eruptions, which staff were interested in. All the departments received specific 
instructions about their role in the response to a volcanic eruption, with Lift Operations receiving 
the most detailed instructions. Staff in all sessions were found to be concerned that Turoa did not 
have a warning system, as well as whether there would be any warning signs before an eruption. 
Some groups of staff, particularly Road Crew and Customer Service, thought they would not have 
to worry because they likely would not be on the mountain; however the session leader stressed 
that they could be on the mountain skiing when an eruption occurred, so it was also important to 
know for personal safety.  
 
Whakapapa 
 
At Whakapapa, emphasis was laid on informing staff about the lahar hazard on the ski area. Most 
departments were informed that the likely warning time between when the warning system sounds 
and when a lahar may enter the ski area to be three minutes. However, this is likely an over-
estimation, as the warning time is expected to be closer to 90 seconds. All departments were given 
specific instructions as to their response, with Lift Operations receiving the most detailed 
instructions. The higher risk in the Far West area was also brought up with Snow School staff. Staff 
at Whakapapa were far more concerned over certain issues than Turoa staff, such as: 
• Whether the mountain would have warning signs before an eruption,  
• Whether people on the ski area had died during past eruptions, 
• Customers panicking, 
• The evacuation plan,  
• Communications during the event, and 
•
 
 The Crater Lake Tephra Barrier collapse.  
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It was also emphasized to staff that there would be practice alarms at the ski area, as well as 
potential false alarms, but that it was important to treat each alarm as real.  
 
6.2 Staff Surveys 
.2.1 General 
oa ski 
 
ment staff 
aditional feeling that Whakapapa ski 
rea is at much higher risk from volcanic hazards than Turoa.  
), 
r 
d by second year staff (19%), four or more year staff (9%), and third year staff 
%) (Figure 5.2).  
.2.2 Lahar Knowledge 
cation posters located around the ski areas. Other 
responses included can be seen in Figure 6.1. 
 
6
 
The following results are from the 2005 winter season staff survey from Whakapapa and Tur
areas. Refer to Appendix 3 for the complete survey results. 150 surveys were handed out to 
Whakapapa staff, and 75 were handed out to Turoa staff encompassing all ski area departments.
79% of the returned surveys were from Whakapapa and 21% were from Turoa. The significant 
difference in response rates may possibly point to several factors, such as seasonal staff at Turoa 
not being as concerned about volcanic hazard as seasonal staff at Whakapapa or manage
at Turoa not being as keen to get surveys out to their staff and have them completed as 
management staff at Whakapapa. This likely results from the tr
a
 
The majority of staff respondents were from the Rental/Workshop/Retail departments (42%), 
followed by Food and Beverage staff (24%), Snow School staff (11%), Lift Operations staff (10%
Road Services staff (8%), management staff (5%) and Ski Patrol/Trail Safety staff (1%) (Figure 
5.1). Although surveys were handed out randomly to each department, none were received at eithe
ski area from the Customer Service department or the Snow Grooming department, and only one 
survey was received from Ski Patrol/Trail Safety staff. The majority of respondents were first year 
staff (67%), followe
(5
 
6
 
Staff respondents were first asked to identify what they thought a lahar was. The majority of 
respondents said volcanic mudflow (49%), which is the definition presented to staff in seasonal 
training as well as the definition on public edu
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Figure 6.1 
 
 
ain. 
ilar misconception during the 1991 Pinatubo eruption, and 
accounts it to 
e 
 the impression that flowing lava is the principal volcanic 
roduct and hazard.” (p. 97) 
 
lthough lahars may also form by collapse of a crater lake (see Section 2.3) or as a secondary event.  
on 
e a river’ (14%), ‘flows down the mountain’ 
), and ‘like a flash flood’ (10%). 
 
 
The majority of responses are similar to a volcanic mudflow, however the responses ‘hot’ and
‘lava’ are incorrect. The confusion with a lahar being hot is relatively easy to explain, as it is 
relatively unknown that lahars at Ruapehu are known as cold lahars, which are near supercritical 
temperature when they are flowing and freeze almost instantly when they stop moving (Manville, 
2005). A lahar is not flowing lava either, although this misconception may also be easy to expl
Rodolfo (1995) experienced a sim
the following: 
“In a way, it is a pity that the lavas of Hawaii are so spectacularly photogenic, because 
images of flowing fountains and streams of lava dominate most television and film footag
of eruptions and leave us with
p
 
Therefore, it is possible that ski area staff at Ruapehu are applying this same recognition of 
Hawaiian volcanoes to an eruption at Ruapehu. Another note of interest is that 73% of staff 
respondents referred in their definition to either an eruption or volcanic activity occurring alongside
a lahar or causing a lahar to form. This is largely correct for a lahar that would affect the ski areas, 
a
 
Respondents were then asked how a lahar was likely to act (Figure 6.2). The majority of 
respondents indicated that a lahar ‘runs downhill, usually in the valleys’(23%). The other comm
responses included ‘fast moving’ (17%), ‘flows lik
(11%
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Didn't understand
Runs down particular paths
Like a tsunami coming down a...
Like thick porridge flowing downhill
Flows down the mountain
Slides down mountain
Violently
Mudflow
Flows down the hill but not very fast
Fast moving
Runs downhill, usually in valleys
Anyway it wants
Runs downhill taking out everythin...
Like an avalanche
Flows like a river
Like a flash flood
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23.0%
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1.1%
1.1%
13.8%
10.3%
How does a lahar act? (n=89)
 
 
Figure 6.2 
 
All responses were fairly consistent with the typical behaviour of a lahar, which is running 
downhill in valleys at a fast speed. The respondents who answered a lahar is ‘not very fast’ and 
moves ‘like thick porridge’ are of concern, as they likely do not understand the speed with which a 
lahar is likely to be moving through the ski area. Fortunately, this was a very small percentage of 
responses.  
 
Staff respondents were then asked how much warning time they believed there would be between 
an eruption (or the alarm triggering) and a lahar entering the ski area (Figure 6.3). Responses were 
grouped into seven categories: 
• Not much warning time (23%) 
• 2 to 5 minutes (16%) 
• 5 minutes (18%) 
• 5 to 10 minutes (7%) 
• 10 minutes (11%) 
• 10 minutes to an hour (10%) 
• Over an hour (1%) 
 
It was indicated by 5% of respondents that they were unsure of the warning time.  
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Figure 6.3 
 
The majority of respondent (56%) felt there would be a short amount of time to respond, at least 5 
minutes or less. Of particular concern are the 23% of staff respondent who believe they would have 
over 10 minutes, and up to and over an hour, to respond before the lahar is a threat to the ski area. 
However, the 1995 lahars entered the ski area 90 seconds after the initial eruption (Nairn et al., 
1996) and it is likely the warning time for a future event may be similar. It is likely that these staff 
are unaware of the 1995 lahars and the speed to which they moved. If staff assume a longer 
warning time, the less likely they are to develop a capability to respond immediately, increasing the 
risk in the event of a suddenly-occurring, fast onset event.  
 
The next survey question asked respondents about the potential hazards from a lahar (Figure 6.4). 
A majority of respondents indicated ‘death’ (55%) and ‘injury’ (21%). Following ‘death’ and 
‘injury’, the next highest responses were ‘being swept away by a lahar’ (19%), ‘damage to 
buildings’ (19%), and ‘damage to lifts’ (19%).  
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Figure 6.4 
 
These responses were quite different than what was expected by the author. There was a slight 
misinterpretation of the question, as the term ‘hazards’ was meant to insinuate possible sources of 
danger to a person caused by a lahar, which could result in ‘death’ or ‘injury’. Examples of this 
include getting swept away or being hit by rocks. Therefore, ‘death’ and ‘injury’ were not expected 
responses, however the overwhelming number of recipients who indicated ‘death’ or ‘injury’ from 
a lahar shows it is of major concern to them. Respondents also seemed very concerned about 
damage to ski area infrastructure (51%). 
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6.2.3 Lahar Training 
 
The next question asked respondents if they thought lahar training was important. The response 
was overwhelmingly positive, as 97% of staff indicated they thought it was important, while only 
2% thought lahar training was not important. 
 
Respondents were then asked why they thought lahar training was important (Figure 6.5). The 
majority of responses were ‘to prevent accidents and fatalities on the ski area’ (44%), as well as ‘to 
learn the correct response actions’ (43%) and ‘to increase awareness’ of the volcanic hazards at 
Ruapehu (38%). Other responses included: 
• ‘Because the volcano could erupt at any time’ (17%) 
• ‘Because there are going to be lots of panicked people’ (2%) 
• ‘We are responsible for the wellbeing and safety of our customers’ (1%) 
 
3% of responses were negative, as those respondents thought lahar training was not important 
because they ‘don’t live near volcanoes’ (1%) and because they are ‘working in a safe zone’ at the 
ski area (2%). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 
 
An interesting dilemma on the ski area is that many staff work in ‘safe’ areas, which was reported 
by respondents in this survey for why lahar training was unimportant (2%). This is a valid feeling 
for staff to have, however staff in safe areas will have just as important role during a volcanic event 
as those out on the ski area, as they will be required to keep customers calm and in the safe areas. 
Therefore, it is an important point for senior staff at the ski area to stress to seasonal staff. 
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6.2.4 Likelihood of a volcanic event 
 
The next question asked respondents when they think the next volcanic event is likely to affect the 
ski area and were given the choices of ‘within the next year’, ‘within the next ten years’, ‘within 
your lifetime’, ‘not within your lifetime’, and ‘don’t know’ (Figure 6.6). The majority of 
respondents chose ‘within the next 10 years’ (38%). A surprising number of respondent chose 
‘within the next year’ (28%), followed by ‘within your lifetime’ (17%). No respondents chose ‘not 
within your lifetime’, and 16% of respondents were unsure of when the next volcanic event was 
likely. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 
 
Some of the surprising number of respondents for ‘within the next year’ (28%) can likely be 
attributed to the increase in media coverage of the Crater Lake barrier failure (see Section 2.3). 
Media have reported that the Crater Lake barrier may fail within the next year (The New Zealand 
Herald, 2005a and 2005b), which many staff may have recalled to influence their response for this 
question. This demonstrates the importance for lahar training at the ski areas to focus on explaining 
the difference between a Crater Lake barrier failure lahar and an eruption-caused lahar, as only the 
latter has the potential to affect the ski area. 
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6.2.5 Warning System Knowledge 
 
The next survey question asked staff what the components of the warning system at their ski area 
are (Figure 6.7). Because of the different style of warning systems at both ski areas, responses were 
split into Whakapapa and Turoa staff.  80% of staff at Whakapapa ski area were aware that the 
warning system at their ski area consisted of ‘siren and speakers’, with some respondents indicating 
an ‘announcement’ would also be played (35%). Some staff displayed knowledge that the volcano 
was being monitored (24%), with 21% of all respondents specifically referring to the ‘EDS’.  
 
The majority of staff at Turoa ski area knew the volcano was being monitored in some way (58%), 
and 26.3% of all respondent specifically referred to the ‘EDS’. Of concern are the 32% of staff who  
indicated that the warning system at Turoa comprised ‘sirens and speakers’, which is not true. It is 
likely these staff are confused with the warning system at Whakapapa ski area.  
 
 
 Figure 6.7 
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Also of concern is that none of the Turoa staff noted that the warning system used notification by 
‘radio’, which is how management staff at Turoa plan to get the word out to staff on the ski area 
that the EDS has been activated. However, 11% of respondents indicated there would be an 
‘announcement’, which is correct for those staff within range of the PA system at Turoa, which is 
located in the base area. Other respondents thought that ‘staff’ also made up a significant part of the 
warning system (11 %). 
 
6.2.6 Confidence in RAL 
 
Respondents were then asked if they thought RAL was prepared to handle a volcanic emergency 
situation (Figure 6.8). The majority of respondents (74%) indicated they felt RAL was prepared, 
however there were also respondents that did not feel that RAL was prepared (15%). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 
 
Respondent were then asked why they felt RAL was or was not prepared to handle a volcanic 
emergency. The main positive responses included ‘because of the health and safety course’ (25%), 
‘because they have a plan’ (22%), and ‘because of previous experience’ (17%). Other responses 
can be seen in Figure 6.9. The most common negative responses were ‘because staff should get 
more training’ (5%), ‘because staff don’t know the evacuation procedures (4%), and ‘because staff 
and public do not have enough knowledge’ (4%). Other negative responses can be seen in Figure 
6.9. Several staff were also unsure of whether RAL was prepared  
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to handle a volcanic emergency, because ‘they have not seen them in practice (3%), ‘they may not 
know what they’re doing (1%), and ‘a lahar is different than any other hazard’ (1%) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 
 
The high number of respondents indicating they feel RAL will be able to handle an eruption is not 
surprising, with many staff referring to the health and safety course, as well as the ski area having a 
‘plan’ and experience in eruptions to explain their confidence. The majority of negative responses 
seem to circulate around staff not having enough training, and not having enough knowledge about 
the ‘plan’. This is often the outcome of the presumed existence of an ‘effective’ response plan, as it 
often lulls personnel and management into a false sense of security (Paton, 1996a) as it is believed 
that the plan will encompass and be able to handle every situation the emergency may present. First 
year staff are also often likely to have a more optimistic view of the company they are employed 
by. 
 
6.2.7 Role Requirements for response 
 
The next question asked staff respondents if their role requirements during a lahar warning were 
explained clearly (Figure 6.10). 54% of respondents said their roles were explained clearly, with 
26% saying their role was not explained clearly.  
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Figure 6.10 
 
Staff were then asked to explain their role requirements during a lahar warning (Figure 6.11). The 
majority of staff indicated their role was to ‘move their group to a safe area’ (55%). Other common 
responses included ‘to calm people’ (23%), ‘move people to higher ground’ (17%), and ‘give out 
information’ (17%). Lift operators also specified that their role would include clearing customers 
off lifts. Of concern are the 8% of staff who indicated their role requirements had never been 
explained to them.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 
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The responses given by staff were fairly similar to what they were told in their lahar training 
sessions during staff induction week. The only response action given that was never discussed is to 
‘evacuate building’ (1%) which is the incorrect action to take as all buildings on both ski areas are 
in safe zones, and staff are encouraged to take a proactive role in keeping customers inside.  
 
6.2.8 Working with others 
 
Staff respondents were then asked a series of questions about working with others in their response 
role. Staff were first asked if their role included working with others, with 85% of respondents 
indicating ‘yes’ and 7% of respondents indicating ‘no’. The next question asked if they felt their 
training for working with other was relevant. Many staff seemed to be unable to understand this 
question and skipped over this part of the survey. The staff that did answer the question were mixed 
in their response. 32% thought the training was adequate because ‘I already work with people in 
my job’, but 26% of staff thought the training was inadequate because ‘I have not had any training 
for working with others in the case of an emergency’ (26%). Other responses can be seen in Figure 
6.12. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 
 
These results show the mixed confidence of staff at the ski area in handling a volcanic event. The 
responses ‘I already work with people in my job’ and ‘I know how to work with people’ show the 
common feeling of staff that handling a volcanic eruption will be relatively easy, as they will be 
able to apply common sense and daily job skills to the response effort and they discount how stress 
will affect their response. While this may be relevant in some ways, it is likely that staff  
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underestimate the potential high stress situation that may be caused by a volcanic event. Some staff 
respondents also mentioned the need to do a ski area simulation (10%). This has already been 
committed to by RAL and DoC, as a simulation and later-season blind test will be run every year, 
following recommendations by Leonard et al. (2004).  
 
6.2.9 Response to a volcanic event 
 
The next series of questions asked staff about what they thought could happen during a volcanic 
event at the ski area. The first question asked staff to specify what sorts of situations they think 
could be most stressful when the lahar warning system activates. Respondents indicated 28 
situations they felt would be hardest to deal with. The most common response of staff was 
‘panicking customers’, which was listed by 59% of respondents followed by ‘lost children/missing 
people’ (17%), ‘customers not knowing where to go’ (14%), and ‘people failing to listen’ (12%). 
Other responses can be seen in Figure 6.13. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13 
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Respondents were then asked what the different possible reactions from customers to a lahar 
warning could be (Figure 6.14). Similar to the above question, an overwhelming majority of staff 
indicated ‘panic’ (84%), followed by ‘confusion’ (25%), and ‘fear’ (21%). There were also a 
certain number of staff who gave positive possible reactions, such as ‘interest/curiosity’ (8%), 
‘calm’ (7%), and ‘asking a staff member what to do’ (5%). Less frequent responses can be seen in 
the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 6.14 
 
Respondents were then asked what customer needs they think they may have to deal with during a 
volcanic emergency. The most common answers were ‘providing reassurance/patience’ (31%), 
‘letting them know what is happening’ (28%), and ‘location of family members’ (26%). Other 
responses can be seen in Figure 6.15.  
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Figure 6.15 
 
The high number of respondents who were concerned with handling panicking people is not 
surprising, as it was one of the possible situations that was stressed in various lahar hazard training 
sessions during induction week training at the ski areas. The high number of situations presented by 
staff in the three previous questions indicates that there are very different ideas between staff 
members of what exactly will happen during the response to a volcanic event. Such diversity can 
be positive, as Morrissey and Reser (2003) found during a study on cyclone preparedness that 
being able to anticipate, then recognize and manage such emotional responses as anxiety during the 
threat of a disaster was shown to enhance successful coping, promote preparedness, and reduce 
post-traumatic stress. Although a cyclone and volcanic eruption are very different events, as the 
warning time for the impact of a cyclone is much longer, this principle can still be applied a 
volcanic event. A staff member who anticipates different situations that may occur after the 
warning system has gone off will likely be able to handle them much better than a staff member 
who only imagines panicky customers as being a problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results and Initial Discussion 85
 
Staff respondents were then asked if they thought they had received adequate training to deal with 
these issues (Figure 6.16). Feelings were mixed on the training, as 51% of respondents thought the 
training was inadequate and 45% thought that training was adequate. However, the number of 
participants who thought the training was inadequate can also be turned into a positive, as it 
indicates that there was good uptake of the issues that will have to be addressed, and hopefully 
recognition of differences between routine work and emergency work. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16 
 
Staff were then asked why they felt the training was inadequate or adequate (Figure 6.17). Positive 
responses received included ‘the training received was already good’ (20%) and ‘because it is 
common sense’ (17%). The neutral response given for this question was ‘won’t know until it 
happens’ (6%). An alarming number of respondents ‘didn’t receive any lahar hazard training’ 
(34%). It is possible that these staff members did attend the health and safety training but could not 
remember any specific lahar hazard training or did not take is seriously as it was not central to their 
job. However, it is more likely that these respondents were employed by RAL after staff induction 
week or were returning staff who chose not to attend the health and safety session. This introduces  
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a dilemma for RAL, as it is difficult to train new staff for lahar hazards after the staff induction 
week as the ski area will then be in full operation and managers may not be able to take time to 
administer the safety course. Some staff who received the induction training at the beginning of the 
year may also leave the ski area before the end of the season, to be replaced by new staff who have 
not had any lahar hazard training. Therefore, staff will be joining the company throughout the 
winter season, so it is difficult to know when the best time of the season would be for a second 
training session.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.17 
 
It is concerning that 17% of staff felt that dealing with the issues presented was common sense as 
the actual actions of a lahar response are not generally common sense reactions, particularly for 
international employees who have never lived in a geologically active area like New Zealand. For 
example, moving to higher ground, which means out of valleys and on to ridge lines, is not 
generally a common response to a ski area alarm sounding. As well, waiting in safe areas while the 
volcano may be erupting is also not a common sense reaction. This suggests that some staff 
underestimate what they may have to do, the time available, and how stress might affect their 
experience and actions.  
 
The next survey question asked the potential consequences to skiers in the path of a lahar when it 
enters the ski area (Figure 6.18). ‘Death’ (74%) and ‘injury’ (41%) were the most common 
responses. Other responses included ‘getting caught up in the lahar’ (30%), ‘getting  
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trapped/isolated’ (9%), ‘take out buildings/lifts that customers may be on/in’ and ‘getting caught in 
an avalanche caused by the lahar’ (1 %). Most of these  responses would likely result in death 
and/or injury to customers.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.18 
 
6.2.10 Public Education 
 
The final survey questions asked respondents if they had seen any public education on volcanic 
hazards at their ski area. 79% of respondents had seen some form of public education, whereas 
20% had not. Respondents were then asked what the posters on volcanic hazards said. The most 
common responses were ‘shows safe areas’ (52%), ‘procedure to follow’ (43%), and ‘shows 
possible lahar paths’ (34%). Other responses can be seen in Figure 6.19. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.19 
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6.3 Staff Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with staff at Whakapapa ski area. The first round of interviews was with 
permanent staff, and the following round of interviews was with first year seasonal staff. The 
interviews were designed to gain an understanding of staff awareness of the lahar hazard, 
estimation of the response effort, and confidence in RAL. Interviews were conducted with staff 
from Ski Patrol (2), Rentals (2), Food and Beverage (3), Retail (2), Customer Service (3), Road 
Services (3), Snow School (5), and Lift Operations (6). The results from the interviews only apply 
to Whakapapa ski area, unless otherwise indicated. 
 
6.2.1 Daily jobs 
 
All staff seemed very comfortable discussing aspects of their daily tasks. All staff also seemed to 
have some knowledge of the 1995/96 eruptions, the impacts on the ski area, and the 1995 lahars. 
Most seasonal staff said the eruption was discussed in lahar hazard training, but is not usually 
mentioned in daily activities at the ski area. A few of the permanent staff interviewees had worked 
at the ski area during these eruptions. They seemed to believe that although the eruption in 1995 
was fairly unexpected, the ski area gained a lot of knowledge from dealing with the eruption and 
the experience would help them in a future event. A permanent staff member mentioned  
“there was times when we were doing a wee bit of head banging and you’re getting people 
heading in the wrong direction, and um, not really coordinating things because it was the 
first time we’d had a major eruption on the hill. But this next time, I think things would go 
a lot smoother”.  
 
It is unknown whether any of the lessons learned from the 1995/96 eruptions were documented by 
RAL, despite numerous attempts by the author to find out. Another staff member said handling the 
past eruption made him/her more confident for handling a future eruption, because: 
“I’ve experienced it. I’ve been here. I’ve seen it. I know the procedures. I know that you 
have to move to higher ground and I know that you have to round up people and keep 
calm, keep them cool, and get them to higher ground, and access a way down”.  
 
Permanent staff also made reference to personal experience in eruptions or handling traumatic 
events much more than seasonal staff members. This is fairly unsurprising, as permanent staff have 
been working on the ski area much longer than seasonal staff and are generally older. Also, 50% of 
the seasonal staff hired by RAL tend to be international, who are likely not used to being around 
active volcanoes. The personal experience of staff is important for RAL to be aware of, as Drabek 
(1986) notes that specific events remembered by those who experience a crisis remain referent 
points, which are shared with others for decades to come, especially if no comparable event occurs. 
Therefore, the memories staff have of the 1995/96 eruption event (right or wrong) will likely be 
shared each year with new members of staff. 
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Ski Patrol and Lift Operations staff that were interviewed seemed to make frequent mention of 
other hazards experienced by the ski area, with the most common being avalanches. Avalanches 
have become a concern of late for both Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas, as many skiers and 
boarders have become eager to get into the backcountry. There have also been deaths at the ski 
areas due to burial by avalanches, which makes it a significant hazard for staff to deal with. In the 
past, a permanent staff member mentioned that:  
“lahars were sort of the furthest thing from our mind…we had so many more immediate 
problems”.  
 
This brings up a dilemma for RAL, as it is obviously difficult to focus resources on one hazard 
when others may seem more threatening. The following method is used by Ski Patrol to determine 
the amount of time they put into a specific hazard: 
“Frequency and severity…decides how much weighting we put on how much training and 
input we have into something. So something like a lahar, severity’s quite high, frequency’s 
relatively low, you know, so whereas, there’s a lot of other emergencies…that frequency’s 
a lot higher, severity’s quite high so we put more into training for them.” 
 
This stance is very understandable, as it is quite common in disaster planning for there to be 
competition between activities for limited resources (Paton, 1996a), even in organizations with 
much fewer daily hazards then the ski area. The goal then for RAL is to be able to develop a 
concise, informative training program in the time they allow for lahar hazard training, which also 
supports other hazard responses. 
 
6.3.2 Lahar Hazard Training 
 
Staff were asked about staff induction week and the lahar hazard training. The set-up for the lahar 
hazard training session was described by a course organizer as follows: 
“We pretty much identify that…it’s a significant hazard where we work…Pretty much the 
guts of how we look at it is two things. We kind of identify lahar paths to them, so look at 
the poster…and, um, and then we talk about actions, so we talk about how we’ll know if a, 
if a lahar is imminent, and what, what actions they should take as to where they are.” 
 
Most staff mentioned they were told about where the safe zones were and their initial response 
actions. Four of the 26 staff interviewed (two seasonal, two permanent) had never attended the 
lahar hazard training, however they all seemed to have informally picked up the general points 
covered in the training session. One staff member indicated 
“I never know where they are or what it does. I’ve only, all I’ve seen is the, you know, just 
a pamphlet they give out to read. That’s all I’ve had”.  
 
 
A few permanent staff members made reference to how much the training had improved this year 
compared to the last few years, as this was the first year that the lahar hazard training was provided  
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in separate departmental sections. However, many seasonal staff felt that training could only help 
people handle an eruption event to a point. For example, one response received was: 
“I think information is always good. The more you know the better. But, um, there can be 
people that you can train forever and ever, and they’re just panic-stricken people no 
matter what you tell them. They’re just gonna go psycho, you know. I definitely think it’s 
necessary to get training, just so you know what’s going on…I don’t know, in the end I 
think it…boils down to character.” 
 
This is a common attitude to have, however it tends to encourage inactivity in regards to the lahar 
safety training. It insinuates that training is only beneficial to a point, and anything after that is a 
waste of time. However, it is true that personality type is a large contributor to how one is able to 
cope with a disaster.  
 
6.3.3 Eruption Event 
 
Staff were then asked a series of questions about an eruption event at Ruapehu, such as the hazards 
associated with a volcanic event, the frequency of eruptions, and the effect of an eruption on the ski 
area. Seasonal and permanent staff were all knowledgeable of the possible hazards to the ski area 
during an eruption, with the main one mentioned being lahars, followed by ash fall and rocks. Staff 
were also confident in defining a lahar and the likely effect of one on the ski area, although two 
seasonal staff members defined a lahar as flowing lava.  
 
Most seasonal staff gave the frequency of eruptions at 10 to 20 years, whereas most permanent 
staff thought the time was longer between events, with frequencies from 10 years all the way up to 
50 years being given. Seasonal staff were more likely to call on lahar training and the public 
education posters as their sources for the information about event frequency, whereas most 
permanent staff verbally calculated the frequency relying on their memory of past events. It is then 
not surprising that permanent staff members tended to indicate longer frequencies, as the eruptions 
recalled were in 1975 and then again in 1995. Many did not seem aware of all the smaller but 
potentially dangerous eruptions that occurred in the last 50 years at Ruapehu. A common result of 
underestimating the frequency of events is known as gambler’s fallacy (Morrissey and Reser, 2000, 
and McClure and Williams, 1996). The simplest way to describe this psychological reaction is that 
gamblers tend to judge their chances of winning to be higher when they have previously lost a 
gamble (McClure and Williams, 1996). Therefore, because the last eruption occurred in 1996, and 
one thinks the frequency of a return event is 40 years, then they feel it is unnecessary to take  
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preventative actions because the next event will not happen for 40 years time. Also, because no one 
has been killed in a previous eruption event on the ski area (the Tangiwai lahar disaster was not 
related to an eruption), most staff may believe that the next event will also have the same result.  
 
All staff on the ski area seemed to be accepting of the fact they were working on an active volcano 
and had to be prepared for an eruption. One staff member reasoned: 
“You’re on an active mountain,  you know. It’s something you’ve got to think of daily. 
Admittedly, I don’t think I think about it all the time, but it’s one of those things I’m aware 
of... being up here and working up here it’s something you have to keep an eye and ear out 
for.” 
 
Seasonal staff seemed very curious and interested in an eruption. Many indicated they thought it 
would be “cool” if there was an eruption during their time working at the ski area. These same staff 
members also seemed very confident that RAL was sufficiently prepared to handle an eruption and 
were optimistic the response would go smoothly. Interestingly, these staff also indicated that an 
eruption would likely result in closure of the ski area and loss of their jobs, and possibly death and 
injury. Many staff members who mentioned death or injury as a consequence seemed to imply it 
would be other people in danger, not themselves. This is referred to by McClure and Williams 
(1996) as unrealistic optimism, where one displays a sense of personal invulnerability; they believe 
they are much less likely than the average person to suffer misfortune. A consequence of this 
outlook is generally an underestimation of risk. In this study it was found that those staff members 
who indicated death and injury as a consequence to a volcanic event (although none specifically 
referred to the possibility of themselves dying or being injured ) were generally also the most 
concerned about the volcanic hazards, initial response, and ski area evacuation. 
 
Many staff also indicated they were concerned the volcano could erupt differently than it had in the 
past. Issues raised by staff included that the lahars may travel down a different path than expected 
possibly into safe areas, the lahars may enter the ski area quicker than they had in the past, the 
lahars may be bigger in size, there may be no warning signs preceding the eruption, and most 
commonly that the eruption may be much larger than past events. Generally staff seemed to have a 
defeatist attitude in regards to a different style event. A common opinion found was: 
“The whole mountain could blow up, like the whole mountain, a really big chunk, like the 
top half goes flying or something. I don’t actually know the probabilities of that happening, 
but that’d be interesting. We’d all die, but it’d be crazy.” 
 
Other staff members used the possibility of a larger eruption for proof that lahar hazard training 
was irrelevant: 
“If it was the biggest, like if it was a pyroclastic eruption, it wouldn’t matter what courses I 
did, I’m gonna get incinerated. I can’t run fast enough to get away from that.” 
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Morrissey and Reser (2000) believe this is a natural reaction to a stressful situation, as repeated 
thoughts that the event is an awesome and uncontrollable ‘act of nature’ can create feelings of 
helplessness resulting in the justification of not taking preventative actions. On the ski area, these 
feelings can result in staff not taking training and a warning system alarm seriously. More 
importantly, it may also result in ski area management taking a negative view towards preparing for 
a larger scale volcanic event situation. It then becomes important for RAL to direct attention away 
from the fear-inspiring ‘volcanic eruption’ to concrete actions that one can take to protect oneself, 
which limits the attitude towards fatalism (McClure and Williams, 1996).  
 
Another issue causing confusion about a volcanic event at the ski area is a Crater Lake tephra 
barrier failure lahar (Section 2.3). A few staff members, both permanent and seasonal, indicated 
they thought the barrier failure lahar could affect the ski area. A few staff members indicated that it 
was likely to do so in the next few years. The reasons for this thinking are likely related to 
increased media coverage of a Crater Lake break-out lahar, particularly in the local newspaper, 
which at the time was publishing a weekly information box on the status of the Crater Lake. The 
easiest way around this confusion is for it to be stressed during the lahar hazard training session 
that a break-out lahar will not affect the ski area, as only an eruption has the potential of ejecting 
water into a position where a lahar may be formed above the ski area.  
 
However, despite staff knowledge of the volcanic hazards, many were still very uncertain about the 
eruption event. A few seasonal staff indicated that flowing lava would be present and many staff 
had no idea if there would be warning signs before an eruption. Many had not heard of the idea of a 
‘blue-sky’ eruption, judging from the following two responses, the first from a permanent staff 
member and the second from a seasonal staff member: 
“I’d say there’d definitely be warning signs, from what I understand. And that would be, it 
could be in the form of thermal, thermal eruptions, or it could be seismic activities,” and 
 
“I don’t think…an eruption would be that spontaneous that you’d have to, that you’d have 
a full mountain of people to, to get everybody off, do you know what I mean?” 
 
If staff believe they will receive warning before an eruption, they may feel it is unnecessary to learn 
the proper response actions as they assume they will either not be present on the ski area or will 
have time to find out what to do when an event occurs. However, it is often difficult to interpret 
signals given by a restless volcano (Peterson, 1988), such at Ruapehu. It is therefore important for 
management to stress the possibility that the eruption could be a ‘blue-sky’ event and the 
importance of preparing for that and that stress will affect what they can do.  
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More concerning is the lack of knowledge about the likely warning time between activation of the 
warning system and a lahar entering the ski area. Only three permanent staff members knew the 
1995 lahars entered the ski area within 90 seconds, and they estimated the warning time for a lahar 
in the future would be similar. It is constructive to base response capabilities on the worst case 
scenario, because if staff can respond to that they will be able to deal with any other eventuality. 
Seasonal staff were very unsure of the potential warning time, with most being unsure and others 
stating the warning time would be over 10 minutes. A few Snow School instructors indicated they 
would likely have time to ski their classes to the bottom of the ski area: 
“I’d get off the mountain….I’d get my students probably to ski in front of me and I’d ski 
behind. And get them all down and get their skis off. Ski, and then, just, ya, get to the 
carpark and evacuate, just get out.” 
 
It is likely that this instructor would not have the same response plan if he/she knew the warning 
time could be around 90 seconds, similar to the 1995 lahars. Therefore, the warning time must be 
quantified in training, as to say ‘not long’ means different things to different people, and then 
stressed repeatedly by indicating the need to quickly get to higher ground. 
 
6.3.4 Warning System and Tests 
 
All staff interviewed were reasonably knowledgeable of the warning system at the ski area. All 
knew it existed, and that a siren and announcement would be broadcast over the ski area. However, 
permanent staff were more concerned about the warning system than seasonal staff. A few raised 
concerns over whether the warning system would actually be triggered by an eruption, and also 
whether they would be able to hear it in their position on the ski area.  
 
Issues regarding the testing of the warning system were also brought up during the interviews, with 
permanent staff having much more to comment on the issue. This was likely because their extended 
employment on the ski area has resulted in them being present for past simulations, blind tests, and 
false alarms of the warning system. Permanent staff had very positive opinions of simulations 
performed in the past, and seasonal staff seemed to feel their lahar hazard training would have been 
more complete if they would have participated in a simulation (which they were due to have 
approximately one week after the interviews were conducted). A seasonal staff member reasoned: 
“There’s not been like a drill or anything where we can all actually see for ourselves what 
we’re meant to do. I mean, it’s alright them explaining it to us in, in a comfy room down 
here. But when it’s up there, and it’s happening and there’s noise and people shouting 
stuff…”  
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Opinions on blind tests of the warning system were mixed amongst permanent staff members. 
Some felt that blind test were very important: 
“Because it keeps people on their toes. It sees what actually people are actually gonna do 
rather than getting reminded that morning ‘alright, so you’re gonna be on this lift at that 
time and when that happens you do this, and…’. I think with a volcanic emergency then, 
um, you’re not really gonna get told what to do.” 
 
However, the same staff member later said that he/she believed a simulation was much more 
effective than a blind test at teaching staff their roles during a volcanic event. Permanent staff 
members generally also felt concerned about the loss of urgency with regards to the response to an 
alarm. For example, one staff member said: 
“Well from what I’ve seen, whenever we’ve done practices, um, people generally, or not 
generally but often, just, just ignore it. People in the valleys often just fall over and lose all 
of their ski gear and spend the next sort of 10 minutes picking it up and trying to get it back 
on, just standing in valleys.” 
 
Nevertheless, many of these same staff members thought it was very important to have tests of the 
warning system, but implied the importance of having a balance between making sure that the 
warning system is working well and desensitizing people. The concept of desensitization is 
discussed by Morrissey and Reser (2000), as it is common for one to feel that nothing is going to 
happen after hearing a number of warning messages that do not result in an emergency. The 
anxiety that accompanies the warning messages may become switched off, causing one to stop 
listening and attending to the warnings. It was stressed to groups during Whakapapa staff induction 
week that staff should treat all alarms as real, however it may be important to repeat the importance 
of responding quickly to the alarm which may go off multiple times in a single season. 
 
On March 22nd, 2005, there was a false alarm at the ski area due to a power failure in Whakapapa 
Village and subsequent failure of the back-up batteries. The lahar warning alarm was also triggered 
for Whakapapa Village. The alarm ended up ringing on the ski area for 15 to 20 minutes, and RAL 
staff were unsure of whether it was a real alarm. RAL staff were eventually informed after 
contacting the DoC Visitor Center that it was indeed a false alarm. However, RAL still had 
customers up on the ski area who were not notified and several ended up calling ‘111’ to determine 
whether it was safe to come down. RAL was only aware of these customers after they received a 
call from the police in Wellington. The customers eventually walked down the mountain but were 
very upset at not being notified it was a false alarm.  
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Management at RAL found their staff response on the day disappointing, stating that: 
“I think the key, the disappointing thing about that day was just, was probably….I had a 
feeling that most people…in the company probably assumed it was a test.” 
 
This brings up another issue for RAL, which is their preparation for an alarm in the off-season and 
how they will notify customers on the ski area. It is a very different situation than the winter, as in 
the summer the RAL operating area only extends from their lift at the bottom to the top of the top 
lift for people using the lifts to get up to the Crater Lake. The situation also will likely not be as 
dangerous in the summer, with less people on the ski area and less snow. The most important issue 
that was raised during the false alarm was the desensitization of staff to the alarm, as most ignored 
it, however customers on the field who were hearing it for the first time were quite flustered. This 
issue likely lies more in the hands of DoC than with RAL, as DoC is able to make a an 
announcement over the entire ski area at any time. It would have been beneficial during this 
situation for DoC to broadcast a false alarm statement as soon as possible, which should be a lesson 
taken from this false alarm.  
 
6.3.5 The Response Plan and CIMS 
 
The concept of a response ‘plan’ was also brought up often by staff members during the interviews, 
particularly Ski Patrol staff. Most seasonal staff members were confident the ski area would have a 
plan, as can be seen in the following response: 
“They’ll have it sussed. I’m sure they’d have to. They’ll have to for legal obligations 
anyway. They’ll have to have like a 100 page document on what to do, what would happen, 
all the different scenarios, and how to combat them.” 
 
Staff members who held this optimistic view of a ‘plan’ were also likely to be very optimistic about 
the response effort. As discussed in the previous section, this is often the outcome of the presumed 
existence of an ‘effective’ response plan, as it often lulls personnel and management into a false 
sense of security (Paton, 1996a).  
 
However, there is currently no specific eruption response plan at the ski area. As far as the author 
could tell, there is a broad plan for responding to emergency situations that would be applied to a 
volcanic event. A member of Ski Patrol justified this approach: 
“I guess the attitude we try to take is that many of those emergencies on the surface are, 
um, the same. It involves a certain amount of people that are in a certain amount of stress 
and need to get somewhere, um, and, and that’s really what, what it comes down to, ya.” 
 
However, this idea of a generalized emergency response plan did not seem to resonate with other  
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staff members. Another permanent staff member requested a more specific plan: 
“I would like to know there was an overall action plan and I would like it divided down 
departmentally into what we do and what our role is within that, and who we talk to from 
our role within that. I’d like it to be organized before it happens.” 
 
 
Staff were also questioned about CIMS (a formalized emergency response plan), which the ski area 
may hope to employ in their response to a volcanic event. A member of Ski Patrol described that  
“we have done some CIMS training with the key management here, um, which has, I think 
will help in the management of the longer term evacuation”.  
 
Only three staff members, two from Ski Patrol and a former Medical Center nurse (currently in 
Customer Services), had any idea what CIMS was. However, all three were very positive about the 
potential for implementing a CIMS structure during a response. A member of Ski Patrol described 
the benefits of using CIMS: 
“Basically, just gives you a structure and a systematic approach to dealing with stuff, and, 
um, it’s a way of learning from, historically from mistakes at big incidents. And, um, and 
come out with a system which will guide people through that and avoid making the same 
mistakes. It’s a really good way of recording all the actions of what happened, and, um, 
and it assist with the decision making process which promotes a group decision making.” 
 
It is likely that if a CIMS structure would have been used at the ski area during the 1995/96 
eruptions, the response of the ski area would have been documented so current management could 
learn from the mistakes made in 1995/96. However, if most members of management staff at the 
ski area are unaware of CIMS, then it is likely that using it in a response to a volcanic event would 
be impractical.  
 
There has been talk on the ski area during the 2005 winter season that a detailed CIMS plan will be 
developed for the response to a volcanic event by the Safety Services department. If so, it is very 
important that this document is developed alongside the DoC Eruption Response Plan, so that the 
two plans can feed positively off one another. The plan should be backed up by regular simulations 
and exercises involving all staff and reviewed and re-developed as a result of the evaluation of 
these simulations and exercises. 
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6.3.6 Stage 1 – Initial Response 
 
The response to a volcanic event was divided into two parts by Galley et al. (2003): 
• Stage 1 – initial response 
• Stage 2 – evacuation of the ski area 
 
Most staff members interviewed seemed very confident in their role requirements for the initial 
response to activation of the warning system, particularly Ski Patrol and Lift Operators. Permanent 
staff often reiterated the need to stay cool, calm, and collected, as customers will look to them for 
help. Other staff members were very optimistic about the response effort, such as the following: 
“I think that as long as the staff have a base knowledge, with the experience that they have 
up here, that they can assume the worst and hope for the best, and rely on the public to be 
as patient and as understanding as they can be.” 
 
A few staff indicated they were very confident because they worked at the ‘Top of the Bruce’ area, 
which is a safe zone, so they did not feel they would be in huge danger. Although it is good for 
staff to be optimistic, overestimating response capabilities and underestimating risk can constrain 
disaster/crisis planning (Paton, 1996a) and may lead to an organization being not properly prepared 
for an emergency situation.  
 
The only ski area departments that seemed to be a bit confused of what they are supposed to do was 
Snow School and Food and Beverage staff. Snow School Instructors were concerned about how 
they would be notified about a volcanic event if they could not hear the warning system, as Snow 
School instructors do not carry radios. A few instructors indicated they would try to ski their 
classes to the nearest lift station instead of immediately taking to higher ground. An international 
Snow School Instructor indicated he/she was confused about locating safe areas during an eruption 
event: 
“I mean, we’ve got the maps, we’ve got the lahar safe areas. But when you’re actually on 
the mountain, it’s not, uh, certain where they are. I mean, when you’re skiing along as it is, 
it’s hard to know where you are. And especially if it’s bad weather as well…it’s hard to, 
sort of, orientate yourself.” 
 
It was suggested that safe areas be marked with green flags so that customers and staff will be able 
to know where to go. However, this is likely unrealistic because it creates more work for Ski Patrol 
to make sure that the flags are maintained and would also create an expectation in users that only 
flagged areas are ‘safe’. A more realistic solution would be to clarify in lahar hazard training that 
higher ground anywhere on the ski area is always a safe area. An animation of how a lahar moves 
down valleys may help to get this point across. It would also eliminate confusion if Snow School 
Instructors were to carry radios. This would be beneficial not only for a lahar response but also in  
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the general running of the ski area. Food and Beverage staff seemed confused about whether they 
should keep customers in the building or evacuate them outside. A simple solution to this problem, 
as suggest by a few staff members, would be to utilize the building fire warden also as an 
‘eruption’ warden. They could easily be trained the proper response during a lahar warning system 
alarm, and could take a leadership role amongst other staff in their building. 
 
Permanent staff raised many more concerns about the initial response than seasonal staff did, 
particularly keeping staff and customers safe. Some staff members indicated that:  
“it’s a very intimidating thought ‘cause I don’t really want to be involved in it. I’d rather 
watch if from a distance”, and 
 
“It would be scary because I’d be on my own. I’d have to deal with all these people on my 
own”.  
 
A few staff members raised concern that seasonal staff were expected to know what they needed to 
do, however it was likely that many of them would be unsure of what to do in an actual eruption 
event. One seasonal staff member explained “ 
“I think they think we have more knowledge than we actually do”.  
This may lead to confusion in an event response, as staff may not act immediately and may crowd 
the radio channels requesting instructions. Also of concern, especially amongst international staff 
members, was that many customers on the mountain may be inexperienced and unaware of what to  
do. RAL has tried to prepare for this problem, with the introduction of a poster public education 
campaign in 2004 at Whakapapa (David Johnston, personal communication, 2006).   
 
Snow School staff seemed to be the most concerned about customer safety. Each Snow School 
Instructor interviewed indicated that they would feel added stress in an emergency situation due to 
having the responsibility of looking after their classes. Several comments include: 
“You’re responsible for those children, so you wouldn’t want to make a wrong move, send 
them places where they shouldn’t go, take them places where they shouldn’t go,” and  
 
“You’re responsible for their, their lives, like, and you know you hope you make the best 
decisions based on the circumstances and on their ability.” 
 
Snow School instructors will have added responsibility during a volcanic event compared to other 
ski area staff. It is possible they may have a class of students with them, and it is likely those 
students would be children away from their parents. Due to the added pressure of not having a 
radio, it would be difficult for Instructors to get instructions on the evacuation procedure and to 
inform management staff of the children they have with them. This added responsibility should be 
explained to Snow School Instructors during lahar hazard training, as it will likely result in them 
being more concerned about knowing the proper response actions. 
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6.3.7 Stage 2 - Evacuation 
 
Staff were also asked about Stage 2 of the response procedure, which would be the evacuation of 
the ski area. All staff members were very uncertain about this stage of the response. Ski Patrol staff 
made the most mention of the evacuation procedure, however when questioned were very uncertain 
about what would actually take place during an evacuation. It was mentioned that a broad 
evacuation plan would be applied to an evacuation during a volcanic event. However, there could 
be problems with applying a broad evacuation plan, as parts of the ski area may be isolated by lahar 
paths and ash fall on the ski area may make mobility difficult. All staff seemed very uncertain 
about who would be in charge of the evacuation, and how they would receive information about 
what to do. A seasonal staff member showed their confidence in RAL: 
“Um, I’m sure they’ve taken…I’m sure when they study the mountain that they must think 
‘oh, ok, maximum, great day, how many people do we have on the mountain, how will we 
evacuate’. They must do that.” 
 
However, no one seemed to have any idea how long it would take to evacuate the ski area, with 
answers ranging from an hour to an entire day. It was also found that no one was exactly sure of 
just how many people would need to be evacuated: seasonal staff estimates ranged from 2,000 to 
20,000 customers on a busy day, and permanent staff estimates ranged from 4,000 to 12,000. This 
suggest that no one has worked out just how many people may be in each location on the mountain, 
how long it would take to get people down, or how many people would be on the mountain in total. 
Many seasonal staff indicated they would like a broad overview of how an evacuation of the ski 
area would work during the Health and Safety training, particularly on who would be heading the 
evacuation effort.  
 
6.3.8 Communication 
 
Staff also spoke about communication during a volcanic event. Permanent staff were more 
concerned about the method of communication and how they would receive information about 
things such as the status of the eruption, while seasonal staff were more concerned about how they 
would receive instructions. There were four methods of communication mentioned: radio, cell 
phone, landline, and verbal. Radio was found to be the main method of communication mentioned 
by the staff members. Because Snow School Instructors do not carry radios, they were more likely 
to refer to cell phones as their main method of communication. It is possible that radios may go 
down during a volcanic event, so the ski area would next rely on cell phones. However, during the 
1995 eruption at Ruapehu, cell phone services in the area were overloaded, collapsing cell phone 
networks (Peter Blaxter, personal communication, 2005). Due to increased cell phone usage  
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between 1995 and 2005, it is possible that cell phone networks in the area would be overloaded 
again during a volcanic event.  
 
Many seasonal staff indicated they would like to have instructions before beginning any response 
to the warning system: 
“probably the first think that I would do would, uh, look for some sort of supervisor or 
something to get instructions from”.  
 
Lift Operation seasonal staff seemed the most dependent on instructions from supervisors or 
management staff. However, permanent staff members generally had a different view:  
“I think with a volcanic emergency then, um, you’re not really gonna get told what to do”.  
Staff also believed that information about the volcanic event and response would constantly be 
passed to them. For example: 
“They’d be letting us know over…wireless. Every now, every now and then they’ll be 
giving us an update. They’ll be saying what’s going on, what’s occurred, what’s 
happening, what’s been taken out.” 
 
This is a fairly optimistic opinion of what will happen on the day, and shows the general trust 
seasonal staff have in the management at RAL. It is likely that during a volcanic event the 
management staff will have no idea what is happening with the volcano and what the damage is, at 
least for the first few hours. This brings up another communication issue, as management at RAL 
will have to be in communication with DoC and GNS about the status of the volcano and what their 
actions should be. It is best if this communication procedure is worked out beforehand, so RAL  
will immediately be able to get in contact with an outside information source. The response to the 
1995/96 eruptions involved 42 organisations (Johnston et al., 1999b), which gives an idea of how 
stressful communication (particularly trying to find out information from other organizations) may 
be during a volcanic crisis.  
 
Staff had different thoughts on who would be responsible during a volcanic event. Permanent staff 
were more likely to indicate Safety Services (Ski Patrol) and DoC as being responsible for handling 
the event. Seasonal staff were more likely to be reliant on their managers and supervisors. Ski 
Patrol members mentioned DoC as being responsible more than another staff member. Because 
they are deemed by most staff as being responsible for the response effort, Ski Patrol and 
management staff must show a keen interest in the volcanic hazards as the ski area, because 
organizational commitment to the programme is vital to its success (Paton, 1996a). This can be 
achieved by having responsibility vested in a key figure on the ski area, such as the Safety Services 
manager.  
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The importance of evacuation, communication plans, and information management at ski areas was 
recently shown during an incident in Lake Louise, Canada, when a gondola broke down, stranding 
skiers for up to 5 hours. Children were stranded on the gondolas away from their parents, and 
minimal effort was made by the ski area to communicate with parents. The resort claimed the 
evacuation was done according to protocol, using 120 personnel, and that delays were due to the 
fact that the evacuation was taking place in a dangerous environment. However, the resort should 
have anticipated that any rescue on the ski area would likely take place in a ‘dangerous’ 
environment. One parent said “communication is key and in this case communication -- for myself 
on the ground, and my sons in the air -- was pretty much non-existent. My sons were literally and 
figuratively in the dark” (Tetley, 2005). Customers called the response an “absolute fiasco, the lack 
of every kind of organization one would expect”, the resort’s evacuation plan “flawed”, and 
demanded cash compensation from the ski area (Monchuk, 2005). However, it is likely that if 
communication would have been better between the ski resort, those in the gondolas, and those on 
the ground that many negative feelings and bad press would have been avoided. This is an 
important lesson for RAL to learn, as communication between groups both on and off the mountain 
will be vital to keeping customers and staff calm during a volcanic event, which will be a much 
more demanding situation than a stopped gondola. 
 
6.3.9 Stressors 
 
Staff brought up many potential stressors of responding to a volcanic event during the interviews. 
All of the following situations were mentioned multiple times: 
• Job loss 
• Closure of the ski area 
• Damage to lifts and buildings 
• Public reaction 
• People scared away 
• Problems with the Bruce road 
• Finding people on the ski area 
• High number of customers 
• People isolated by the lahar 
• Having to wait for instructions 
 Finding out-of-bounds skiers 
 
 
•
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The most commonly mentioned stressor was public reaction. Most staff interviewed believed that 
the public reaction would be negative, with customers not taking the alarm seriously, panicking, 
and not listening. A permanent staff member thought the biggest issue would be  
“…panic. People will panic and so therefore people don’t listen and things get out of 
control”. 
  
However, another staff member thought that opinion was likely an overreaction. He/she thought:  
“it’s funny, I think, you think there’s gonna be widespread panic and screaming. But I 
don’t necessarily think that’s gonna happen”.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, it is positive to find that staff members are thinking of many 
possible situations they may be placed in during a volcanic event. Morrissey and Reser (2003) 
found during a study on cyclone preparedness that being able to anticipate, then recognize and 
manage such emotional responses such as anxiety during the threat of a disaster was shown to 
enhance successful coping, promote preparedness, and reduce post-traumatic stress. Interestingly, 
Ski Patrol staff did not mention public reaction once during their interviews. Their interviews had a 
more militarialistic feel to them, as they discussed responses, procedure, and plans, but did not 
seem concerned about public response. 
 
Staff also mentioned consequences to skiers as a result of a volcanic event. The most common 
responses were death and injury, with permanent staff generally mentioning death and injury much 
more in their interviews than seasonal staff. Staff who did not mention death or injury as a 
consequence to a volcanic event generally seemed much more confident in RAL to be able to 
handle a volcanic eruption, and also in volcanologists to be able to predict an eruption. One 
seasonal staff member indicated:  
“they assume in the past it’s always been quite insignificant, that no one’s really died from 
it, other than the train years ago. But I guess they don’t, it’s not usually a huge life risk, is 
assumed”.  
 
It is important for staff to understand that there are real risks associated with a volcanic event and 
there are steps that can be taken to lessen these risks, as denial of risk generally leads to 
unpreparedness (McClure and Williams, 1996).  
 
Staff were also asked about their views on coping after a volcanic event. A member of Ski Patrol 
outlined the likely response the ski area would take after a volcanic eruption: 
“If it was just an eruption, we’d close the field and nothing happened, we’d debrief it 
definitely and from a technical point of view. And of course, the option would be to put up 
to everyone do they want to sit and talk about it, you know, psychologically or do they want 
to seek further help”.  
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Although the majority of permanent staff mentioned debriefing as a coping method, no seasonal 
staff mentioned debriefing, likely because they are unaware of what debriefing is. Most staff felt 
that coping was individual, as some people would have no problem recovering from a traumatic 
event while others may have a hard time. Most staff members thought that they could easily handle 
the stress of an eruption, like the following comment from a member of seasonal staff:  
“I wouldn’t be that worried about it. I would be sad about not being able to snowboard the 
rest of the season…I don’t think it would be necessary to give stress counselling….It 
probably would be upsetting, but I wouldn’t, it wouldn’t ruin my life I don’t think. Um, but 
for some people, ya maybe. Some people would feel really bad”. 
 
This again shows the personal invulnerability attitude that many staff had, by discussing how 
others may need help but not them. Staff were against mandatory counselling sessions, instead 
believing that one should request counselling if they would like to talk to someone.  
 
Because of the danger associated with working on a ski area and past traumatic events involving 
staff and customers, RAL has good relations with counselling services in their area and would 
likely be able and willing to provide that kind of support to staff members. However, in order for 
staff to make use of these services they must be aware of them. Paton (1996a) stresses that 
“training should cover the causes and consequences of traumatic stress, the development of realistic 
expectations about personal vulnerability, promote the use of appropriate coping strategies, and 
increase their awareness of the benefits of utilizing support services” (p. 212). These topics could 
easily be covered very quickly in the Health and Safety training session during induction week, as 
these issues can apply to many situations on the ski area, not just a volcanic event. 
 
6.3.10 Public Education 
 
Staff were also keen to discuss the volcanic hazards public education program in place at the ski 
area. Permanent staff mentioned that the ski area had been working hard to increase public 
awareness of the volcanic hazard, and the newest addition to that effort was mailing out ‘Volcanic 
Hazards at Whakapapa’ brochures along with season passes to all season pass holders at the ski 
area, which this year was 25,000 skiers. Most staff believed the program would raise customer 
awareness, leading to an improved response efficiency: 
“Well because the more the public know, the easier it is to deal with them. If they’re totally 
oblivious to what’s going on, well then it’s a hard, hard to explain it to them from scratch. 
If they’re a bit more clued onto it all the time, then it makes it easier for our staff to collate 
them and get them down.” 
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However, many seasonal staff were very pessimistic about the public education program, as they 
did not believe it would help new skiers as most would likely ignore the posters. For example: 
“It’ll make, maybe somebody who’s curious and is waiting in the queue, and then looks ‘oh 
ya, this is a volcano, wow, ya, ok, that’s a lahar, ok’. I mean, ya it’s, it’s informative for 
someone who looks at the poster and decides to read it and study it, ya. But when the 
actual volcano, you know, something happens or if there’s an actual lahar or whatever, 
will it help that person react better knowing? No, I don’t think so.” 
 
It was mentioned that RAL is hoping to develop some site-specific signs around the ski area to 
inform customers in that area what their actions should be: 
“We’ll also be developing…a site specific sign for the Far West T-Bar which details, just, 
just brings to people’s attention, to customers out there ‘cause that is probably one of our 
high risk areas on a fine day, uh, where they are and what their emergency plans should 
be.” 
 
It is likely that the development of site-specific signs could have more of an effect on customers 
than posters placed around the ski area, because they will likely have more specific actions to 
follow. According to Morrissey and Reser (2000), public education materials which heighten the 
salience, nature, likelihood, and magnitude of a natural disaster and do not provide concrete 
information about what to do and how to deal with the situation can often result in a diminished 
response and preparedness motivation. Therefore, any new public education developed for the ski 
area should be limited in its explanation of the hazard, but be concise and direct on the appropriate 
actions.  
 
 
6.4 Observation of Simulation 
A simulation of the warning system response took place on Wednesday, August 3rd, 2005 at 
Whakapapa ski area. It was a fine day with no wind, with all areas of the ski area open, except the 
Far West area. Because it was the middle of the week, the ski area was not crowded. Staff were 
supposed to be informed by their supervisors in the morning before they began working that a lahar 
warning system simulation would be taking place, and the appropriate actions they should take. 
While this may have happened for the Lift Operations and Ski Patrol staff, most other staff were 
just notified by radio that the alarm system would be going off.  
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Observers were put into position at the following places on the ski area (Figure 5.3): 
• Happy Valley 
• Top of the Bruce 
• Rockgarden 
• Hutt Flat 
• Waterfall Express Chair 
•   Knoll Ridge Café – Outside
• Knoll Ridge Café – Inside 
• Knoll Ridge T-Bar – Loading area 
a • Knoll Ridge T-Bar – Offload are
• Waterfall T-Bar – Loading area 
• Waterfall T-Bar – Offload area 
Offload area 
 Far West area  
overed. 
 just over five minutes. The complete list of 
bservations can be found in Appendix 4. 
ions 
t 
le to hear the 
larm. However, this is not a large concern as the Rock Garden is in a ‘safe area’. 
m, 
rm 
 even 
rfall 
ers. 
ustomers about what was happening. Outside, staff members also did not give any instructions to  
• Valley T-Bar – Loading area 
• Valley T-Bar – 
•
 
This resulted in fairly good coverage of the ski area, with all lifts and main cafes being c
The alarm was sounded just after 11am, for
o
 
Staff in the Lower Mountain safe areas, such as Happy Valley, Top of the Bruce (including LBC) 
and Hutt Flat, all responded very well, and were seen offloading chairlifts and giving instruct
and information to customers. Snow School Instructors in Happy Valley were very useful a
helping skiers to move up towards the Happy Valley café. The only problem in the Lower 
Mountain was at the Rock Garden drive station, as Lift Operations staff were unab
a
 
Staff response on the Upper Mountain was varied. Staff at the Knoll Ridge, Waterfall, and Valley 
T-Bars all reacted appropriately. Of concern was the slow response time by staff, especially at the 
Waterfall T-Bar area which is next to a lahar path. The Lift Operator was unable to hear the alar
and had a delayed response so the lift actually was not stopped until one minute after the ala
began ringing. Although customers on the T-Bar are not likely in danger, customers skiing 
generally do not tend to take the alarm seriously until they see the T-Bars stop moving, and
then there is a delayed reaction until the customers will head to higher ground. The sweep 
conducted by a Trail Safety member was also much too slow, as he/she did not enter the Wate
T-Bar area until nearly three minutes after the alarm had sounded. There is also danger at the 
offload areas of all three T-Bars, as staff members are not generally present to instruct custom
Response at the Knoll Ridge café was very poor. Inside, café staff did not instruct or inform 
c
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customers. This is essential, as it is important for staff in safe areas such as Knoll Ridge Cafe to 
inform customers that they are safe and should remain in the building. Confused customers may 
egin to head down towards the car parks, which may put them at significant risk. 
uring this test to determine if the speakers were working as the 
rea was not open to the public.  
 to 
 could learn if the response they took was the correct one and 
ake adjustments accordingly.  
 
6.5 Observation of Blind Test 
ar 
at 
d off 
taff member was heard asking if 
ey should begin assigning sweep positions for the blind test.  
 
t lift 
less 
kely does not teach staff anything new and does not give observers an honest reaction of how  
b
 
The Far West area was observed d
a
 
There were many lessons learned from this simulation. The first was the importance of a briefing 
amongst observers before the test for what is key to record, such as staff and customer response, as 
well as specific notes as to which speakers were working around them. The second was for staff
be debriefed after the test, so they
m
The blind test of the warning system took place on Wednesday, October 12th, 2005 at Whakapapa 
ski area. Conditions on the ski area were near white-out, with very low visibility. However, the ski 
area was still crowded due to good snow conditions and many school groups being present. The F
West area was open, although a few lifts were shut down just before the alarm due to decreasing 
visibility. Happy Valley was closed due to minimal snow coverage, so the Hutt Flat area was very 
busy with beginner skiers. There was no wind present. The test was organized to be blind, so th
staff would be unaware of the impending alarm. However, due to the presence of an increased 
number of DoC staff as well as a camera crew filming the test, it is likely that staff were tippe
that something unusual may be happening. Communication on the Ski Patrol radio was also 
observed, and about five minutes before the alarm a Ski Patrol s
th
 
There are many difficulties in regards to running a completely blind test on the ski area. In order to
maintain good relationships between organizations, DoC managers generally inform several RAL 
managers (mountain manager, ski area manager, and Safety Services manager) about the upcoming 
test. The Customer Service manager is generally also informed so that observers are able to ge
tickets. While some staff remain unaware, staff that will have an important role for an actual 
volcanic event response are generally aware of the impending alarm. In the author’s opinion, un
the second test can be truly blind, it is unnecessary to have a ‘blind test’ alarm every year, as it 
li
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customers and staff would respond to a real alarm, and may also result in desensitization to the 
larm system.  
Observe w n at the following places on the ski area (Figure 5.4): 
uce 
a 
a 
a 
a 
ng area 
rea 
 ski area, with all lifts and main cafes being covered. 
he alarm was sounded just after 11am, for just under three minutes. The complete list of 
tt 
yed. 
Instructors were very informative to staff, and Lift Operation staff acted fairly 
ppropriately. The overall trend in the Lower Mountain area was that customers wanted more 
oll 
 
e 
sponses, but once again were much too delayed. The Ski Patrol sweep by 
e Waterfall T-Bar took too long, with the Ski Patroller arriving at the bottom of the area four 
minutes after the alarm.  
a
 
rs ere put into positio
• Top of the Br
• Rockgarden 
• Hutt Flat 
• Waterfall Express Chair 
• Knoll Ridge Café – Outside 
• Knoll Ridge Café – Inside 
• Knoll Ridge T-Bar – Loading are
• Knoll Ridge T-Bar – Offload are
• Waterfall T-Bar – Loading are
• Waterfall T-Bar – Offload are
• Valley T-Bar – Loadi
• Valley T-Bar – Offload a
• Far West area – Top 
• Far West area – Bottom 
 
This resulted in fairly good coverage of the
T
observations can be found in Appendix 5. 
 
Response on the Lower Mountain was mixed. Staff at the Top of the Bruce seemed to respond 
well, particularly LBC Food and Beverage staff, Road Service staff, and Customer Service staff. 
Rental staff could have been more informative to the customers they were serving. Staff at Hu
Flat also responded well, although needed to respond much quicker as reactions were very dela
Snow School 
a
information. 
 
Response on the Upper Mountain was also mixed. Again, there was no response from Knoll Ridge 
café staff, likely because they could not hear the alarm inside the building. Staff outside the Kn
Ridge café had a better response, with Snow School Instructors giving instructions to customers. It
was also found that the Lift Operator at the Waterfall Express offload area was very busy, and 
would likely benefit from help from another staff member. Staff working on and around the thre
T-Bars had fairly good re
th
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The Far West area was also observed during this test. Staff were reported to have a very good 
reaction in most areas. There seemed to be a high number of Ski Patrollers in this area who gav
appropriate directions to customers. Lift Operations staff also responded well by giving direct 
instructions to customers about what was happening and wh
e 
ere to proceed to. Food and Beverage 
taff at the West Ridge café seemed unsure of what to do.  
te, although the reaction time of 
taff and customers must be improved in all areas of the ski area.  
 
s
 
Therefore, it seems that staff response to this blind test was adequa
s
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Further Discussion and 
Recommendations 
 
This chapter discusses key themes that relate to the initial objectives of the study; it builds on the 
result-specific discussion given in Chapter Six. Constraints to organisational commitment to 
disaster planning are discussed, as is RAL’s legal obligations to provide volcanic hazard training 
for their staff. A training needs analysis for the ski areas is also presented, broken down 
departmentally. Recommendations for Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas are then brought forth and 
discussed.  
 
7 FURTHER DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Common Organisational Constraints 
There are several factors that can constrain organisational commitment to disaster/crisis planning. 
Paton (1996a) acknowledges the following: 
• Underestimation of risk 
• Underestimating the consequences for employees and organisations 
• Overestimating existing (response) capabilities 
• Competition with other (mainstream) activities for limited resources 
• Difficulty substantiating the benefits 
• Ambiguity of responsibility 
 
This model can be applied to RAL and their commitment to preparing for a volcanic event.  
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7.1.1 Underestimation of risk 
 
In all of the research conducted for this study, underestimation of risk was found to be a common 
theme in almost all staff responses. As shown by the data, staff displayed an optimistic opinion of 
what was likely to happen on the day and generally showed an attitude of personal invulnerability. 
Staff working in safe areas, such as Food and Beverage staff and Rental staff, were most likely to 
display these characteristics. However, there is nothing to say that a volcanic event affecting the ski 
area will not be complicated and difficult to handle. If a 100-year frequency event (see Section 
2.2.4) were to hit during a fine Saturday at the ski area, the effects of an eruption would be 
incredibly complex and the impact extremely serious (refer to Sections 3.3 and 3.4). Even if a 
smaller event were to occur, the response would still be an incredibly complex and high stress 
situation, and require help from all RAL staff members. The biggest danger of underestimation of 
risk is that it generally leads to unpreparedness (McClure and Williams, 1996), which in this study 
would result in the ski area company feeling it is unnecessary to properly train staff and to develop 
an effective volcanic event response plan.  
 
There are many different factors that influence how risk is perceived. Paton and Sylvester (1996) 
reason that differences in such variables as life experience, emotional maturity, and cognitive 
sophistication will work together to influence how problems are defined, or in other words, the 
mental model one will develop about the risk of volcanic hazards at the ski area. Specific factors 
that may contribute to the development of one’s mental model of volcanic risk at the ski area 
include experience working at ski areas and familiarity with volcanic eruptions. See Section 7.3.1 
for a more detailed discussion on mental models. 
 
7.1.2 Underestimating the consequences for employees and organisations 
 
Another factor that was recurrent throughout the data was the underestimation of the possible 
consequences for employees and organisations of a volcanic event at the ski area. Staff were 
optimistic about the consequences of a volcanic event, including the psychological outcome 
(Section 6.3.9), which again displays the theme of personal invulnerability. Limited mention was 
made of possible consequences to the company. However, it is possible that if enough damage is 
done to the ski area facilities or if the response effort is handled improperly, the ski area may never 
be able to reopen due to either legal or monetary reasons. An example of this is the sale of the 
Turoa ski area to RAL by its former company after not being able to recover monetarily from the 
1995/96 eruptions. Also, if customers or staff are killed or injured by a volcanic event, RAL could  
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be held liable, particularly if it appears they were negligent about their preparation to handle a 
volcanic event. See Section 7.2 for a more detailed discussion. 
 
7.1.3 Overestimating existing (response) capabilities 
 
Overestimating the company’s response capabilities was also found to be a common theme in the 
data. As shown in Sections 6.2.6, 6.3.5, and 6.3.8, staff are confident that RAL will be able to 
handle a volcanic eruption and most are also confident in their personal ability to respond 
appropriately. Many staff also frequently referred to the ‘plan’; however the author was unable to 
find out if such a plan did in fact exist. The presumed existence of an effective response plan can be 
dangerous, as it often lulls personnel and management into a false sense of security (Paton, 1996a). 
This was proved at Whakapapa ski area, as those who were found to make reference to ‘the plan’ 
were also likely to be optimistic about the response. It is also likely that new staff will have a more 
positive view of the company’s response capabilities, which was also proved by this study, as new 
seasonal staff had a much more optimistic view than permanent staff.  
 
7.1.4 Competition with other ‘mainstream’ activities for limited resources 
 
This factor is of particular relevance to RAL. There are many everyday hazards on the ski area that 
are of concern to the company, such as cliffs and rocks. Also of concern are other hazards such as 
blizzards, avalanches, ice, environmental conditions (i.e. cold) and white-outs. It was determined 
that the amount of input the company makes regarding a certain hazard is determined by frequency 
and severity (see section 6.3.1). The company assigns others hazards a much higher frequency 
standing than lahars or volcanic events, even though the potential severity of a volcanic event 
might be equal or more than a different hazard. Therefore, this competition with more ‘threatening’ 
hazards tends to lead to the limited emphasis RAL puts on volcanic hazards in relation to others. 
The goal then in volcanic hazard training is for RAL to develop a concise, informative, specific 
training program in the time they allow for lahar hazard training, and to further train staff on 
handling emergency situations which focus on other ‘more likely’ hazards.  
 
Another area that suffers from competition with other activities is training staff who join RAL mid-
season in regards to volcanic hazards. It is likely RAL will need these staff to begin work 
immediately and managers may not be able to take time to administer the safety course. This is a 
difficult situation for the company, as it is understandable that new staff join throughout the winter 
season and it is difficult to train each person in the response to a volcanic event. The best way to  
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solve this is through incorporation of this issue into the culture of the organisation and its 
transmission through organizational socialization process (i.e. talking about it regularly with other 
staff) (Paton, 1999). Organisational commitment to the program, which can be accomplished by 
key ski area personnel taking the issues seriously and reflecting this to other staff members, is 
necessary to incorporate volcanic hazards risk into the organisation (see Section 6.3.8). 
 
7.1.5 Difficulty substantiating the benefits 
 
A common theme in many of the interviews with staff member was the feeling that how a person 
would respond to a lahar warning and cope after an actual event was very individual. While this is 
a correct inference, as people respond differently to emergency situations, a few staff members 
used this belief to suggest that lahar training was only beneficial to a point (see Sections 6.3.2 and 
6.3.9). These staff felt that it was necessary to learn about the hazards and to have support systems 
available to staff, but felt it was unnecessary for staff to receive training on emotions they may 
experience during and after an event. However, it has been found that coping issues relating to 
stress and trauma can be managed proactively using stress resilience training (Paton and Flin, 1999; 
Paton and Jackson, 2002). If a person can anticipate feeling he or she may develop, it helps to 
reduce post-traumatic stress as the person is able to then recognize and manage these emotions 
(Morrissey and Reser, 2003). It is also noted by Spillan and Hough (2003) that many businesses 
assume they will not be affected by crises, yet this assumption is overly optimistic and a formula 
for an ineffective response to an eventual crisis.  
 
7.1.6 Ambiguity of responsibility 
 
A dilemma facing RAL’s commitment to planning for a volcanic event is ambiguity of 
responsibility. Because Ruapehu is in a national park, DoC is in control of the area and RAL is a 
concessionaire, which means they pay DoC a certain yearly fee to be able to operate on the 
mountain. Therefore, there is mixed opinion as to how much of the response effort RAL will be 
responsible for. However, in order to plan for a worst case scenario, it is important for RAL to 
realize that it is possible they will be isolated and therefore solely responsible for getting all 
customers on the mountain to safety. Joint and inter-agency training/preparation is also important 
to ensure that issues are not missed because one agency assumes the other is responsible and has 
done something, as well as to help build understanding of their separate contributions to response 
and recovery management.  
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7.2 Legal Requirements for RAL 
RAL is required legally to provide volcanic hazard training to their staff due to two main reasons. 
The Health and Safety in Employment Act (Department of Labour, 2002) is the first reason, as 
there are numerous requirements made in the Act for employers. The object of the Act (Section 5) 
is to: 
• encourage the prevention of harm to all persons at or in the vicinity or a work place by 
promoting excellence in health and safety management,  
• define hazards or harm in a wide-ranging way,  
• impose persons who are responsible for work with various duties,  
• setrequirements that are flexible to cover different circumstances, and  
• recognize that successful management is also achieved through the input of those doing the 
work.  
 
There are certain requirements an employer also must meet, which are specified in Section 6 of the 
Act. Those that relate to RAL and volcanic hazards are as follows: 
• Provide and maintain a safe working environment for employees, and 
• Develop procedures for dealing with emergencies that may arise when employees are at 
work.  
 
Section 16 of the Act also stipulates that those who control a place of work must also take 
practicable steps to ensure that no hazard that is or arises in the workplace harms people in the 
vicinity of the area (including people in the vicinity solely for the purpose of recreation or leisure).  
 
The Act also stresses the three step process of either eliminating, isolating, or minimizing hazards, 
which is the same system that RAL uses in handling ski area hazards. Because the volcanic hazards 
at Ruapehu can neither be eliminated nor isolated, Section 10.2 of the Act requires that steps must 
be taken to minimise the likelihood that the hazard will be a cause or source of harm to employees.  
 
Of particular relevance to RAL is that Section 12 of the Act stipulates that employees must be 
informed of the hazard and provided with ready access to information about the hazard which the 
employee is likely to understand. At RAL, many employees are likely to be completely unaware 
when they first arrive at the mountain that there is an increased risk at the ski area from volcanic 
eruptions and that there is a set procedure they will need to be a part of in response to a volcanic 
event. The Act specifics that information must be provided about: 
• What to do if an emergency arises while the employee is working, 
• All identified hazards to which the employee may be exposed to while working, and  
• The steps to be taken to minimise the likelihood the hazards will be a cause of a source of 
harm to the employee 
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RAL is also obligated to provide volcanic hazard training to their staff due to the concession 
agreement between DoC and RAL. Because Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas are in a national park, 
DoC agrees to let RAL operate in the national park as a concessionaire. RAL then has certain 
obligations they must fulfil, which are contained in the concession agreement. Because of the 
commercial sensitivity of the agreement, the author was not able to be granted access to view the 
volcanic hazard section. However, it is understood that RAL is obligated to provide their staff with 
volcanic hazard training and to be prepared to handle a volcanic eruption (Graham Leonard, 
personal communication, 2005).  
 
 
7.3 Key findings 
The following findings correlate to the objectives in Section 1.2. 
 
7.3.1 Staff perception of the risks of volcanic hazards on the ski areas 
 
It was assumed at the commencement of this study that staff, especially seasonally-employed staff, 
would be unaware of the volcanic hazards at Ruapehu, and therefore would have a low risk 
perception of the volcanic hazards at the ski area. However, it was found that most staff are very 
aware of the different volcanic hazards at Ruapehu (Sections 6.2.2, 6.2.4, 6.2.8, and 6.3.3) yet risk 
perceptions encountered varied greatly. Some staff were very worried about handling a volcanic 
event and the hazards that may occur, while other staff were very confident and thought it would be 
easy to keep customers safe and evacuate the ski area quickly. Generally permanent staff were 
more worried about the volcanic hazards and response, and seasonal staff were found to be much 
more confident. It is a common reaction for people to be confident, as most view themselves as 
personally immune to hazards (Slovic et al., 1980). 
 
It is quite common for a group of individuals dealing with the same hazard to have very different 
risk perceptions (Paton et al., 2001). It has been found that differences in life experience, emotional 
maturity, and cognitive sophistication all play into how a problem is defined (Paton and Sylvester, 
1996). These are used to generate a mental model of a hazard, which can be described as the set of 
principles from which one generates predictions or ideas about a situation (Bostrom et al., 1992). 
Gregory et al. (1997) indicates several factors that influence one’s mental model: 
“Individual’s perceptions are likely to have geographical, social, economic, cultural, and 
temporal components, and include, consciously or subconsciously, factors such as the 
magnitude of the hazard, the cost and availability of alternatives, the degree of perceived 
control over the consequences, the degree of personal exposure, and other social costs and 
benefits” (p. 48). 
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Generally, when faced with uncertainty and complexity (which is expected when dealing with the 
response to a natural hazard), people use various methods to try to simplify their understanding of 
complex processes and relationships (Spedden, 1998). These may include: 
• Using decision rules, which are based on intuition and past experience, 
• Constructing mental models, and  
• Relying on outside sources of expertise (real or perceived). 
 
The mental models that people use to make sense of hazardous processes generally affect how the 
risk is perceived, and the cognitive, emotional, and behavioural efforts people make to deal with 
these situations will be shaped by their mental model (Spedden, 1998).  
 
It is also common for lay people’s mental models of hazards to differ greatly from expert 
perceptions of the hazards (Gregory et al., 1997; Bostrom et al., 1992), which may lead to 
important misunderstandings about the hazard. An example of this that was seen frequently in the 
interviews was the perception amongst staff of how a lahar would act. Some staff made reference 
to it being high enough to wash customers out of the chairlifts, and therefore believed the correct 
response should be to evacuate the chairlifts immediately instead of running them out. Other staff 
thought that a lahar would be hot and had the potential to burn them and other structures in the 
lahar’s path. If management staff leading the lahar hazard training session are unaware of these 
misconceptions, it is very difficult for them to correct them. Staff also seemed very unaware of how 
fast a lahar can move and how short the warning time is between the warning system activating and 
the lahar entering the ski area. If staff were more aware of this, it is likely their risk perceptions 
would be quite different.  
 
It was also found by Gregory et al. (1997) that individuals are prepared to tolerate risks in certain 
circumstances, in return for benefits the circumstances may offer. Slovic (1987) found that the 
public will accept risks from activities such as skiing that are 1000 times as much as they would 
tolerate from involuntary hazards. This was also referred to by staff at RAL, with one staff member 
describing: 
“like people don’t, they don’t care {about the volcanic hazards} as long as they’ve got 
some good skiing around” 
 
It is important for risk perception of volcanic hazards by staff on the ski area to be high, as those 
who perceive they are vulnerable are generally more likely to respond to warnings and undertake 
protective behaviour (Johnston et al., 1999a). The difficulty on the ski area lies in convincing staff 
that the risk of a volcanic event affecting the ski area is fairly high, but that certain activities can 
lower the risk to themselves and to customers. A major barrier to this is the personal invulnerability  
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displayed by staff members throughout the interviews, who repeatedly pointed out that other people 
may die but did not indicate they would suffer the same fate (Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.9). Other staff 
also felt a ‘blue-sky’ eruption would be unlikely, therefore the risk to them would be low as they 
would likely not be on the ski area if it was going to erupt (Section 6.3.3).  
 
In conclusion, it was found that staff were knowledgeable about the volcanic hazards at the ski 
area, including lahars, but had differing perceptions of the risk associated with these hazards. This 
shows the different mental models that staff members have of a potential volcanic event.  
 
7.3.2 Staff knowledge of procedures for the response to a volcanic event, particularly the 
evacuation stage (Stage 2) 
 
It was found in this study that staff were very knowledgeable about the initial response (Stage 1) 
actions they would be required to take during a volcanic event (Section 6.3.6). This is positive, as 
staff have similar mental models of the immediate response to the warning system. Staff will likely 
have high self-efficacy for this part of the response, which is defined as an individual’s judgement 
regarding their capabilities to execute courses of action required to achieve objectives (Bandura, 
1997). This is important, as irrespective of the level of perceived risk, it was found by Paton et al. 
(2001) that people are unlikely to prepare for a hazard event if they perceive the effects as 
insurmountable or if they do not think they have the competence to act. Therefore, having staff 
knowledgeable and confident of the initial response (Stage 1) actions will provide for outcome 
expectancies which support the intentions to promote resilience and facilitate personal acceptance 
of responsibility (Paton, 2001). 
 
On the other hand, opinions were very mixed on what would happen after Stage 1 of the response 
passed, and the response entered the evacuation stage (Section 6.3.7). The amount of confusion that 
surrounds the Stage 2 evacuation is worrying, particularly amongst permanent staff members who 
others will look to for directions. Staff were unsure of how long it would take to evacuate the ski 
area and how many people would likely need to be evacuated. Ski Patrol indicated there was a 
broad evacuation plan for the ski area; however, there would be problems with applying this during 
a volcanic event as areas may be isolated by lahar paths and ash fall and damage may be done to 
ski area facilities (such as lifts) needed in the evacuation. Galley et al. (2003) suggested that the ski 
area consider evacuation routes in advance, and then pick the best route from each threatened area 
to include in the evacuation plan. However, it is important to have multiple evacuation routes listed 
in the eruption response plan, in case the ‘best option’ is blocked. It is concerning that staff are so  
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unsure about the Stage 2 response effort because it is possible if staff do not receive immediate 
instructions they will take the course of action which they feel will lead to safety, such as trying to 
get off the ski area by crossing a lahar path. The assumptions that staff make about an evacuation 
may also be very different from the plan that RAL management wants to initiate. Paton (2003) 
describes that during the response phase of an emergency situation “inappropriate assumptions 
regarding operating conditions, performance expectations, roles, and tasks significantly increase 
stress vulnerability” (p. 205).  
 
In conclusion, it was found that staff are knowledgeable and confident in the initial (Stage 1) 
response to a volcanic event on the ski area. However, they were very unsure of what the 
evacuation or Stage 2 response would involve. This can be fairly easily corrected by briefly 
discussing a ski area evacuation in induction training (which will be discussed in Section 7.5).  
 
7.3.3 A practical system of effective training session and simulations designed to mitigate 
the risk 
 
In the 2005 winter season, RAL adopted some of the recommendations put forth by Ward et al. 
(2003) and Leonard et al. (2004). These recommendations included: 
• separating departments for the lahar hazard training to receive role specific information, 
• evaluating training by getting staff to fill out a question sheet, and  
• conducting a yearly alarm simulation, followed by a later season blind test 
 
Permanent staff members commented during the interviews that most feel that the lahar hazard 
training has improved at the ski area since last year. 
 
Allowing time for staff training on lahar hazards during staff induction week is difficult, as staff are 
also required to learn their daily jobs and how to handle other hazards on the mountain. Therefore, 
it is important for the lahar hazard training to be concise and clear, covering all the major issues in 
the shortest amount of time possible. Major issues that need to be covered include the volcanic 
hazards at Ruapehu, eruptive history, impacts of lahars, safe areas and lahar paths, the warning 
system, and role specific response information. However, because staff will be handling a stressful 
emergency situation, it is also necessary for training to cover developing realistic expectations 
about personal vulnerability and how the event will play out, promote the use of coping strategies, 
and discuss the post-event support available to staff and the benefit of using these (Paton, 1996a). 
Discussing the event in detail will help staff to develop similar mental models of the response, 
leading to a more efficient performance (Paton and Jackson, 2002), and will likely lessen negative 
reactions that may occur, if staff are uncertain about the duration of the disaster, the period of their  
 
 
                                Chapter Seven 118 
 
involvement, or about additional threats (Paton, 2003). Training will also play a pivotal role in 
managing stress reactions (Paton and Flin, 1999), as identifying potential stressors during the 
response and areas that they may occur in during training, as well as reinforcing this in training 
simulations, will help to minimize their dysfunctional consequences (Paton, 1996b). 
Recommendations to improve training at the ski areas can be found in Section 7.5. 
 
It is commonly indicated that simulation exercises are invaluable as to the level of training they 
provide to those participating in them. Paton and Jackson (2002) give several positives associated 
with conducting simulation exercises: 
1. Afford opportunities to develop, review, and rehearse under realistic circumstances, 
2. Practice dealing with high pressure situations in an environment that is safe and supportive, 
3. Practice the roles they will adopt in a disaster situation, 
4. Receive feedback on their performance and identify areas of personal development, 
5. Increase awareness of stress reactions and facilitate rehearsal of ways to minimize negative 
reactions, and 
6. Identify organizational constraints on effective response management. 
 
In its current simulation format, RAL is accomplishing objectives 2 and 3: however the others 
remain elusive. It is important after a simulation exercise for managers and supervisors at the ski 
area to give feedback to staff (objective 4) so that they will either become confident that they know 
the correct response or be informed of the correct actions. It would also be beneficial for the 
management staff at RAL to be informed, either by area managers and supervisors or by the 
simulation test observers, of the actions on different areas of the ski area so they can determine 
what the overall response was and what areas need improvement. An example of this has been the 
continuing negative performance during the simulations and blind test of the last few years of the 
Food and Beverage staff, who continually do not react to the warning system. While the reason for 
this may be as simple as the staff in cafes not being able to hear the warning system, coming up 
with a solution to the problem is impossible if no one knows what the recurring problems are. 
Recommendations in regards to improving the simulations can be found in Section 7.5. 
 
In summary, it was found that RAL has made huge improvements to their lahar hazard training 
program over the past few years, based on recommendations by Ward et al. (2003) and Leonard et 
al. (2004). However, there are still changes to be made that will benefit the staff training and 
simulation exercises, without lengthening the time needed for training, which are discussed in 
Section 7.5. 
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It is also necessary to avoid ‘risk homeostasis’ at the ski area, which occurs when a perceived 
increase in safety may possibly reduce the risk perception of that hazard, and may encourage 
unsafe behaviour (Johnston et al., 1999b). 
 
7.3.4 A realistic volcanic hazard response plan for the ski area using a CIMS structure 
 
Currently, there is no specific ski area plan for handling a volcanic event. During the interviews, it 
was discovered that the plan for RAL management was to apply a broad evacuation plan for the 
Stage 2 part of the response effort. However, this is likely to be impractical, as a volcanic event is a 
unique event and quite dissimilar to any other kind of hazard the ski area may face. Disaster 
planning is not only beneficial due to the output of a ‘plan’ to help guide the response effort, but it 
also helps those who engage in the planning activities to develop similar mental models of the 
event and response which will be beneficial during an actual event (Paton and Jackson, 2002). The 
plan should be based upon a detailed and comprehensive analysis of operational demands (similar 
to Section 7.4), and an inventory of potential disaster stressors (similar to Section 6.2.9 and 6.3.9), 
linked to actions such as training and simulation exercises, and test regularly (Paton and Jackson, 
2002; Paton and Flin, 1999). It was found that staff are very open to having a specific volcanic 
event plan, as most either already thought RAL had one or were in support of developing one.  
 
It is also important for the plan to make note of the need to suspend organisational authority in 
favour of lower level decision making in the early stages of the response (Galley et al., 2003). 
Authority can then gradually be transferred back to head management staff after Stage 1 (initial 
response) has passed (Paton, 1997). The overall evacuation plan must also be decided, with the 
option of flexibility, as certain evacuation routes may be impassable after a volcanic event. It is 
also necessary to decide if the evacuation will be done group by group, with groups being 
specifically instructed when to move or whether all groups will be given permission to move at the 
same time (Galley et al., 2003). Staff must be informed during lahar hazard training of what the 
decision is so that they know what to expect during the response to a volcanic event.  
 
RAL has also recently shown an interest in using CIMS during the response to a volcanic event. 
Although this may be beneficial as a CIMS structure will provide RAL the flexibility that will be 
needed to handle a volcanic event, there are several reasons why using CIMS during a volcanic 
event would not currently be beneficial for RAL. The first is that only a few key management staff 
at RAL are aware of CIMS. It was found during the staff interviews that only three out of twenty-
six staff knew what CIMS was. In order for CIMS to work, it is important for all management staff  
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to be aware of it so it can be quickly implemented during an emergency event with minimal 
confusion. CIMS is also fundamentally about working together, rather than simply describing how 
people should work together. In CIMS, top-down organisational structure is used. However, as 
discussed previously (Section 4.1.1, as well as in the previous paragraph), it is more likely during a 
ski area response to a volcanic event that organisational authority will likely be suspended in 
favour of lower-level decision making (Galley et al, 2003; Paton, 1997). Also, integrated 
communication in stressed in CIMS, but it is more likely that information management (which is 
separate from communication) will be more crucial to the ski area during the response effort. 
Information management involves identifying what is communicated and whether it is meaningful 
to recipients (Paton and Hannan, 2004). CIMS also requires that an Initial Action Plan (IAP) be 
drafted before an event. However, this plan would involve including response goals, operational 
objectives, and support activities, which are unimportant for a ski area event as the goals and 
objectives are obvious.  
 
In summary, it is important for RAL to draft a plan for how they will deal with a volcanic event. 
Thinking through how they will handle a volcanic event will increase the company’s resilience, 
which is defined as “the capacity of systems to main their integrity and the relationships and 
balance between elements in the presence of significant disturbances by drawing upon internal 
resources and competencies to manage the demands, challenges, and changes encountered” (Paton 
et al., 2001, p.47). This resilience will decrease the reliance of RAL on DoC, as it is important for 
the ski area to plan for a worst case scenario where they will be isolated from outside help. A CIMS 
structure could be effective at the ski area, however staff members need to be aware of CIMS and 
how to implement it, and an initial action plan (IAP) must be drafted. To be successful, the plan 
requires support from all levels of management, most important being senior management (Clark, 
1996).  
 
 
7.4 Training needs analysis 
In preparation for managing a potential crisis, training needs analyses become very important. It is 
vital for a training needs analysis to identify situations that may be encountered when responding to 
a disaster, and the demand characteristics and competencies likely to be used (Paton, 1999). Paton 
(1999) notes that “information obtained can be useful to assist plan development, defining the 
training and support needs of staff, and to develop systems and procedures that promote 
organisational resilience” (p.132). The comprehensive inventory of disaster stressors from Sections  
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6.29 and 6.39 were used when developing the training needs analysis to help identify high risk 
situations and to provide a basis for anticipating the intensity of reactions to these stressors (Paton, 
1996b). These potential stressors can also alert RAL to the likely support requirements that will 
need to be met (Paton, 1996b). 
 
Galley et al. (2003) suggests people will function better during an emergency if they know what to 
do in advance, but stresses that this does not mean developing a long list of details of individual 
actions. A clear role description should be provided, based on the development of general 
competencies (Paton, 1996b; Paton and Jackson, 2002), which allows individuals to use common 
sense to carry out the role. The following training needs analysis for Whakapapa and Turoa ski 
areas (Tables 8 to 16) attempts accomplish this. This table was expanded from the original training 
needs analysis from Ward et al. (2003) (Tables 6 and 7). The head of the response effort is referred 
to in the training needs analysis as the Incident Controller (IC). There are slight differences as to 
how the training needs analysis should be applied to each area, which are explained in the sections 
below. 
 
7.4.1 Whakapapa 
 
At Whakapapa ski area, the main hazard is from lahars. Therefore, the biggest problems 
encountered after the Stage 1 (initial) response will be moving groups of customers off the ski area, 
as routes down the mountain may be blocked by lahar paths, and chairlifts that were needed for the 
evacuation may be wiped out. Because of the distance from the Summit Hazard Zone, it is likely 
that these initial lahars are the biggest danger to the ski area and once these have passed, time can  
be taken to make sure customers and staff are not crossing lahar paths and also to assess the danger 
of secondary flows which will likely be done by GNS and DoC. 
 
7.4.2 Turoa 
 
At Turoa, it is uncertain whether lahars or ballistic bombs will be the larger threat to the ski area 
(Figure 7.1). At the present time, research is being conducted by GNS to determine the likelihood 
of lahars passing through the ski area during an eruption event. If the largest hazard is determined 
to be ballistic bombs in the summit hazard zone, it is therefore important that customers and staff in 
the Summit Hazard Zone are evacuated immediately to reduce the risk from ballistic bombs.  
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Customers and staff in this area may be evacuated to the Giant Café, at the top of the Giant Chair 
and at the base of the High Noon T-Bar, and remain there until it is determined to be safe to get 
down the mountain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Hazards at Turoa ski area
 Volcanic Event response tasks 
 
Daily Tasks Training Needs Pre-Event Stage 1 – Initial response Stage 2 - Evacuation Training Needs Suggestions 
Ski Patrol 
 
- Prepare ski area for 
the day (includes trail 
checks, setting out 
fencing, signs, etc) 
- Consult terrain hazard 
atlas to manage hazards 
- Avalanche control 
work if it is necessary 
- Communicate with 
other departments to 
open the ski area 
- Help customers and 
staff who have been in 
accidents, injuries 
- Shut the ski area 
down by conducting 
sweeps and pulling in 
signs 
- Possibly work in 
RARO (Ruapehu 
Alpine Rescue 
Organization) in search 
and rescue tasks 
 
- Medical skills 
- Search and 
Rescue skills 
- Ski area and 
terrain hazard 
atlas knowledge 
- Avalanche 
control training 
- Customer 
service skills 
- Open and 
closing 
procedures 
- Accident 
reporting 
procedure 
 
- Provide 
information to 
customers and 
staff enquiring 
about the volcanic 
hazards at 
Ruapehu 
- Be positive role 
models for other 
staff members by 
treating the hazard 
as worthy of 
concern, and by 
treating each test 
of the warning 
system seriously 
 
- Sweep of high risk 
areas if in position, 
otherwise help customers 
and staff in your area to 
move to high ground 
- If near T-Bar offload 
area, help customers 
there 
- Move to higher ground 
with customers and assure 
they remain there, reassure 
them of their safety 
 
- Attend to those injured  
- Wait for instructions on radio 
channel, do not move customers until 
authorized to do so by the head Ski 
Patroller, the ski area manager, or the 
Incident Controller, and then move 
customers to where you are requested 
to go 
- Ski Patrol members may be asked 
to take control of a sub-area, which 
will involving giving instructions and 
information to customers and staff 
members in that area 
 
- General information about the 
volcanic hazards at Ruapehu, 
eruption history, and frequency 
of events. 
- Information about lahars, how 
they flow, lahar paths at the ski 
area, and safe areas 
- Information on the summit 
hazard zone at the ski area 
- Information about the warning 
system and warning times 
- Information on the correct 
response actions 
- Information on the evacuation 
plan, and the importance of 
remaining in safe area until 
authorized to move 
- Information on the 
development of realistic 
expectations of personal 
vulnerability 
- Information on different types 
of coping strategies and services 
that will be offered to staff, and 
the benefits of using them 
 
 
- When explaining 
hazards and past 
eruptions, indicate what 
it means for contingent 
decision making and 
response, as well as 
using this information 
to develop stress 
resilience 
- Evacuation plan can 
be included in the 
general Health and 
Safety as the general 
evacuation procedure 
- Can reference 
similarity of lahar 
movement to avalanche 
to put it into context 
- Medical skills will be 
taught in daily job 
training 
- Coping strategies and 
services can be 
beneficial to learn for 
all emergency situations 
at the ski area 
Ski Patrol 
Manager 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
- Assign sweep positions, 
find locations of Ski Patrol 
members 
- Immediately 
communicate with Ski 
Area Manager on situation 
 
- Decide along with Field Operations 
Manager and Ski Area Manager on 
who will be assigned CIMS positions 
(if needed), including the Incident 
Controller (IC) position 
- IC should begin communicating 
with DoC and GNS on the status of 
the volcano 
- Assign Ski Patrol members to 
different sub-areas 
- Assign where First Aid Centres 
should be set up and who should staff 
them 
- When approved, initiate ski area 
evacuation plan 
- After field has been evacuated, 
coordinate with DoC to form search 
and rescue groups, if needed 
 
Same as above, but including: 
- CIMS structure (if needed) 
- Communication procedures 
with DoC and GNS 
- Sub areas of ski area 
- Evacuation procedure 
- Information and decision 
management (Paton and 
Hannan, 2004) 
 
Similar to above 
Table 7.1 Training Needs Analysis for Ski Patrol
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Volcanic Event response tasks 
 
Daily Tasks Training Needs Pre-Event Stage 1 – Initial Response Stage 2 – Evacuation Training Needs Suggestions 
Lift 
Operations 
 
- De-ice towers (only 
some lift operators) 
- Report in, get lift 
assignments 
- Perform safety checks 
on lift and set up for  
the day (can include 
shovelling snow, 
preparing on-load and 
offload areas, setting up 
queue lanes) 
- Load and unload 
customers, help 
beginners 
- Answer customer 
questions and make 
sure they are dressed 
for the weather 
conditions 
 
- General 
customer service 
- Lift operations 
training 
(location and 
types of lifts, 
safety 
procedures, 
loading 
technique, 
loading disabled 
customers) 
- Chair lift 
evacuations 
- Job safety, ski 
area hazards 
- Radio training 
 
- Provide 
information to 
customers and 
staff enquiring 
about the volcanic 
hazards at 
Ruapehu 
- Be positive role 
models for other 
staff members by 
treating the hazard 
as worthy of 
concern, and by 
treating each test 
of the warning 
system seriously 
 
Chairlifts 
- Stop loading customers, 
speed up chairlifts, call last 
number (last chairlift 
loaded) to lift operator at 
offload area 
- While chairlift is emptying, 
direct staff in area to higher 
ground (safe areas) 
- Lift operators in offload area 
should help customers off lift, 
direct to safe area 
- Chairlift should be stopped 
once it is emptied and lift 
operators should move to safe 
area 
 
T-Bars 
- Immediately stop T-Bar 
once the alarm is heard 
- Instruct and help customers 
in area to safe zone 
 
- Lift Operators should remain 
with customers in safe area, 
keep customers in area, and 
reassure them of their safety 
 
 
- Attend to those injured and 
keep customers warm and in safe 
zone 
- Wait for instructions on radio 
channel, do not move customers 
until authorized to do so by the 
head Ski Patroller, the ski area 
manager, or the Incident 
Controller, and then move 
customers to where you are 
requested to go 
- Provide information over radio 
as requested, do not overload 
radio channels asking for 
instructions 
 
- General information about the 
volcanic hazards at Ruapehu, 
eruption history, and frequency 
of events 
- Information about lahars, how 
they flow, lahar paths at the ski 
area, and safe areas 
- Information on the summit 
hazard zone at the ski area 
- Information about the warning 
system and warning times 
- Information on the correct 
response actions, focusing on 
different response actions 
between chairlifts and T-Bars 
- Information on the evacuation 
plan, and the importance of 
remaining in safe area until 
authorized to move 
- Information on the 
development of realistic 
expectations of personal 
vulnerability 
- Information on different types 
of coping strategies and services 
that will be offered to staff, and 
the benefits of using them 
 
 
 
- When explaining 
hazards and past 
eruptions, indicate what 
it means for contingent 
decision making and 
response, as well as 
using this information 
to develop stress 
resilience 
- Evacuation plan can 
be included in the 
general Health and 
Safety as the general 
evacuation procedure 
- Can reference 
similarity of lahar 
movement to avalanche 
to put it into context 
- Important to stress 
that chairlift does not 
need to be evacuated, it 
just needs to be sped up 
and run out 
- Coping strategies and 
services can be 
beneficial to learn for 
all emergency situations 
at the ski area 
Lift 
Operations 
Managers/ 
Supervisors 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
- Immediately inform staff by 
radio that the warning system 
has been activated and to take 
the appropriate response 
actions 
- Coordinate with other 
supervisors and managers as to 
their location on the ski area 
- Notify IC of status and location 
when requested, prepare to take 
possible role in CIMS structure 
- Reassure Lift Operations staff 
by radio to remain where they 
are, keep customers together, and 
to being collecting names of 
those with them (if they are able 
to do so) 
- Assist IC with evacuation of ski 
area 
- Pass names collected by staff 
on to Customer Services 
- Take instructions from IC on 
assisting with search and rescue 
 
Same as above, but including: 
- CIMS structure (if needed) 
- Evacuation procedure 
- Information and decision 
management (Paton and 
Hannan, 2004) 
 
Similar to above 
Table 7.2 Training Needs Analysis for Lift Operations
 
Further Discussion and Recommendations 
Volcanic Event response tasks 
 
Daily Tasks Training Needs Pre-Event 
Stage 1 – Initial 
Response Stage 2 – Evacuation Training Needs Suggestions 
Snow 
School 
 
- Attend meeting 
assigning ski area 
locations 
- Give lessons to 
customers, out of 
Happy Valley, Hutt 
Flat, or Knoll Ridge, 
averaging an hour long 
 
- Customer 
service 
- Most Snow 
School 
Instructors arrive 
pre-trained 
 
- Provide 
information to 
customers and 
staff enquiring 
about the volcanic 
hazards at 
Ruapehu 
- Be positive role 
models for other 
staff members by 
treating the hazard 
as worthy of 
concern, and by 
treating each test 
of the warning 
system seriously 
 
- Immediately move to 
nearest safe areas with 
class, helping them to 
remove equipment if 
necessary 
- Remain with customers 
in safe area, keep 
customers in area, and 
reassure them of their 
safety 
 
- Attend to those injured and keep 
customers warm 
- Wait for instructions (either 
verbally or over the radio from a 
senior staff member), do not move 
customers until authorized to do so 
by the head Ski Patroller, the ski area 
manager, or the Incident Controller, 
and then move customers to where 
you are requested to go 
- Provide information about 
customers and status when requested 
 
- General information about the 
volcanic hazards at Ruapehu, 
eruption history, and frequency 
of events 
- Information about lahars, how 
they flow, lahar paths at the ski 
area, and safe areas 
- Information on the summit 
hazard zone at the ski area 
- Information about the warning 
system and warning times 
- Information on the correct 
response actions 
- Information on the evacuation 
plan, and the importance of 
remaining in safe area until 
authorized to move 
- Information on the 
development of realistic 
expectations of personal 
vulnerability 
- Information on different types 
of coping strategies and services 
that will be offered to staff, and 
the benefits of using them 
 
 
- When explaining 
hazards and past 
eruptions, indicate what 
it means for contingent 
decision making and 
response, as well as 
using this information 
to develop stress 
resilience  
- Evacuation plan can 
be included in the 
general Health and 
Safety as the general 
evacuation procedure 
- Can reference 
similarity of lahar 
movement to avalanche 
to put it into context 
- Important to indicate 
how instructors are 
likely to get information 
as they do not carry 
radios 
- Coping strategies and 
services can be 
beneficial to learn for 
all emergency situations 
at the ski area 
Snow 
School 
managers/ 
supervisors 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
- If in safe area, assist Ski 
Instructors at grouping 
classes together, and 
moving inside building, if 
possible 
- Begin taking names of 
customers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- When requested, inform IC as to 
how many classes and instructors 
were in possible danger areas at the 
time of the alarm 
- Take instructions from IC as to 
evacuation of the ski area 
- Pass on list of names to Customer 
Services 
- At off-mountain location, help 
Customer Services to reunite groups 
 
- CIMS structure (if needed) 
 
Similar to above 
Table 7.3 Training Needs Analysis for Snow School
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Volcanic Event response tasks  
Daily Tasks Training Needs Pre-Event 
Stage 1 – Initial 
Response Stage 2 – Evacuation Training Needs Suggestions 
Food and 
Beverage 
 
- Set up cafes for the 
day 
- Take orders, make 
and serve food to 
customers 
- Clean up 
 
- Customer 
service skills 
- Food 
preparation 
- Alcohol 
responsibility 
training 
- Barista training 
 
- Provide 
information to 
customers and 
staff enquiring 
about the volcanic 
hazards at 
Ruapehu 
- Be positive role 
models for other 
staff members by 
treating the hazard 
as worthy of 
concern, and by 
treating each test 
of the warning 
system seriously 
 
- Stop serving food 
- After manager has made 
an announcement, reassure 
customers 
 
- Inform customers of what is 
happening 
- Wait for instructions (either 
verbally or over the radio from a 
senior staff member) do not move 
customers until authorized to do so 
by the head Ski Patroller, the ski area 
manager, or the Incident Controller, 
and then move customers to where 
you are requested to go 
- Prepare cafes and buildings to 
receive incoming staff and customers  
- Provide information about 
customers and status when requested 
 
 
- General information about the 
volcanic hazards at Ruapehu, 
eruption history, and frequency 
of events 
- Information about lahars, how 
they flow, lahar paths at the ski 
area, and safe areas 
- Information on the summit 
hazard zone at the ski area 
- Information about the warning 
system and warning times 
- Information on the correct 
response actions 
- Information on the evacuation 
plan, and the importance of 
remaining in safe area until 
authorized to move 
- Information on the 
development of realistic 
expectations of personal 
vulnerability 
- Information on different types 
of coping strategies and services 
that will be offered to staff, and 
the benefits of using them 
 
 
 
 
- When explaining 
hazards and past 
eruptions, indicate what 
it means for contingent 
decision making and 
response, as well as 
using this information 
to develop stress 
resilience  
- Evacuation plan can 
be included in the 
general Health and 
Safety as the general 
evacuation procedure 
- Can reference 
similarity of lahar 
movement to avalanche 
to put it into context 
- Indicate importance of 
making an 
announcement to 
customers and keeping 
them indoors 
- Coping strategies and 
services can be 
beneficial to learn for 
all emergency situations 
at the ski area 
Food & 
Beverage 
managers/ 
supervisors 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
- Stop serving food 
- Make an 
announcement that the 
lahar warning system 
has been activated and 
that customers should stay 
inside the café, reassure 
them of their safety 
- Begin assigning staff 
members to take names of 
the customers in the cafe 
 
- Report status to IC when requested 
- Assign staff members to turn off 
roof water intakes 
- Prepare café to receive more 
customers, possible for overnight 
- If in area for a lengthy period, begin 
catering to customers, but ration 
food 
- Assist IC in evacuation of mountain 
when requested 
- Pass names on to Customer 
Services 
 
 
 
Same as above, but including: 
- CIMS structure (if needed) 
- Location of water intakes 
 
Similar to above 
Table 7.4 Training Needs Analysis for Food and Beverage
 
Further Discussion and Recommendations 
Volcanic Event response tasks 
 
Daily Tasks Training Needs Pre-Event 
Stage 1 – Initial 
Response Stage 2 – Evacuation Training Needs Suggestions 
Rentals 
 
- Get rental shop ready 
for the day 
 - Rent gear to 
customers, size boots, 
set up skis 
- Intake equipment at 
end of day, put away 
 
- Customer 
service 
- Sizing 
equipment 
 
- Provide 
information to 
customers and 
staff enquiring 
about the volcanic 
hazards at 
Ruapehu 
- Be positive role 
models for other 
staff members by 
treating the hazard 
as worthy of 
concern, and by 
treating each test 
of the warning 
system seriously 
 
- Stop renting equipment 
- Inform customers what is 
happening and that they 
are in a safe area 
- Make sure customers 
remain in the area 
 
- Inform customers of what is 
happening 
- Wait for instructions (either 
verbally or over the radio from a 
senior staff member), do not move 
customers until authorized to do so 
by the head Ski Patroller, the ski area 
manager, or the Incident Controller, 
and then move customers to where 
you are requested to go 
- Provide information about 
customers and status when requested 
 
- General information about the 
volcanic hazards at Ruapehu, 
eruption history, and frequency 
of events 
- Information about lahars, how 
they flow, lahar paths at the ski 
area, and safe areas 
- Information on the summit 
hazard zone at the ski area 
- Information about the warning 
system and warning times 
- Information on the correct 
response actions 
- Information on the evacuation 
plan, and the importance of 
remaining in safe area until 
authorized to move 
- Information on the 
development of realistic 
expectations of personal 
vulnerability 
- Information on different types 
of coping strategies and services 
that will be offered to staff, and 
the benefits of using them 
 
 
- When explaining 
hazards and past 
eruptions, indicate what 
it means for contingent 
decision making and 
response, as well as 
using this information 
to develop stress 
resilience  
- Evacuation plan can 
be included in the 
general Health and 
Safety as the general 
evacuation procedure 
- Can reference 
similarity of lahar 
movement to avalanche 
to put it into context 
- Indicate importance of 
making an 
announcement to 
customers and keeping 
them indoors 
- Coping strategies and 
services can be 
beneficial to learn for 
all emergency situations 
at the ski area 
Rental 
managers/ 
supervisors 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
- Stop renting equipment 
- Make an 
announcement that the 
lahar warning system 
has been activated and 
that customers should stay 
inside the rental building, 
reassure them of their 
safety 
- Assign staff to begin 
taking names of those in 
the rental building 
 
 
 
- Report status to IC when requested 
- Prepare building to take in 
customers 
- Assist IC in evacuation of mountain 
when requested 
- Pass names on to Customer 
Services 
 
Same as above, but including: 
- CIMS structure (if needed) 
 
Similar to above 
Table 7.5 Training Needs Analysis for Rentals
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Volcanic Event response tasks 
 
Daily Tasks Training Needs Pre-Event 
Stage 1 – Initial 
Response Stage 2 – Evacuation Training Needs Suggestions 
Customer 
Services 
 
- Issue snow report 
- Make sure schools 
and group tickets are 
prepared to go 
- Check email and 
phone messages 
- Get floats to various 
departments on ski area 
- Sell tickets, issue 
refunds, deal with 
customer complaints, 
customer enquiries 
- Print out tickets for 
schools and groups 
 
 
- Customer 
service skills 
 
- Provide 
information to 
customers and 
staff enquiring 
about the volcanic 
hazards at 
Ruapehu 
- Be positive role 
models for other 
staff members by 
treating the hazard 
as worthy of 
concern, and by 
treating each test 
of the warning 
system seriously 
 
- Stop selling tickets 
- Inform customers what is 
happening and that they 
are in a safe area 
- Make sure customers 
remain in the area 
 
- Help to coordinate 
communication between ski area 
departments, Doc, and/or GNS 
- Avoid making uncertain and/or 
false statements. If unsure, tell people 
that and assure them you will find out 
- Set up one staff member to prepare 
a register of all customers reported 
missing 
- Wait for instructions (either 
verbally or over the radio from a 
senior staff member), do not move 
customers until authorized to do so 
by the head Ski Patroller, the ski area 
manager, or the Incident Controller, 
and then move customers to where 
you are requested to go 
- Provide information about 
customers and status when requested 
 
- General information about the 
volcanic hazards at Ruapehu, 
eruption history, and frequency 
of events 
- Information about lahars, how 
they flow, lahar paths at the ski 
area, and safe areas 
- Information on the summit 
hazard zone at the ski area 
- Information about the warning 
system and warning times 
- Information on the correct 
response actions 
- Information on the evacuation 
plan, and the importance of 
remaining in safe area until 
authorized to move 
- Information on the 
development of realistic 
expectations of personal 
vulnerability 
- Information on different types 
of coping strategies and services 
that will be offered to staff, and 
the benefits of using them 
 
 
- When explaining 
hazards and past 
eruptions, indicate what 
it means for contingent 
decision making and 
response, as well as 
using this information 
to develop stress 
resilience  
- Evacuation plan can 
be included in the 
general Health and 
Safety as the general 
evacuation procedure 
- Can reference 
similarity of lahar 
movement to avalanche 
to put it into context 
- General emergency 
communication 
procedures can be 
included in the general 
Health and Safety talk 
- Coping strategies and 
services can be 
beneficial to learn for 
all emergency situations 
at the ski area 
Customer 
Services 
manager/ 
supervisors 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
- Stop selling tickets 
- Assign a few staff 
member to proceed 
outside to help customers 
in the TOB area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Record a phone message for 
incoming calls 
- Assist IC in communications 
- Prepare a few staff members to 
begin registry of name (both 
missing and present) by compiling 
sheets received from other staff 
members 
- Assist IC with evacuation of the 
mountain 
- Avoid making false, uncertain 
statements. If unsure, tell people that 
and assure them you will find out 
 
Same as above, but including: 
- CIMS structure (if needed) 
- Emergency phone contacts 
- Plan in case of communication 
breakdown 
- Information and decision 
management (Paton and 
Hannan, 2004) 
 
Similar to above 
Table 7.6 Training Needs Analysis for Customer Services
 
Further Discussion and Recommendations 
Volcanic Event Response Tasks 
 
Daily Tasks Training Needs Pre-Event 
Stage 1 – Initial 
Response Stage 2 – Evacuation Training Needs Suggestions 
Road 
Services 
 
- Clear roads and 
parking lots of snow 
- assess status of road, 
place restrictions if 
necessary 
- Set up parking lots, 
snow-chain trailer 
- Drive buses to pick up 
customers and staff 
- Help to offload buses  
- Keep an eye on traffic 
flow, monitor parking 
- Help staff and 
customers to leave the 
ski area, either by bus 
or car 
 
- Customer 
service skills 
- Road safety 
- Equipment 
knowledge 
 
- Provide 
information to 
customers and 
staff enquiring 
about the volcanic 
hazards at 
Ruapehu 
- Be positive role 
models for other 
staff members by 
treating the hazard 
as worthy of 
concern, and by 
treating each test 
of the warning 
system seriously 
 
- Stop all cars in the 
‘loop’ at the TOB 
- Inform customers that 
they are in a safe area, ask 
them to remain there 
- Set up roadblocks past 
the last parking lot so no 
one is able to leave the 
ski area (due to the 
possibility of a lahar 
taking out the bridge) 
 
- Inform customers of what is 
happening 
- Wait for instructions (either 
verbally or over the radio from a 
senior staff member), do not move 
customers until authorized to do so 
by the head Ski Patroller, the ski area 
manager, or the Incident Controller, 
and then move customers to where 
you are requested to go 
- Do not let anyone proceed down 
the road unless permission is given 
to do so 
 
- General information about the 
volcanic hazards at Ruapehu, 
eruption history, and frequency 
of events 
- Information about lahars, how 
they flow, lahar paths at the ski 
area, and safe areas 
- Information on the summit 
hazard zone at the ski area 
- Information about the warning 
system and warning times 
- Information on the correct 
response actions, and the 
importance of keeping the 
Bruce Road empty 
- Information on the evacuation 
plan, and the importance of 
remaining in safe area until 
authorized to move 
- Information on the 
development of realistic 
expectations of personal 
vulnerability 
- Information on different types 
of coping strategies and services 
that will be offered to staff, and 
the benefits of using them 
 
 
- When explaining 
hazards and past 
eruptions, indicate what 
it means for contingent 
decision making and 
response, as well as 
using this information 
to develop stress 
resilience  
- Evacuation plan can 
be included in the 
general Health and 
Safety as the general 
evacuation procedure 
- Can reference 
similarity of lahar 
movement to avalanche 
to put it into context 
- Coping strategies and 
services can be 
beneficial to learn for 
all emergency situations 
at the ski area 
Road 
Services 
manager/ 
supervisors 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
- Inform staff of warning 
system alarm 
- Assign staff members to 
set up roadblocks 
- Stop all cars 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Report status to IC when requested 
- Prepare all RAL vehicles to assist 
in evacuation 
- Make sure road is clear for 
emergency vehicles 
- Prepare site for disaster victim 
identification 
- Assist IC in ski area evacuation 
- Get all customers and staff off ski 
area to off-mountain meeting place 
(possibly staff quarters) 
 
Same as above, but including: 
- CIMS structure (if needed) 
- Location of disaster victim 
identification site 
- Information and decision 
management (Paton and 
Hannan, 2004) 
 
Similar to above 
Table 7.7 Training Needs Analysis for Road Services
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Volcanic Event response tasks 
 
Daily Tasks Training Needs Pre-Event 
Stage 1 – Initial 
Response Stage 2 – Evacuation Training Needs Suggestions 
Retail 
 
- Set up shop 
- Help and sell products 
to customers 
- Re-stock merchandise 
- Clean up store at end 
of the day 
 
- Customer 
service skills 
- Merchandise 
knowledge 
 
- Provide 
information to 
customers and 
staff enquiring 
about the volcanic 
hazards at 
Ruapehu 
- Be positive role 
models for other 
staff members by 
treating the hazard 
as worthy of 
concern, and by 
treating each test 
of the warning 
system seriously 
 
- Stop selling merchandise 
- Inform customers what 
is happening and that 
they are in a safe area 
- Make sure customers 
remain in the area 
 
- Inform customers of what is 
happening 
- Wait for instructions (either 
verbally or over the radio from a 
senior staff member), do not move 
customers until authorized to do so 
by the head Ski Patroller, the ski area 
manager, or the Incident Controller, 
and then move customers to where 
you are requested to go 
- Provide information about 
customers and status when requested 
 
- General information about the 
volcanic hazards at Ruapehu, 
eruption history, and frequency 
of events 
- Information about lahars, how 
they flow, lahar paths at the ski 
area, and safe areas 
- Information on the summit 
hazard zone at the ski area 
- Information about the warning 
system and warning times 
- Information on the correct 
response actions 
- Information on the evacuation 
plan, and the importance of 
remaining in safe area until 
authorized to move 
- Information on the 
development of realistic 
expectations of personal 
vulnerability 
- Information on different types 
of coping strategies and services 
that will be offered to staff, and 
the benefits of using them 
 
 
 
- When explaining 
hazards and past 
eruptions, indicate what 
it means for contingent 
decision making and 
response, as well as 
using this information 
to develop stress 
resilience  
- Evacuation plan can 
be included in the 
general Health and 
Safety as the general 
evacuation procedure 
- Can reference 
similarity of lahar 
movement to avalanche 
to put it into context 
- Coping strategies and 
services can be 
beneficial to learn for 
all emergency situations 
at the ski area 
Retail 
managers/ 
supervisors 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
- Stop selling merchandise 
- Make an 
announcement that the 
lahar warning system 
has been activated and 
that customers should stay 
inside the retail area, 
reassure them of their 
safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Assist IC when requested 
- Help Food and Beverage staff with 
incoming customers 
- Assign staff to help Food and 
Beverage staff take names 
- Assist IC in evacuation of mountain 
- Pass names on to Customer 
Services 
- Assist other staff at Off-mountain 
area once evacuated 
 
Same as above, but including: 
- CIMS structure (if needed) 
- Evacuation plan 
 
Similar to above 
Table 7.8 Training Needs Analysis for Retail
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Volcanic Event response tasks 
 
Daily Tasks Training Needs Pre-Event 
Stage 1 – Initial 
Response Stage 2 – Evacuation Training Needs Suggestions 
Groomers 
 
- Groom runs 
- Fix equipment 
 
- Equipment 
skills 
- Knowledge of 
ski area 
 
- Be aware a lahar 
alarm may occur 
at any time, 
including during 
night shifts 
 
- Move to high ground  
- If not in an area where it 
is possible to drive to 
higher ground, get out and 
climb to high ground 
 
- Wait for instructions over radio 
 
- General information about the 
volcanic hazards at Ruapehu, 
eruption history, and frequency 
of events 
- Information about lahars, how 
they flow, lahar paths at the ski 
area, and safe areas 
- Information on the summit 
hazard zone at the ski area 
- Information about the warning 
system and warning times 
- Information on the correct 
response actions 
- Information on the evacuation 
plan, and the importance of 
remaining in safe area until 
authorized to move 
- Information on the 
development of realistic 
expectations of personal 
vulnerability 
- Information on different types 
of coping strategies and services 
that will be offered to staff, and 
the benefits of using them 
 
 
- When explaining 
hazards and past 
eruptions, indicate what 
it means for contingent 
decision making and 
response, as well as 
using this information 
to develop stress 
resilience  
- Because groomers are 
less likely to be on the 
ski area during 
operating times, it is 
likely that the lahar 
hazard training can be 
shortened  
- Coping strategies and 
services can be 
beneficial to learn for 
all emergency situations 
at the ski area 
Groomer 
manager/ 
supervisors 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
Similar to above 
 
- Make an 
announcement over 
radio to staff indicating 
the warning system has 
been activated 
- Communicate with staff 
to find positions on the 
mountain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Day 
- Work with IC on evacuation of the 
ski area 
 
Night 
- Call emergency services 
- Try to locate all staff, and proceed 
off mountain if possible 
 
Same as above, but including: 
- CIMS structure (if needed) 
- Evacuation procedure 
 
Similar to above 
Table 7.9 Training Needs Analysis for Groomers
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7.5 Recommendations 
Recommendation 1 
Calculate the number of people present on the ski areas in different circumstances 
 
It was determine during the interviews that staff are very unsure about how many people would be 
on the ski area during a busy Saturday, and where most of those customers would be located. This 
can create a problem during the response to a volcanic event, because those controlling the 
response will be unsure of how many customers will need to be evacuated. This can also influence 
the expected time it will take to evacuate the ski area. 
 
This can be accomplished by recording customer numbers during different times of the ski season, 
such as the following: 
• Weekend, fine weather, school holiday 
• Weekend, bad weather, school holiday 
• Weekday, fine weather, school holiday 
• Weekday, bad weather, school holiday 
• Weekend, fine weather 
• Weekend, bad weather 
• Weekday, fine weather 
 Weekday, bad weather •
 
These approximate customer numbers can then be listed in the ski area volcanic response plan, and 
will give those implementing the plan an idea of the numbers they will be dealing with. However, 
staff will need to be trained for a worst case scenario, and be trained in skills to handle large groups 
with varying degrees of stress, anxiety, etc. 
 
ecommendation 2R  
 
Hold a yearly pre-season meeting with key RAL, GNS, and DoC staff and have emergency contact 
umbers (DoC, GNS) readily available n
 
It would be beneficial to all organizations involved in a potential response effort to send key 
members to meet with key RAL staff sometime during the off-season. This would help to 
familiarize those responding with each other, and also to set a plan for the upcoming winter season, 
in the way of: 
• the plan for lahar hazard training, and warning system checks,  
• potential dates for Stage 1 ski area simulation,  
• potential dates for Stage 2 full evacuation simulation, and 
• potential dates for the ski area volcanic hazard public surveys.  
 
 
 
 
Further Discussion and Recommendations 133
 
This will help RAL to work these dates into their busy winter season schedule, so as to make as 
little disruption to the company as possible. RAL can also bring up concerns or ideas in regard to 
the public education on volcanic hazards conducted at the ski area. Such a meeting was conducted 
before the 2005 winter ski season, and would be beneficial to continue into the future.  
 
To try to minimize potential problems during a lahar response, emergency contact numbers from 
DoC, GNS, and any other potential organizations involved in the response (i.e. police, helicopter 
companies) must be researched beforehand and provided in the eruption response plan. Because 
numbers and contacts may change, this list should be updated yearly before the start of the winter 
season. Having these numbers available will mean that RAL is able to contact outside agencies 
immediately for assistance and information, making the response effort more efficient. 
 
Recommendation 3 
 
Run an evacuation simulation with permanent staff in March at Whakapapa 
 
While numerous simulations have been conducted on the ski area for Stage 1 of the response 
(initial), there has yet to be any practice on what will happen after Stage 1 is complete. Although 
previous recommendations have been made by Ward et al. (2003) to run a full-scale simulation 
during the ski season, this is likely impractical for RAL due to the amount of time that will be 
needed to run a full simulation and the amount of disruption that will imposed on customers. 
Therefore, the best solution to this problem is to run a full-scale simulation in the off-season. 
Although seasonal employees will not be there to participate, permanent staff will be available. It is 
more imperative for permanent staff to participate in a full-scale simulation, as they will be the 
staff members that will be relied upon most during an evacuation. By running the evacuation in the 
off-season, this limits the amount of disruption to RAL and their customers. Although the situation 
will be slightly different as there will be no snow, the main benefits of running a simulation 
(practising on the field, receiving performance feedback, allowing management to discover 
problems with the plan, etc.) can all be accomplished. RAL will also begin to see which evacuation 
routes will likely work the best for them in certain situations. 
 
Recommendation 4 
 
Provide Snow School instructors with two-way radios 
 
During interviews with Snow School instructors, it was found they were quite worried about the 
response to a volcanic event because they were unsure of how they would get instructions or 
information about what was occurring if they were isolated with a group of students. Because Snow 
School Instructors are generally skiing on the ski area, they are at higher risk from volcanic hazards  
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than other staff such as Rental or Food and Beverage staff. They also have added responsibility 
because they will not only feel responsible for getting themselves to safety but also for looking 
after the students they will have with them. The author is unsure as to RAL’s reasoning for not 
supplying Snow School instructors with two-way radios, as many other international ski areas 
supply their instructors with two-way radios. Providing these staff members with two-way radios 
would be beneficial for all safety situations on the mountain.  
 
Recommendation 5 
 
Run a second test at Whakapapa during the ski season only if it is completely ‘blind’ 
 
This recommendation relates to the problems on the ski area this year with running a ‘blind test’. 
The goal of a blind test is to have all staff at the ski area completely unaware of the impending 
alarm to get as honest a reaction as possible from the staff to gauge the effectiveness of the lahar 
hazard training. Therefore, unless the test can be completely ‘blind’, there is no benefit in having a 
second alarm during the ski season. It is possible that having the alarm sound multiple times during 
the ski season will desensitize staff and customers on the ski area, known as the ‘cry wolf’ effect 
(Atwood and Major, 1998). It was found by Breznitz (1984) that those afraid during a false alarm 
(which also can be generalized to include a blind test) are: 
1. The least likely to pay attention to future warnings, 
2. The most likely to downgrade the credibility of the warning system, and 
3. The most resistant to taking protective action in the future. 
 
Also, staff may become used to hearing two alarms in a ski season, leading them to respond slowly 
to a second alarm. 
 
Recommendation 6 
 
Begin running yearly volcanic event simulations at Turoa and possibly a yearly full-scale 
evacuation in the off-season 
 
Because of the danger of volcanic hazards affecting the Turoa ski area, it is important for the ski 
area to begin running yearly Stage 1 simulations to familiarize their staff with the response actions 
they will need to take to complement the volcanic hazard training they receive during staff 
induction week. This will also allow management staff at Turoa to evaluate the effectiveness of 
their training session and to identify any gaps in response knowledge.  
 
It would also be beneficial for Turoa to run a full-scale evacuation simulation in the off-season with 
permanent staff members. This would be beneficial for the response to other emergencies at the ski 
area, not only for volcanic events.  
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Recommendation 7 
 
Hold a debrief with staff after each simulation 
 
In order for a simulation exercise to be effective, staff must be informed after the simulation of 
whether their response was appropriate and what could be improved. This could be most easily 
done in a department debrief, after closing on the simulation day, as managers and supervisors 
could go over what was seen and what could be changed. This will help to confirm the correct 
response actions to staff, giving them more confidence in a future event.  
 
Recommendation 8 
 
Place site-specific signs on the ski area in high danger locations 
 
In areas of high danger on both ski areas, it would be beneficial to have site-specific signs with 
brief, clear instructions on the correct response actions to take during activation of the warning 
system. At Whakapapa, areas that would benefit from these signs include the Far West area, the 
bottom of the Waterfall T-Bar, and the Staircase area under the Waterfall Express Chairlift. An 
example of the sign at the top of the Far West area would be “If lahar siren sounds, move 
immediately to ridgelines” and nothing more. It was determined that the development of a site-
specific sign for the Far West area is currently being undertaken by RAL (Andy Hoyle, personal 
communication, 2005). At Turoa, it would be beneficial to have these signs at the top of the two 
highest T-Bars, the Jumbo and the High Noon. An example of the sign at the top of the High Noon 
T-Bar would be “If notified by staff a volcanic event is occurring, move immediately to ridgelines 
(high ground), and begin walking down ridge to the Giant Café” and nothing more. It is important 
to keep this message to the point as customers and staff will look to them for immediate 
instructions.  
 
Recommendation 9 
 
Increase education around times of higher risk or elevated volcanic activity 
 
It was suggested by a few staff members during the interviews that they believed it would be 
beneficial to increase the level of volcanic hazard education on the ski area during periods of 
increased risk. Times where this would become relevant include when the Crater Lake is at a high 
level or when the volcano is beginning to show signs of activity but not enough to warrant the 
closing of the ski area. This increase in public education can be as simple as ticket-sellers 
informing each customer that there is a higher risk from volcanic activity at the ski area and to 
respond immediately when the warning system sounds. The level of activity of the volcano can also 
be described by Snow School Instructors when teaching classes, and Lift Operators can also make 
small talk with customers in line informing them of the volcanic hazards at Ruapehu. However, this  
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must be done carefully so customers are not scared away. Therefore it is important to stress that 
Ruapehu is a unique area and that staff are trying to educate customers about the mountain. 
 
Recommendation 10 
 
Laminate and paste specific lift response instructions to the wall in each lift drive station 
 
It was discovered that each lift-specific manual located in the lift drive stations contains the proper 
response procedure for each lift once the alarm has been activated. It would be beneficial if these 
instructions were photocopied, laminated, and stuck to the wall of the drive station for easy access 
during an emergency. Even if the lift operator knows the response actions, seeing them on the wall 
will give added confidence that they are taking the right actions.  
 
Recommendation 11 
 
 Help permanent staff on the ski area to become confident enough in their response to initiate it 
immediately 
 
During the response to a volcanic event, organizational authority will have to be suspended in 
favour of lower-level decision making for at least the initial phases of a lahar response (Galley et 
al., 2003). Therefore, effort must be made to increase the confidence of managers and supervisors 
who may be in positions of authority during that phase. The following are two examples of ways 
that this can begin to be achieved: 
1. Continue encouraging returning staff to attend the Health and Safety course presented 
during staff induction week, and 
2. Involve these staff in the full-scale evacuation simulation in the off-season. 
 
The 2005 winter season staff induction was the first year that returning staff at Whakapapa ski area 
have been asked to attend the Health and Safety training (Andy Hoyle, personal communication, 
2005). This is a positive step, as it was found during the interviews that some long serving staff at 
the ski area had never attended a lahar hazard training session before.  
 
Recommendation 12 
 
Make volcanic hazards training sessions clearer and more concise 
 
The volcanic hazard training sessions held during RAL staff induction week have improved 
considerably in the last few years, thanks to a renewed commitment and enthusiasm put forth by 
key RAL management. However, this year some training sessions were found to be long, as the 
material could be covered just as efficiently in a shorter time period. The following include 
recommendations of the main points to be covered during staff induction training. 
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A. Continue training each department separately and consider bringing in a DoC staff member to 
assist with running the training 
 
Most staff interviewed commented on the improvement in lahar hazard training at the ski area over 
the past year. Part of this improvement is likely due to separating the departments, as the session 
leader is able to focus on teaching each department the role they will play. It also may be beneficial 
to bring in a DoC staff member from Whakapapa Village involved in the warning system at the ski 
area to assist with running the training. This will show staff that RAL takes the risk seriously and 
has relationships with outside agencies for handling the hazard. The DoC staff member may also be 
able to make valuable contributions like explaining the volcanic hazard and warning system. 
 
B. Focus on explaining past eruptions and impacts on the ski area (10 minutes) 
 
During the interviews, it was found that each staff member had a very different idea of past 
eruptions at the Ruapehu and the effects on the ski area. This means that staff members may have 
very different expectations of a future eruption at the ski area. This can be easily covered by 
explaining the past three major eruptions (1969, 1975, and 1995/96) and their impacts on the ski 
area. It is important to mention that none of the historical eruptions at Ruapehu have contained 
flowing lava. It may be beneficial to show news footage of the 1995/96 eruption and impact on the 
ski area. This will also help to explain to staff how a lahar acts and looks. A member of RAL who 
experienced the 1995/96 eruptions could also be brought in to briefly share their experience. 
 
C. Explain the warning system (<5 minutes) 
 
It is important for the warning system at Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas to be explained to staff in 
the simplest terms possible. It is not important for staff to know the location of seismometers, but 
more important for them to understand how the alarm will sound and the importance of responding 
quickly. The warning times associated with a lahar entering the ski areas can also be explained 
here.  
 
D. Explain their role, perhaps using public education materials (5 minutes) 
 
An important part of training is explaining to staff member their role in the response to a volcanic 
eruption. RAL has already begun to divide into departments for the training, which is extremely 
beneficial for being able to explain in detail the role their department will play. It may be useful to 
pull out the public education posters during this section of the training, so that staff are able to see 
where lahars will affect the ski area and can determine what their response should be dependent on 
which part of the ski area they are in.  
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E. Explain how a ski area evacuation would occur, taking an all-disaster approach (<5 minutes) 
 
This includes explaining what the overall ski area response will be, so that staff can get an idea of 
what their role will be in relation to other departments. It is also useful to explain to staff what the 
overall procedure will be after the initial event has passed, such as if they should wait for 
instructions before moving off the ski area or if they should immediately head for the closest 
building.  
 
F. Include stress resilience training (5 minutes) 
 
It is important during the training session for staff to discuss different situations they may come 
across during the response to a volcanic event and emotions they may feel. It should be stressed to 
staff that these emotions are normal, and various ways to cope with these feeling should be 
explained. This stress resilience training can be used proactively to manage potential symptoms 
relating to stress and trauma (Paton and Flin, 1999; Paton and Jackson, 2002). Any support services 
that will be offered to staff after a volcanic event should also be explained (i.e. debriefing and 
counselling) and the benefits of using these services should be covered.  
 
Recommendation 13 
 
Write a ski area action plan, including designating an off-mountain meeting point and plans for 
communication 
 
Firstly, the ski area will need to decide if CIMS is the most efficient structure for them to use in the 
response to a volcanic event (see Section 7.3.4 for a detailed discussion). If the ski area decides to 
follow CIMS guidelines when responding to an emergency situation, they will first need to write an 
Initial Action Plan (IAP). This plan can be constructed based on the training needs analysis in 
Section 7.4, as RAL can get an idea of tasks that will need to be done and problems that may be 
encountered during a response. Potential evacuation routes from high risk areas should be listed in 
the plan. It will also be important to designate an off-mountain meeting point, as customers and 
staff will need to be evacuated to one location so managers are able to account for everyone. An 
example of an appropriate area may be the RAL staff quarters/Skotel area, which is also out of any 
potential secondary lahar paths in Whakapapa Village.  
 
The plan for communication must also be thought of beforehand. This also must include a backup 
plan in case the main method of communication fails (i.e. two-way radios).Considering how the 
media will be handled is another important matter, as a volcanic event affecting the ski area has the 
potential for international attention. Clark (1996) describes that: 
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“past disasters show that companies have failed to consider how the media was to be 
handled, only to find that their devastating experience is being broadcast over the radio or 
television without any plan for how to deal with the flood of incoming calls from family 
members and concerned individuals.” (p. 43) 
 
Consistent with previous research, Galley et al. (2003) also suggests communication will be an 
essential part of the response plan. However, information management, which is separate from 
communication, is another key training issue (Paton and Hannan, 2004). This will help staff to 
understand what is being communicated and whether it is meaningful to the recipients (Paton and 
Hannan, 2004). 
 
The plan must also be supported by all levels of management at the ski area.  
 
Recommendation 14 
 
Work with DoC to possibly arrange adding more speaker sites on Whakapapa, and adding 
speakers to the top area of Turoa 
 
It may be beneficial on Whakapapa to increase the speaker coverage, as during the 2005 tests it was 
found that in some areas the volume of the warning system was less than ideal. DoC should also be 
responsible for testing the warning system before the beginning of the ski season (as opposed to the 
first simulation) to avoid placing skiers and staff at unnecessary risk at the beginning of the season.   
 
It would also be useful for the warning system to be expanded to Turoa, by the addition of speakers 
near the top two T-Bars at greatest risk. Management at Turoa seem very open to this idea, so it 
would just be a matter of negotiation between DoC and RAL as to who should pay for these 
speakers and where they should be placed for greatest efficiency. 
 
Recommendation 15 
 
Train building fire wardens to also be an ‘eruption’ warden 
 
It was suggested by a few staff members during the interviews that each building should have an 
‘eruption’ warden, similar to a fire warden. This is an excellent idea which would likely minimize 
confusion, as the ‘eruption’ warden could take a leadership role in each building amongst staff 
during a volcanic event response. The simplest way to accomplish this is to use the building fire 
warden also as an ‘eruption’ warden, and train them in the proper eruption response actions when 
they receive their fire training.  
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Conclusion 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
The situation RAL faces at Whakapapa and Turoa ski areas is unique compared to most other ski 
area companies worldwide. The amount of work and responsibility RAL has put into preparing 
their staff for a volcanic event is to be admired, considering the low frequency of a volcanic event 
affecting the ski area compared to other natural hazards. It is important for RAL to be aware of 
factors that can constrain organizational commitment (Section 7.1) and to work at overcoming 
these factors in order to be prepared for a volcanic event that may have extremely serious 
consequences for the ski area.  
 
Four main objectives were put to test during this research, and the conclusions are as follows 
(Section 7.3): 
• Staff were found to be knowledgeable about the volcanic hazards at the ski areas but had 
differing perceptions of the risk associated with those hazards, 
• Staff were found to be knowledgeable and confident in the Stage 1 (initial) response to a 
volcanic event, however were unsure of what a Stage 2 (evacuation) response would 
involve, 
• RAL has made significant improvement in recent years to their volcanic hazard training 
(including staff training during induction week, simulations, and blind tests), however 
minor changes can be made to improve the effectiveness, and 
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• RAL needs to develop a specific ‘plan’ for how they will deal with a volcanic event, as 
applying broad emergency plans will likely be unproductive during the response to a 
volcanic event. 
 
The following recommendations were then made: 
1. Calculate number of people present on the ski areas in different circumstances 
 
2. Hold a yearly pre-season meeting with key RAL, GNS, and DoC staff, and have emergency 
contact numbers (DoC, GNS) readily available 
 
3. Run an evacuation simulation with permanent staff in March at Whakapapa 
 
4. Provide Snow School instructors with two-way radios 
 
5. Run a second test at Whakapapa during the ski season only if it is completely ‘blind’ 
 
6. Begin running yearly volcanic event simulations at Turoa and possibly a yearly full-scale 
evacuation in the off-season 
 
7. Hold a debrief with staff after each simulation 
 
8. Place site-specific signs on the ski area in high danger locations 
 
9. Increase public education around times of higher risk 
 
10. Laminate and paste specific lift response instructions to the wall in each lift drive station 
 
11. Help permanent staff on the ski area to become confident enough in their response to be able to 
initiate it immediately 
 
12. Make volcanic hazards training session clearer and more concise: 
a. Continue training each department separately and consider bringing in a DoC staff 
member to assist with running the training.  
b. Focus on explaining past eruption and impacts on the ski area 
c. Explain the warning system 
d. Explain their role, perhaps using public education materials 
e. Explain how a ski area evacuation would occur, taking an all-disaster approach 
f. Include stress resilience training 
 
13. Write an overall CIMS based ski area action plan, including designating an off-mountain 
meeting point and plans for communication 
 
14. Work with DoC to possibly arrange adding more speaker sites on Whakapapa, and adding 
speakers to the top area of Turoa 
 
15. Train the building fire wardens to also be ‘eruption’ wardens 
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APPENDIX 1: DEPARTMENT SPECIFIC TRAINING OBSERVATIONS DURING 
TUROA AND WHAKAPAPA STAFF INDUCTION WEEKS 
1. Lift Operators 
Turoa 
 
Lift Operations staff for this session consisted of new and returning staff. Staff were explained the 
warning system, and that some staff on both areas have pagers which are linked to the EDS to 
inform all parties. The 1995/96 eruptions were also explained, with staff told that although it was 
quite a small eruption, it was still scary, as the mountain was spewing ash and sounded like a jet 
engine. The Tangiwai rail disaster was also explained. Lift Operations staff were also informed that 
the main hazard at Turoa is ballistic bombs in the summit hazard zone.  
 
The correct response actions were then explained to the Lift Operations staff. They need to inform 
customers if they are alerted of an eruption and direct them to safe areas, which are usually cafes. 
Chairlifts must also be run at maximum speed to unload customers, and then everyone must move 
to higher ground. All surface lifts must be stopped. Lift Operators are then required to wait for 
instruction of either Ski Patrol or their supervisors on the evacuation of the mountain.  
 
Lift Operation staff were unsure if there would be any warning signs before an eruption, and were 
told that the 1995 eruption occurred with no warning and there were skiers on the mountain. In 
panic, people quickly tried to get off the ski area and lift operators left their stations, which is what 
they are now working to avoid 
 
The lahar hazard video was not played, as the audio was not working.  
 
Whakapapa 
 
Lift Operations staff for this session consisted of new and returning staff, as well as supervisors and 
managers. Most staff seemed knowledgeable that Ruapehu was an active volcano, and were told 
the volcano was one of the most active in the world. Lahars were indicated as the key hazard, and 
consisted of a dense flow of mud and ash which flows quickly (60 to 90 km/hr) down the valleys. 
Staff were then split into groups and asked to come up with the main volcanic hazards at the ski 
area. The warning system was then explained, including how the announcement sounds. Lift 
operators were identified as a key part of the response plan. The session leader then indicated that it 
was also important to think of the next step after the alarm sounds, because people will begin to 
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panic and want to leave. Staff were told it is important to stay calm, as customers will look to them 
for a leadership role. Public education posters were then handed out to staff, and they were asked to 
think of what they would do if they heard the alarm sound. Responses included speeding up lifts to 
get customers off, moving people to safe areas, stopping T-Bars, and keeping people in safe areas, 
which were all indicated as correct responses with a trend towards keeping the public safe and 
minimizing damage. It was also made clear to Lift Operators that lifts may be damaged, hence the 
importance of removing people from the lifts quickly. 
 
Staff also enquired about how quickly a lahar would enter the ski area, and were told it is likely 
take three minutes from the crater to the first T-Bar. Staff also asked if they would likely feel an 
earthquake before an eruption, but were told they may not feel any seismicity or warning signs, and 
that it was important to treat the sounding of the warning system as a real test each time. If in doubt 
of what to do, staff were told to talk to their supervisors. Staff were also interested in discussing if 
anyone had died during an eruption at Ruapehu before. It was also discussed that there is a 
traditional feeling that Turoa is safe, however there were other hazards Turoa may have a problem 
with, such as ballistic bombs if close enough to the crater. Lift operators were told that they have 
lahar specific instructions in their lift manuals, and that RAL aims to have a general practice run of 
the warning system during the season. Lift operators were told they needed to concentrate on the 
initial action plan, and not to worry about the later evacuation plan.  
 
The video was then shown, but only worked for the first few minutes.  
 
2. Customer Services 
Turoa 
 
Customer service staff for this session consisted of both new and returning staff. They were told 
that the eruption in 1995 was a ‘blue-sky’ eruption, where no one knew the volcano was going to 
erupt. It was also explained that there were various warning levels of volcanic activity, and that the 
managers would make the call on when to close the ski area. Ballistic bombs and ash were 
described as the key hazards. Customer service staff were concerned about who would be 
responsible for informing people if the pager systems were to go off, and were told they would 
have a key role in telling other departments the appropriate response. The main response action 
would be informing customers and directing them to safe areas, such as the car park and cafes. Ski 
Patrol would then be responsible for clearing the mountain. The session leader also indicated that 
Turoa likely would be fine during an eruption event. Staff were then shown the video. Customer 
service staff were concerned about whether there would be warning signs from the mountain, and 
 
Appendices 153
were told that they would possibly hear the eruption but may not be able to see it. The eruption 
event itself was described as ‘awesome’ and ‘not that scary’.  
 
3. Food and Beverage 
Turoa 
 
Food and Beverage staff for this session consisted of both new and returning staff. The warning 
system at the ski area was first described to food and beverage staff, with pagers alerting key staff 
to know which activity level is present on the mountain and whether the EDS has been activated. 
Staff were also told that if there was an eruption, everyone would be well off. The public education 
brochure was then handed out, and the difference between the two ski areas was described. Food 
and beverage staff were told they were to tell people to stay in the cafes as the cafes are a safe area. 
Ski Patrol and supervisors would then tell staff when to move and where to. Food and beverage 
staff were also told that it applies more to Whakapapa, however higher ground is still the place to 
be. The video was then shown, however had problems at about five minutes and was stopped.  
 
Whakapapa 
 
Food and Beverage staff for this session consisted of both new and returning staff. Food and 
Beverage staff were immediately split into groups and asked to discuss why the volcano was a 
problem for the ski area. Most staff thought that lahars would be the biggest problem, which were 
described to them by the session leader as forming when an eruption shoots the Crater Lake water 
into the air which lands and melts the snow, rushing down valleys and entraining rocks. Staff also 
mentioned ash and poisonous gases as being a problem. The session leader explained the likely 
warning signs from the volcano, such as increased seismicity and increase in lake water 
temperature, and that the volcano erupts every 10 to 15 years.  It was also stressed to staff that they 
were safe in buildings and that the main job was to keep customers calm.  
 
The warning system at Whakapapa was then described to staff, and it was noted that there would be 
a test early in the season. Staff were told that the top lifts would only have three minutes warning 
time. Staff were concerned if anyone had ever been killed during an eruption and were told there 
hadn’t been any deaths on the ski area just damage to structures. The public education posters were 
then handed out, so staff could familiarize themselves with the lahar paths, summit hazard zone, 
and safe areas. Food and Beverage staff were also told their personal safety was the most important 
thing, and that they should try to keep people in cafes, keep them calm, and give them information. 
Staff were concerned that Happy Valley was a safe area even though it was in a valley, however it 
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was explained to them that there is a deeper valley up above that will channel the lahar flow so 
there is no danger of it entering Happy Valley. Staff were also told there was an evacuation plan for 
getting everyone off the mountain, and that some possible complications to the evacuation plan 
would be food, water, and communication problems, and also the added complication of the 
weather possibly being bad. It was also stressed it is important for staff not to cross lahar paths as 
the ground may not be stable. The staff were also told that public education posters would be 
everywhere on the ski area to maximize customer awareness, and that staff would be needed to 
help inform customers of the risk.  
 
The video for this session did not work. 
 
4. Road Crew 
Turoa 
 
Road Crew staff for this session consisted of new staff only. The volcanic warning system was first 
explained to road crew staff. They were told the main volcanic hazard at Turoa was ballistic 
bombs, as Turoa does not get as many lahars as Whakapapa. Turoa was summed up as being not 
that dangerous. Staff were concerned a bigger hazard may be gases or debris, but were told that 
was dependent on the way the wind was blowing. However, staff were told that eruptions do 
happen, such as 1995/96, when Turoa did not have a warning system. The event occurred without 
warning, and customers were unsure of what to do so everyone ran off, including staff. However, 
road crew staff were told that their main response action for a volcanic event is to stay in position 
and take responsibility for the road and traffic signs. It was also explained that the ski area is likely 
to be closed if it was too dangerous. Staff were also warned if it was a crappy day it may not be 
obvious the volcano was erupting. Road crew staff were unsure of what ‘high ground’ meant, and 
were advised that it means to move out of valleys, similar to the response to an avalanche.  
 
The video was then played, and staff were concerned that there was no sounding siren at Turoa like 
there was at Whakapapa. However, the session leader indicated there was one around the base area 
at Turoa, which would be expanded for the rest of the ski area, but that the danger at Turoa isn’t 
from lahars. Road crew staff also indicated they wouldn’t have to worry because they wouldn’t be 
on the mountain during an eruption, however it was stressed to them it is important to know 
because they may be skiing or up on the mountain at the time of an eruption.  
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5. Snow School 
Whakapapa 
 
Snow School staff for this session consisted of returning staff only, as new staff were due to arrive 
at the ski area in two weeks times and would attend a Health and Safety session then. They were 
first asked what the main hazards were from a volcanic eruption. Lahar was the first answer, which 
they believed could either be created by the side of the Crater Lake giving way or by an eruption. 
Other hazards mentioned included pyroclastic flows, earthquakes, and ash. The session leader 
explained that although pyroclastic flows aren’t common at Ruapehu, they still can’t be discounted.  
 
The initial response plan was then discussed, which the session leader described as something he 
also did not want to deal with but would have to, as the ski area is responsible. Snow School staff 
thought the biggest problem on the ski area would be panic. The session leader agreed, indicating 
that is why it is important for anyone in an RAL uniform to take a leadership role. Staff were then 
encouraged to think of what they would do if they heard the warning system. Common answers 
included dropping equipment, getting people to safe ground, making sure they are safe, getting 
names and numbers, reassuring people, and making them remain in safe areas. It was indicated to 
staff that no matter where they were on the ski area, it was important to move to high ground as the 
lahar could go anywhere. Past lahar damage at the ski area was also discussed.  
 
It was also mentioned that in past tests Food and Beverage staff haven’t realized they need to take 
an active role in keeping people inside. It is also important to initiate the response plan as soon as 
the warning system is heard, and that the best plan was a solid response and high public awareness. 
The warning system was then explained to staff, and different environmental conditions that may 
hinder the warning system were discussed. The higher risk at the Far West T-Bar was also brought 
up, as well as the summit hazard zone. Snow School staff were also told their primary response 
actions were to move their group to high ground, leaving equipment behind, and spread word about 
what is happening. Phase 2, the evacuation phase, was also discussed, as every staff member will 
be needed to help manage groups of people.  The importance of treating every alarm as a real one 
was also stressed, as the ski area managers will not know immediately if it is a real alarm. The 
lahar safety video was then shown.  
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6. Groomers 
Whakapapa 
 
Groomer training consisted of both new and returning staff, as well as supervisors, who were first 
told they work on an active volcano which erupts regularly. Staff were told that at Whakapapa, the 
main threat was from lahars which could occur 10 to 20 years, whereas at Turoa the main threat 
was from ballistic bombs. Groomer staff thought that the Crater Lake wall collapse could affect the 
ski area, however were told that is not a threat to the Whakapapa ski area. The session leader 
described a lahar as mud, rock, and water, which was kind of like lava, and could travel up to 90 
km/hr. The Eruption Detection System (EDS) was then described and it was noted it only exists at 
Whakapapa. Groomers were concerned they may not be able to hear the siren from inside their 
machine, so it was then decided to supply the manager with a pager to alert him when the warning 
system was sounded and then he could radio the alert to his crew.  
 
The 1995 lahar was also discussed and the risk it would have had to people if it would have 
occurred during the day. Staff were also told to look at volcanic hazards posters around the ski 
area, as there was lots of good information on them. The summit hazard zone was then described, 
and staff watched the lahar hazard video. Because the video mainly talked about the response of 
people on skiers, groomer staff were then broken up into groups to talk about what their response 
would be. Staff were told the correct action would be to drive to higher ground, or drive out of 
dangerous areas such as the Gutt or Turnpike where there was no way to get to higher ground. It 
was agreed upon that groomer staff would not immediately be in a position to help customers, 
however once they were safe it was important for them to inform customers and point people to 
where they need to go. The session leader also discussed that in tests, people have just ignored the 
warning system or have fallen over in a panic, which puts pressure on Ski Patrol to remove 
everyone from lahar paths. The time frame between when the alarm was sounded and when it could 
be determined if it was a real alarm was estimated at 10 to 15 minutes. It was also stressed to staff 
that it was not up to RAL to determine whether the alarm was false. Staff would then need to 
follow instructions from their supervisor on evacuating people. Groomer staff then wanted to know 
if there was a specific channel for informing people of what was happening, and were told that the 
Ski Patrol would be using their channel.  
 APPENDIX 2: INFORMATION SHEET, CONSENT SHEET, AND 2005 STAFF 
SURVEY 
 
Information Sheet – Management staff interviews 
 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. I am a Masters student at the 
University of Canterbury in the Department of Geological Sciences, specializing in 
Hazards Management. I am working with the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences 
on volcanic hazards at Ruapehu. My research focuses on staff training at Whakapapa and 
Turoa ski fields for a volcanic event. These interviews will be used to gauge the current 
level of thinking of management staff at RAL on volcanic hazards on Ruapehu, 
specifically lahar hazards. 
 
Participation is voluntary. In no way will the results of the interview have any outcome on 
your position at Ruapehu Alpine Lifts. All interviews will be kept confidential, and will be 
securely stored. Information from these interviews will be used to develop 
recommendations on how to improve staff training at Whakapapa and Turoa ski fields.  
 
Thanks 
 
Amy Christianson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 158 
Consent Sheet 
 
I, _____________________________________________, give Amy Christianson at the 
University of Canterbury permission to record this interview, and to use information from 
my responses in this interview in her MSc. Thesis and a GNS report.  
 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
Signature of interviewee 
 
 
__________________________________________________ 
Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 159
Ruapehu Alpine Lifts – Staff Survey - Lahar Training 
 
 
GENERAL 
  
Which ski field do you work at?:      __ Whakapapa         __ Turoa 
 
What area(s) will you predominantly work in this season?: (Tick all that apply) 
__ Permanent Staff/Management            
__ Ski Patrol             
__ Lift Operator                     
__ Snow School                  
__ Customer Services 
__ Food and Beverage        
__ Rental/Workshop/Retail           
__ Groomers 
__ Other: ____________________ 
 
How long have you worked on this ski field?: (Tick one) 
 __ 1st Year      __ 2nd Year       __ 3rd Year       __ More 
 
 
SPECIFIC 
 
The following questions relate to lahar staff training: 
 
1. Please provide as detailed a description as possible for the following questions: 
 
a) What is a lahar? _______________________________________________ 
 
b) How does a lahar act?___________________________________________ 
 
c) If a lahar occurs, how much warning time would there be before it affects the ski 
field?  ___________________________________________________ 
 
d) What are the potential hazards from a lahar? _________________________ 
                _____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
2. Do you think lahar training is important? Y / N 
 
 Why/ Why not? __________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
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3. When do you think the next volcanic event is likely to affect the ski field? (circle one) 
 
Within the next year      ___   _    Within your lifetime        _______    Don’t know__ 
           Within the next 10 years      _____   _  Not within your lifetime___       
 
 
 
4. What are the components that make up the lahar warning system at your ski field? 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
5. Do you feel RAL is prepared to handle an emergency situation? Y / N 
 
 Why/ Why not? _________________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
6. Were your role requirements during a lahar warning (i.e. actions you will be expected to 
take) explained clearly? Y / N 
 
a) What are they?  
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
b) Does it involve working with others? Y / N 
 
c) If so, do you feel your training for working with others was adequate? Y / N 
 
 Why/ Why not? _________________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
7. What sorts of situations do you think could be most stressful when the lahar warning 
system activates? 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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8. a) What are the different possible reactions from customers to a lahar warning? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
b) What kinds of customer needs do you think you might have to deal with? 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
c) Do you think you have received adequate training to deal with these issues? Y/ N 
 
 Why/ Why not? _________________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
9. What are the potential consequences to skiers in the path of a lahar when it enters the ski 
field? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
10. Have you seen any public education on volcanic hazards at your ski field? Y / N 
 
 What does it say? ________________________________________________ 
 
 _______________________________________________________________ 

 APPENDIX 3: 2005 WINTER SEASON STAFF SURVEY RESULTS 
 
Results 
 
Table 1:  Which ski field do you work at? 
 
  Responses 
   Count (n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 Whakapapa 70 78.7 
 Turoa 19 21.3 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:   What area(s) will you predominantly work in this season? 
 
  Responses 
 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 Permanent Staff/Management 4 4.5 
 Ski Patrol/ Trail Safety 1 1.1 
 Lift Operator 9 10.1 
 Snow School 10 11.2 
 Food and Beverage 21 23.6 
 Rental/Workshop/Retail 37 41.6 
 Road Services 7 7.9 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:    How long have you worked on this ski field? 
 
  Responses 
 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 1st Year 59 66.3 
 2nd Year 17 19.1 
 3rd Year 4 4.5 
 More 8 9.0 
 Missing 1 1.1 
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Table 4:   What is a lahar? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%)  
 Volcanic mudflow 43 48.9 
  Ice/slush/mudflow from volcanoes 1 1.1 
  A flow of geological material caused by volcanic activity 1 1.1 
  
Flash flood of hot mud and debris 6 6.8 
  Mud/ash/water flow 13 14.8 
  A landslide caused by a volcanic eruption, includes debris 2 2.3 
  Debris and water from crater when volcano erupts 1 1.1 
  Mudslide 12 13.6 
  A hot liquid that comes out of the mountain 1 1.1 
  Lava 7 8.0 
  From an eruption 10 11.4 
  Muddy water flow from Crater Lake 5 5.7 
  Hot 13 14.8 
  A volcanic flow of ash 1 1.1 
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Table 5:   How does a lahar act? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 Like a flash flood 9 10.1 
  Flows like a river 12 13.5 
  Like an avalanche 1 1.1 
  runs downhill taking out everything in it's path 1 1.1 
  Anyway it wants 2 2.2 
  Runs downhill, usually in valleys 20 22.5 
  Fast moving 15 16.9 
  Flows down the hill but not very fast 1 1.1 
  Mudflow 3 3.4 
  Violently 1 1.1 
  Slides down mountain 3 3.4 
  flows down the mountain 10 11.2 
  Like thick porridge flowing downhill 1 1.1 
  Like a tsunami coming down a mountain 1 1.1 
  runs down particular paths 3 3.4 
  Didn't understand 4 4.5 
  No Response 2 2.2 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:  If a lahar occurs, how much warning time would there be before it affects the ski field? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
  Not much 20 22.5 
  2-5 minutes 14 15.7 
  5 minutes 16 18.0 
  5 to 10 minutes 6 6.7 
  10 minutes 10 11.2 
  10 minutes to an hour 9 10.1 
  Over an hour 1 1.1 
  Don't know 4 4.5 
  Didn't understand 4 4.5 
  No Response 5 5.6 
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Table 7:   What are the potential hazards from a lahar? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent 
 (%) 
 Death 46 55.4 
  Injury 18 21.7 
  Burns 3 3.6 
  Removal of snow 1 1.2 
  Damage to lifts 15 18.1 
  Damage to ski area 11 13.3 
  Damage to buildings 16 19.3 
  Burial 5 6.0 
  Being trapped 1 1.2 
  Flash floods in rivers 7 8.4 
  Being swept away by one 16 19.3 
  Closure of ski field 6 7.2 
  Air pollution 1 1.2 
  Avalanche 3 3.6 
  Water supply contamination 1 1.2 
  Ecological repercussions 2 2.4 
  Anything in its path is destroyed 6 7.2 
  Gas 3 3.6 
  Rocks 8 9.6 
  Mudflow 5 6.0 
  People's reaction 2 2.4 
 
 
 
 
Table 8:   Do you think lahar training is important? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
  Yes 86 96.6 
  No 2 2.2 
  No response 1 1.1 
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Table 9:   Why do you think lahar training is important? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 
To prevent accidents and fatalities (for safety) 38 43.7 
  To increase awareness 33 37.9 
  
To learn correct response actions 37 42.5 
  Because there are going to be lots of panicked people. 2 2.3 
Because the volcano could erupt at any time 15 17.2 
  
We are responsible for the wellbeing and safety of our 
customers 
 
1 1.1 
  It’s not, because I don't live near volcanoes 1 1.1 
  It’s not, because I'm working in a safe zone 2 2.3 
 
 
 
 
Table 10:   When do you think the next volcanic event is likely to affect the ski field? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent 
 (%) 
  Within the next year 25 28.1 
  Within the next 10 years 34 38.2 
  Within your lifetime 15 16.9 
  Don't know 14 15.7 
  No response 1 1.1 
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Table 11:   What are the components that make up the warning system at your ski area? 
 
 Responses - Whakapapa 
  
Count 
(n=80) 
Percent 
 (%) 
  Monitoring 16 24.2 
  Siren and speakers 53 80.3 
  Radio 1 1.5 
  Announcement 23 34.8 
  Staff 13 19.7 
  Signs 1 1.5 
  EDS 14 21.2 
  DoC 2 3.0 
  Cameras 1 1.5 
 
 Responses - Turoa 
  
Count 
(n=19) 
Percent 
 (%) 
  Monitoring 11 58.0 
  Siren and speakers 6 31.6 
  Radio 0 0 
  Announcement 2 10.5 
  Staff 2 10.5 
  Signs 0 0 
  EDS 5 26.3 
  DoC 0 0 
  Cameras 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 Table 12:    Do you feel RAL is prepared to handle an emergency situation? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent 
 (%) 
  Yes 66 74.2 
  No 13 14.6 
  Don't Know 1 1.1 
  Sort of 6 6.7 
  No response 3 3.4 
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Table 13:   Do you feel RAL is prepared to handle a volcanic emergency? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent 
(%) 
 Yes, because of previous experience 13 16.9 
  Yes, because of help from DoC and other groups 4 5.2 
  Yes, because key staff are well trained 8 10.4 
  Yes, because of the health and safety course 19 24.7 
  Yes, because they are aware of the hazard 9 11.7 
  Yes, because they have a plan 17 22.1 
 Yes, because they have all the equipment that will be 
needed 1 1.3 
 Yes, because the posters up show exactly what to do 7 9.1 
 Yes, because of the warning system in place 11 14.3 
 Yes, because most buildings are out of lahar paths 1 1.3 
 Yes, because they should be prepared and have to be 4 5.2 
  No, because you can't hear the speakers on some parts of 
the mountain 1 1.3 
  No, because there is no way to know how the lahar will 
act 2 2.6 
  No, because staff should get more training 4 5.2 
  No, because staff don't to know the chain of command 1 1.3 
  No, because staff don't know evacuation procedures 3 3.9 
  No, because it is difficult to evacuate a large number of 
people as there is only one road out  2 2.6 
  No, because they need to have a simulation or some form 
of practical training 2 2.6 
 No, because staff and public do not have enough 
knowledge 3 3.9 
  
Don’t know, because I haven't seen them in practice 2 2.6 
  Don’t know, because they may not know what they're 
doing 1 1.3 
  Don’t know, because a lahar is different than any other 
hazard 1 1.3 
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Table 13:   Were your role requirements during a lahar warning (i.e. actions you will be expected to  
                   take) explained clearly? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
  Yes 48 53.9 
  No 23 25.8 
  Sort of 3 3.4 
  No response 15 16.9 
 
 
 
 
Table 14:     What are your role requirements during a lahar warning? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent 
 (%) 
 Move people away from lahar paths 2 2.6 
  Move group to safe area 42 54.5 
  Stay in safe area 4 5.2 
  Remove skis and snowboards 1 1.3 
  Walk/climb up onto ridges 1 1.3 
  Put your own safety first 2 2.6 
  Move people to higher ground 13 16.9 
  Move people into buildings 1 1.3 
  Calm people 18 23.4 
  Give out information 13 16.9 
  Don't panic 1 1.3 
  Get all customers down the mountain safely 4 5.2 
  Move people out of valleys 1 1.3 
  Take instructions from a supervisor 7 9.1 
  Never explained 6 7.8 
  Get inside a building 5 6.5 
  Get customers off lifts 4 5.2 
  Call last number, shut lift down 1 1.3 
  Evacuate building 1 1.3 
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Table 15:   Does it involve working with others? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent 
(%) 
 Yes 76 85.4 
  No 6 6.7 
  No response 7 7.9 
 
 
 
 
Table 16:   Do you feel your training for working with others was adequate? 
 
  Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent 
(%) 
 Yes, we had safety training already 9 18.0 
  Yes, I already work with people in my job 16 32.0 
  Yes, I know how to work with people 8 16.0 
  No, the training was not specific enough 4 8.0 
  No, we need to do simulation/scenarios 5 10.0 
  
No, I have not had any training for working with others in 
case of an emergency 13 26.0 
  No, I feel staff assigned to certain areas should have a 
meeting to discuss what will happen 1 2.0 
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Table 17:   What sorts of situations do you think could be most stressful when the lahar warning  
                    system activates? 
 
  Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 Panicking customers 50 58.8 
  Lost children/missing people 14 16.5 
  Non-English speaking people 5 5.9 
  Ignore warning signal/sirens 3 3.5 
  Keeping customers calm 4 4.7 
  Keeping customers organized 1 1.2 
  Keeping customers in buildings 1 1.2 
  People failing to listen 10 11.8 
  Safety of people on the mountain 3 3.5 
  Confusion 8 9.4 
  Public reaction 9 10.6 
  Being stuck in valleys on the mountain 5 5.9 
  Customers not knowing where to go 12 14.1 
  Not knowing where to get information 2 2.4 
  Skiers getting injured 2 2.4 
  High number of customers on the mountain 6 7.1 
  Bad weather 3 3.5 
  Moving people out of valleys 2 2.4 
  Traffic on the road out 2 2.4 
  People being pushed over in crowds 5 5.9 
  People worried about gear 1 1.2 
  Rescuing those who are not near a safe zone 1 1.2 
  People going into unsafe areas 1 1.2 
  Lone skiers 1 1.2 
  Prioritizing 1 1.2 
  Helping disabled people 1 1.2 
  Beginner skiers having a hard time moving to safe areas 1 1.2 
  Lahars following a new route, possibly into a safe zone 1 1.2 
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Table 18:   What are the different possible reactions from customers to a lahar warning? 
  Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 Panic 73 83.9 
  Confusion 22 25.3 
  Shock 6 6.9 
  
Do something stupid, reckless, dangerous 3 3.4 
  Nervous/anxious behaviour 12 13.8 
  Stressed out 13 14.9 
  Unreasonable behaviour 5 5.7 
  Don't listen 7 8.0 
  Ignorance 6 6.9 
  Think it's a drill 2 2.3 
  Fear 18 20.7 
  Anger 5 5.7 
  Wanting to leave 3 3.4 
 No reaction 1 1.1 
  Ask a staff member what to do, what is going on 4 4.6 
 Calm 6 6.9 
 Cooperation 3 3.4 
 Obedience 3 3.4 
 Excitement 2 2.3 
  Interest/Curiosity 7 8.0 
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Table 19:   What kinds of customer needs do you think you might have to deal with? 
 
  Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 Injuries 14 17.9 
  Stress 10 12.8 
  Location of family members 20 25.6 
  Reassurance/patience 24 30.8 
  Letting them know what is happening 22 28.2 
  Dealing with fear 7 9.0 
  Non-English speaking customers 5 6.4 
  Irrational concerns 1 1.3 
  Dealing with children 1 1.3 
  Supplying food/water/shelter 3 3.8 
  Helping disabled people/people that need assistance to move 7 9.0 
  Safety 9 11.5 
  Helping them to evacuate 5 6.4 
  Every kind 1 1.3 
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Table 20:   Do you think you received adequate training to deal with these issues? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 Yes 40 44.9 
  No 45 50.6 
  Sort of 2 2.2 
  No response 2 2.2 
 
 
 
 
Table 21:   Do you think you have received adequate training to deal with these issues? 
 
  Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 Yes, because I feel confident I will be able to keep customers calm 2 3.1 
  Yes, because it is common sense 11 17.2 
  Yes, because the training already received was good 13 20.3 
  Yes, because we received awareness of safe zones 5 7.8 
  No, because it was not specific enough 4 6.3 
  No, because I haven't had experience with a situation like this before 5 7.8 
  No, because I didn’t receive any lahar hazard training 22 34.4 
  No, because we should have on-hill training/simulation 5 7.8 
 No, because there was no training on dealing with injured people 4 6.3 
 No, because we weren’t give any information to keep to look over 1 1.6 
  Won't know until it happens, can't really train for it 4 6.3 
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Table 21:     What are the potential consequences to skiers in the path of a  
                      lahar when it enters the ski area? 
 
  Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent  
(%) 
 Injury 33 40.7 
  Death 60 74.1 
  Getting trapped/isolated 7 8.6 
  Take out lifts/buildings that customers may be on/in 4 4.9 
  Getting caught up in the lahar 24 29.6 
  Getting caught in an avalanche caused by the lahar 1 1.2 
 
 
 
 
Table 22:    Have you seen any public education on volcanic hazards at your ski field? 
 
 Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent 
 (%) 
 Yes 70 78.7 
  No 18 20.2 
  No response 1 1.1 
 
 
 
Table 23:   What do the posters on volcanic hazards say? 
 
  Responses 
  
Count 
(n=89) 
Percent 
 (%) 
 Don't know 1 1.5 
  Listen to sirens 3 4.6 
  Evacuate to car parks 1 1.5 
  Information about lahars 4 6.2 
  Shows possible lahar paths 22 33.8 
  Shows safe areas 34 52.3 
  Risks 1 1.5 
  Procedure to follow 28 43.1 
  Volcanic Hazards 15 23.1 
  Warning system 11 16.9 
  Previous Damage 2 3.1 
  Move out of valleys to higher ground 5 7.7 
  General information 3 4.6 
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APPENDIX 4: SIMULATION OBSERVATIONS 
Simulation – August 3rd, 2005 
 
Happy Valley 
- Great response 
- A good response by most staff because they knew about the test 
- Staff got people off chairlift, then stopped it. Didn’t load anyone. Gave instructions to 
some people 
- Snow School Instructors stopped people from skiing, got them to move back to top 
 
Top of the Bruce 
- Staff reacted in a calm manner 
- Staff relaxed and calm looking to see if public are moving 
- Staff stopped cars, said it was a lahar warning 
- Took a couple of minutes before staff stopped chairlifts 
 
Hutt Flat 
- Centennial offloading staff moved people to a ridge above the chairlifts, told to 
remain still up on ridge area 
- Staff gave information on what was happening 
- Staff at chairlifts were telling people where to go 
- Staff member was telling people not to ski down 
- Lifts stopped awhile after alarm 
 
Rockgarden 
- Staff at drive station could not hear the alarm 
 
Waterfall Express Chair 
- Staff at loading area stopped people going any higher, gathered people outside 
loading area 
- One staff member did a sweep under the chair 
- Chair sped up and emptied 
- Lift was sped up 
- Staff didn’t react, didn’t give any instructions at bottom of the Waterfall chair 
 
Knoll Ridge Café – Outside 
- One staff member walking around, but not giving any directions 
- Lots of staff standing around doing nothing 
- No instructions given 
- Asked someone on staff if they were in the right place, and staff member said yes 
- Didn’t hear or see any café or retail staff 
- One staff member seemed more concerned about what was happening at the Valley 
T-Bar 
 
Knoll Ridge Café – Inside 
- Café staff continued to clear tables saying nothing.  
- Staff didn’t give any instructions 
- Staff didn’t do anything 
 
Knoll Ridge T-Bar 
- At loading area, took staff a long time to convince punters to move 
- At offload area, a ski patroller came through giving directions 
- T-Bar stopped as soon as alarm sounded 
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- Liftie said to move to higher ground, stopped lift 
- Liftie stopped lift, no other action 
 
Waterfall T-Bar Area 
- At drive station, lift was stopped 60 seconds after the alarm, the lift queue was moved 
- A Ski Patroller had to tell the liftie to stop the lift 
- Trail Safety staff boarded right thought about 2 minutes after the siren through lahar 
path, to move public who were already in a safe spot. As a result, skiers moved 
through lahar path. 
- After all clear, liftie still waited for supervisor to give all clear 
- No staff at offload area to begin with, but two staff members eventually came into 
view, could hear them yelling for people to move 
- Trail Safety member went down run doing a sweep 
- Took liftie awhile to shut down the T-Bar 
- A Ski Patrol member said it was a drill, but to get up the side 
- At loading area, staff asked people to remove gear and move to a safe point 
- T-Bar didn’t stop immediately 
- At loading area, staff member turned off his stereo so he could hear the alarm, told 
everyone to get up the hill and leave their gear. As soon as he heard the alarm, he shut 
off lift 
 
Valley T-Bar 
- Valley Drive Station – received call from RAL after lift stopped 
- Liftie unsure what was happening, couldn’t hear alarm, told everyone to move to 
higher ground, gave reason way 
- Staff called to people on lift to move to high ground, staff member was last to leave 
lift area 
- Lift immediately stopped 
- Liftie at loading area directed people to Knoll Ridge Café 
- No staff reaction 
- Saw a staff member doing a sweep down the run 
- T-Bar was stopped quickly 
 
Far West area – Top 
- Groomers were only staff within the area, no response but likely unnecessary as they 
were in a safe area 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 5: BLIND TEST OBSERVATIONS 
Blind Test Observations of Staff – October 12th, 2005 
 
Top of the Bruce 
- A few staff around, some went to the lifts but didn’t address the public 
- Outside rental area, staff gave clear instructions 
- Asked staff inside LBC what was happening, the staff explained what a lahar was and told 
them to stay as the TOB is a safe zone 
- Two staff were present, told people at the table what was happening (warning, lahars, etc), 
said this is a safe zone 
- Inside Rentals area, staff kept serving customers 
- Rental staff told customers they are just doing another test 
- Most staff stayed where they were. Trail Safety staff and Customer Service manager were 
outside in the plaza explaining to people to stay where they were 
- Road Services staff told her to stay put, and stopped cars at the loop 
 
Hutt Flat 
- Snow School Instructors had delayed reactions, but were eventually efficient at moving 
groups up the ridge and could hear several answering customers questions 
- Staff offloading the Centennial chair kept offloading, but didn’t tell customers anything 
- Waterfall Express lifties could not be seen, but heard chairlift speed up instantly 
- Staff were good and did the right thing 
- Staff talked to the public to let them know it was a test 
 
Rockgarden 
- Staff knew what to do 
 
Waterfall Express Chair 
- Lift initially stopped then started again moving faster 
- Only one lift operator was present at off-loading area, not enough to assist skiers as many 
were falling trying to get off lifts in a hurry. Customers told to move towards Knoll Ridge 
Café 
- Chair was speed up, then staff directed everyone to café 
- Chair speed up, reached top quickly, directed to Knoll Ridge café 
- At Drive Station, staff went to phone to confirm and held everyone back, stopped loading 
- Staff member was skiing down and didn’t say anything 
 
Knoll Ridge Café – Outside 
- Ski School told customers to stay 
- Staff were good, helped children who were alarmed by siren 
- No reaction from staff 
- RAL informed people it was a test 
 
Knoll Ridge Café – Inside 
- Staff instructed public to stay where you are 
- Staff had a hard time hearing alarm inside the building 
- No staff did anything 
- No response from staff 
- No staff in Knoll Ridge café appeared to hear the warning 
- No staff reaction 
- No staff reaction 
- No staff reaction, likely didn’t hear alarm 
- No response 
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Knoll Ridge T-Bar 
- Staff good, moved people to higher ground, acted like alarm was real 
- There was a skidoo with one person who was checking the speakers, customer asked what 
was happening and were told it was a drill 
- Staff member told customers to get to higher ground 
- Liftie at bottom of T-Bar directed public towards Knoll Ridge café and stopped the T-Bar 
- T-Bar stopped 
- Ski Patrol carried on 
- Didn’t load anyone once alarm went off, then ran the lift so last 4 T’s could get up back to 
Knoll Ridge Café 
- Staff member tried to alert and explain to public what was happening, but the alarm was 
too loud 
 
Waterfall T-Bar Area 
- Staff had a good response, well organized 
- Ski Patrol were very quick and gave clear precise instructions 
- Liftie did really good job instructing public 
- Ski Patroller told people to go to higher ground, staff gave good instructions 
- At drive station, staff acted appropriately telling people to move to higher ground 
- At offload, a staff member was telling people to go to the Knoll Ridge café 
- Went 1/3 of the way up the T-Bar before it stopped 
- At drive station, liftie took 30 sec. to react, likely because he couldn’t initially hear alarm 
- Ski Patroller arrived at area 4 minutes after siren after completing a sweep 
 
Valley T-Bar 
- Ski Instructor gave clear instructions to his clients and they moved directly off area 
- T-Bar stopped immediately, staff turned off lift immediately 
- Staff near drive station told people to move down valley and wait on ridge 
- Ski Patrol came down the run asking people to move out of the valley 
- Ski Patroller pointed everyone to higher ground, told them to follow him 
- T-Bar stopped a little bit after alarm sounded 
 
Far West area - Top 
- two staff at top of T-Bar told people it was a lahar warning and to ski to the café and wait 
there. The one staff member at the café was unsure of what to do 
- Ski Patrol staff member was seen on a skidoo going down the run 
- Ski Patroller directing people back east 
 
Far West area – Bottom 
- Staff stopped lift, instructed customers to get out of valleys  
- one customer went the wrong way, lift operator called him back to the lift area 
- Very good response, although nobody was around as the lift was closed a the time 
- Liftie staff in loading area reacted well, telling people to get to higher ground 
- staff sped up chair and acted in calm manner telling everyone to go to café in clear loud 
voices 
- Many customers queried staff as to whether it was a test or not 
 
Communication Comments 
- Was listening to Ski Patrol radio and about 5 minutes before alarm, a patroller said ‘so 
should we assign sweep positions for the warning’, and another Ski Patrol member said 
‘ok’ and began assigning positions. This kind of defeats the purpose of a blind test 
- However, after this, Ski Patrol seemed to have a good response at carrying out 
sweeps, with the head Ski Patroller reassuring Ski Patrollers that they were 
responding to a ‘real’ alarm, explained what patrol should do, and organized 
sweeps 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 6: INTERVIEW CODES 
These themes and sub-categories (sub-themes) were used to pull similar ideas from the interview 
data. The number in brackets behind each sub-category indicates how many times this sub-category 
was mentioned in total in all the interviews combined.  
 
1. Daily jobs 
a. Training (67) 
b. Tasks (78) 
c. Customer service (10) 
d. Daily hazards (38) 
2. Lahar training 
a. RAL training (141) 
b. Common sense (10) 
c. Forget (11) 
d. Never attended (12) 
e. CIMS (18) 
3. Awareness/Knowledge 
a. Personal experience (58) 
b. Reliance on second hand/expert knowledge (50) 
c. Public education (85) 
d. Over-educated (1) 
e. Inexperience (19) 
4. Past events 
a. Knowledge of 1995/96 eruptions (64) 
b. Past damage (25) 
c. People’s reaction (10) 
d. Experience (22) 
5. Eruption event 
a. Unpredictability (21) 
b. Interest/curiosity (15) 
c. Uniqueness (4) 
d. Acceptance (23) 
e. No control (20) 
f. Different style eruption (30) 
g. Hazards (61) 
h. Warning time (22) 
i. Uncertainty (65) 
j. Crater Rim failure (17) 
6. Lahars 
a. Uncertainty (28) 
b. Effect (20) 
c. Knowledge (65) 
7. Warning system 
a. Knowledge (39) 
b. Concern (10) 
c. Uncertainty (28) 
8. Tests 
a. False alarm (22) 
b. Blind test (21) 
c. Simulation (39) 
d. Loss of urgency (30) 
e. Importance (12) 
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9. Procedure/response to eruption 
a. Knowledge of actions (212) 
b. Plan (39) 
c. Efficiency (30) 
d. Safety (42) 
e. Concern (62) 
10. Evacuation 
a. Uncertainty (61) 
b. Concerns (26) 
c. Efficiency (24) 
d. Procedure (51) 
11. Responsibility 
a. Staff (12) 
b. Managers/supervisors (48)  
c. Public (0) 
d. DoC (24) 
e. Safety Services (49) 
12. Communication 
a. Method (111) 
b. Instructions/Information (130) 
13. Stressors 
a. Job loss (23) 
b. Closure (40) 
c. Damage (lifts, buildings) (43) 
d. Public reaction (74) 
e. People scared away (11) 
f. Road problems (19) 
g. Finding people (23) 
h. High number of customers on ski area (34) 
i. People isolated by lahar (15) 
j. Waiting for instructions (4) 
k. Out-of-bounds skiers (6) 
14. Consequences 
a. Death (42) 
b. Injury (17) 
15. Coping 
a. Individual (14) 
b. Debriefing (13) 
c. Counselling (30) 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 7: WHAKAPAPA AND TUROA SKI AREA MAPS AND BASE AREA 
LAYOUTS 
 
 
 
Whakapapa Base Area 
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Whakapapa Trail Map 
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Turoa Base Area 
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Turoa Trail Map 
 
